CEDH · PRESS;FORTHCOMINGHEARINGS;ENG — 22 mai 2006

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Royaume-Uni (no. 543/03)   The applicant, Mark McKay is a British citizen, born in 1983 and living in Bangor, Northern Ireland.     On 6 January 2001, at 10 p.m., he was arrested on suspicion of having carried out a robbery of a petrol station in Bangor, County Down. On 7 January 2001, he admitted being responsible for the robbery and was charged.   On 8 January 2001 the applicant made his first appearance in the magistrates’ court, where he instructed his solicitors to make an application for his release on bail. The police officer gave evidence to the court stating that the robbery was not connected with terrorism and that, subject to the proper conditions, he would have no objection to bail.   The sitting resident magistrate refused the application, indicating that the offence was a scheduled offence and that he therefore did not have the power to order release (under section 67(2) of the Terrorism Act 2000 and section 3(2) of the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1996).   On 8 January 2001, the applicant applied to the High Court for bail. On 9   January 2001, the High Court heard and granted his application.   On 12 April 2001, the applicant pleaded guilty in the Crown Court to an offence of robbery and was sentenced to two years’ detention in a young offenders’ institution, followed by a year of probation.   The applicant applied unsuccessfully for judicial review seeking a declaration that the legislation in question was incompatible with Articles 5 § 3 (right to liberty and security) and 14 (prohibition of discrimination) of the European Convention on Human Rights.   The applicant complains that people charged with scheduled offences cannot apply for bail before the magistrates' court; they are required to make an application to the High Court and it may be up to four days later before their application is heard. He maintains that this is in breach of Article 5 as it separates the power to grant bail from the court before which an accused person is brought and leaves the accused person to seek bail elsewhere.   On 17 January 2006 the Chamber to which the case was assigned relinquished jurisdiction to the Grand Chamber in accordance with Article 30 of the Convention.     Thursday 15 June 2006   Chamber       Hearing on the admissibility and merits 9 a.m.   Staroszczyk v. Poland (no. 59519/00) &     Sialowska v. Poland (no. 8932/05)   Staroszczyk The applicants, Marianna Staroszczyk and Stanisław Staroszczyk, are Polish nationals, who were born in 1932 and 1933 respectively and live in Warsaw.   In 1982 they were informed that a plot of land they owned, in Pruszków, near Warsaw, was to be expropriated to build a number of new homes. They requested compensation in the form of another plot of land. Their son also filed a request asking that a plot of land be allocated to him. By a letter of 16 May 1986 Pruszków City Council informed the applicants that their request could not be granted. In their letters the local authorities confirmed that it would be possible to allocate a plot of land within the Pruszków community to the applicants’ son after the applicants’ land had been expropriated.   Ultimately, the applicants’ land was not expropriated and they sold it to the City Council.   In 1990 the applicants’ son was informed by the City Council that the allocation of plots of land within the community had been conducted illegally and that the entire process was to be reviewed. They subsequently brought unsuccessful proceedings to oblige Pruszków City Council to allot a plot of land to their son. Their action was dismissed.   They appealed and were granted free legal aid. Warsaw Bar Association was requested by the relevant court to appoint a lawyer for the applicants. The first two ex officio lawyers appointed declined to represent the applicants. The third lawyer appointed represented them before the appellate court, which dismissed their appeal.   The applicants were subsequently unable to contact the lawyer to file a cassation appeal, which had to be drafted and signed by a lawyer. They submitted that they went to their ex officio attorney’s law offices on numerous occasions, tried to telephone him and wrote both to him and the bar association. The applicants submit that they finally managed to meet their lawyer on 27   January 2000, when they were informed that there were no grounds for filing a cassation appeal in their case. They also claim that their lawyer asked them to sign declarations that they had not wished to pursue their case before the Supreme Court.   The applicants complain that they were denied effective access to a court, as the lawyer appointed under the applicable legal aid scheme failed to undertake the necessary steps to lodge a cassation appeal. They also maintain that the domestic courts violated the principle of equality of arms as their submissions were not properly recorded and the State Treasury was clearly favoured. They further allege that they were misled into selling their property. They rely on Article 6 § 1 (right to a fair hearing) and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (protection of property).   Sialowska The applicant, Krystyna Siałkowska, is a Polish national who was born in 1950 and lives in Wrocław.   Following her husband’s death in December 2002 she brought proceedings for the grant of a widow’s pension. However, her claim was dismissed by the courts, which upheld the Pension Fund’s findings, namely that, though still married to her husband, the applicant had been separated from him since 1994 when he had left her to set up home with another woman, she had not received any maintenance payments from her husband, had not nursed him during his illness and had only learned of his ill health in March 2002. The courts rejected the only evidence that the marriage had continued until the death of the applicant's husband and concluded that the applicant did not satisfy the statutory conditions that would have entitled her to a pension.   A lawyer was assigned to assist the applicant with an appeal to the Supreme Court. However, he refused to lodge an appeal after explaining to her in a legal opinion why he considered that an appeal would be inadmissible. The applicant maintains that the lawyer only informed her of his decision not to lodge an appeal at a meeting in his office after the statutory time-limit for lodging an appeal had expired.   Relying on Article 6 of the Convention, the applicant complains of the domestic courts’ factual findings and assessment of the oral evidence. She also contests the outcome of the proceedings. She further alleges that her lawyer’s refusal to lodge the appeal had deprived her of access to the Supreme Court.     Tuesday 20 June 2006   Chamber   9 a.m.   Evaldsson and Others v. Sweden (no. 75252/01)   Hearing on the merits   The applicants are Tommy Evaldsson, Johan Svahn, Tonnie Hodell, Jonny Lindqvist and Conny Brandt, all Swedish nationals, born in 1948, 1974, 1965, 1964 and 1963 respectively.   The individual applicants were employed by the construction company LK Mässinteriör AB from 3 March to 30   July 1999.   The company was bound by a collective labour agreement, the Construction Agreement ( Byggnads-avtalet ), concluded between the Swedish Building Workers’ Union ( Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet) (the Union) and Swedish Construction Industries ( Sveriges Byggindustrier .   At the relevant time, eight employees in the company carried out work covered by the labour agreement. Three of those workers were members of the Union whereas the five individual applicants were not members of the Union or of any other trade union.   Under the collective agreement, as it stood at the relevant time, the local union branch had the right to monitor certain salary payments and to be reimbursed for the costs involved on the basis of a fee of 1.5 per cent of the worker’s salary. The employer was obliged to deduct that amount from the worker’s salary and to supply the local branch with the information it needed for monitoring work. Only workers belonging to another union were exempt from those deductions.   On 22 May 1991 the company and local union concluded an agreement concerning the monitoring work, which specified that it was the company’s responsibility to provide the relevant information and to deduct the fees from its workers’ salaries.   The individual applicants asked to be exempted from those deductions. The company complied with their requests, stopped paying the fees to the Union or providing the agreed information concerning the applicants. The union insisted on payment and initiated formal local negotiations. However, no solution was reached.   The Industries eventually brought the case before the Labour Court ( Arbetsdomstolen ), seeking a declaratory judgment to the effect that the company was not obliged to levy the fees in question. On 7 March 2001, the Labour Court rejected the Industries’ claims.   The applicants maintain that they were forced to contribute to the financing of a union’s general activities against their will and in a manner comparable to a union member, which was tantamount to forced membership of the union. They also allege that they suffered discrimination compared both to members of the Union and members of other trade unions. They rely on Article 11 (freedom of association), Article 9 (freedom of thought and conscience), Article 10 (freedom of expression), Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (protection of property).   Wednesday 21 June 2006   Grand Chamber   9 a.m.   Association S.O.S. Attentats v. France (no. 76642/01)   This case concerns an application lodged by Béatrice Castelanu d'Essenault, a French national who lives in Paris, and an association ‘SOS Attentats, SOS Terrorisme’, whose headquarters are in Paris.   The applicants complain that, following a terrorist attack in 1989 that resulted in the loss of a DC 10 operated by UTA, they have been prevented from bringing criminal proceedings against Colonel Gaddafi and from claiming compensation for their losses by the immunity he enjoys in France on account of his position as a foreign head of state.   On 19 September 1989 an airliner operated by the French airline UTA exploded over the Ténéré desert following a bomb attack in which 170 people, including Ms Castelanu d'Essenault's sister and a number of other French nationals, were killed.   In proceedings instituted in France, six Libyan nationals were committed for trial in the Paris Special Assize Court. These were the head of the Libyan secret service (Colonel Gaddafi's brother-in-law), four members of the Libyan secret service and a civil servant from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who worked at the Libyan Embassy in Brazzaville. On 10 March 1999 the six defendants were convicted in their absence to life imprisonment and ordered to pay compensation to the victims' families.   In June 1999 the applicants lodged a complaint against Colonel Gaddafi, the head of the Libyan State, and sought leave to join the proceedings as civil parties. They alleged complicity in voluntary homicide, the destruction of property by an explosive device causing fatal injury, and conspiracy to undermine public order through intimidation and terror.   The investigating judges ruled that an information could lawfully be laid. Although the Indictment Division of the Paris Court of Appeal noted that an international custom afforded foreign heads of state immunity from prosecution in the courts of another state, it went on to find that the immunity did not apply in the case before it owing to the nature and seriousness of the alleged offences. However, its judgment was quashed by the Court of Cassation in a decision of 13 March 2001 in which it held that the alleged offences did not come within the exceptions to the principle of immunity for foreign heads of state and that there was therefore no ground for investigating the applicants’ complaints.   On 9 January 2004, following protracted negotiations, the association ‘Les familles du DC 10 UTA en colère!’ and the applicant association, both representing families of the victims, concluded an agreement with the ‘Gaddafi World Foundation for Charities’ under the terms of which the families were to receive one million US dollars in consideration for waiving their right to bring “civil or criminal proceedings in any French or international court on account of the explosion aboard the aircraft” and the applicant association agreed “not to take any hostile action or to lodge any complaint against Libya or Libyan natural or juristic persons in connection with the explosion aboard the aircraft”.   Relying on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (right to a fair hearing), the applicants submit that the Court of Cassation's ruling that Colonel Gaddafi was entitled to sovereign immunity infringed their right of access to a court. They also complain under Article 13 (right to an effective remedy) of the lack of an effective remedy.   On 5 January 2006 the Chamber to which the case was assigned relinquished jurisdiction to the Grand Chamber in accordance with Article 30 of the Convention.   Tuesday 27 June 2006   Chamber   2.30 p.m.   Vincent v. France (no. 6253/03) Hearing on the admissibility and merits   The applicant, Olivier Vincent, is a 36 year-old French national who is currently in Villepinte Prison (France). He has been paraplegic since an accident in 1989 and, although autonomous, cannot move around without the aid of a wheelchair.   His application concerns the conditions of his detention and its compatibility with the Convention in view of his physical disability.   On 25 November 2002 the applicant was placed under formal investigation and detained in Nanterre Prison on suspicion of involvement in the abduction of a seven-month old infant. He made various applications for bail that were dismissed. After initially being held in Nanterre Prison, the applicant was subsequently held in Fresnes Prison, Cergy-Pontoise Prison, Meaux-Chauconin Prison and La Santé Prison in Paris.   Since first entering prison, he has made various complaints to domestical and international bodies about his prison conditions.   He alleges that his cell in Nanterre Prison was not designed for wheelchairs and that he had practical difficulties in performing everyday tasks such as using mirrors or cupboards as a result. In addition, a wheelchair he was lent when his own fell into disrepair was not serviceable, so that he had been forced to drag himself across the floor on his hands, for example in order to go to the toilet.   He further complains that in February 2003 he was transferred to Fresnes Prison in a prison van that was not equipped to transport him and that the prison did not have the facilities to house disabled prisoners which meant that he had been unable to take part in sporting or religious activities and had been forced into dependency on others. On one occasion during his stay there, the Paris Court of Appeal had dismissed an appeal he had lodged against a refusal of bail in his absence, after he refused to get out of the prison van in order to protest about its unsuitability. The applicant said that he had lodged a complaint against the doctor who had authorised his transfer after she had told him that she was not “a vet” and did not deal with the “transport of animals”. His complaint is still pending.   The applicant was transferred to Cergy-Pontoise Remand Prison in June 2003. He said that he was unable to gain access to the prison library without assistance and also complained that he had been prevented from having a shower for more than a month after essential alterations to the unit were delayed.   In February 2005 he was transferred to Meaux Prison where he was given an individual cell adapted to his disability and was able to use a lift that enabled him to attend a medical centre on the first floor for medical attention when needed.   Since 21 March 2006 he has been held in Villepinte Prison, where he says that conditions are not suitable for his disability.   The applicant complains under Articles 3 (prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment) and 14 (prohibition of discrimination) that the conditions in which he is being held are not suitable for his disability and that he does not enjoy the same rights as able-bodied prisoners. He further complains under Article 6 (right to a fair hearing) that the proceedings that ended with the dismissal of his appeal against the order for his detention were not fair. He alleges a violation of Article 17 (prohibition of abuse of rights) on account of the fact that a prison van and not an ambulance was used to transport. Under Article 8 (right to respect for correspondence) he complains that a letter from the European Court of Human Rights was opened by the prison authorities. Under Article 9 (freedom of religion) he complains of a violation of his right to observe his religion on the ground that he was prevented from attending the place of worship by a lack of special facilities. Lastly, he complains under Article 13 (right to an effective remedy) that the authorities have failed to reply to his letters complaining of his conditions of detention.     Wednesday 28 June 2006   Grand Chamber   9 a.m.   Anheuser-Busch Inc v. Portugal (no. 73049/01) The case concerns an application brought by a company, Anheuser-Busch Inc., which is an American public limited company whose registered office is in St Louis (Missouri, United States). It produces beer and sells it under the brand name “Budweiser” in a number of countries around the world.   In 1981 the applicant company applied to the Portuguese National Institute for Industrial Property (INPI) to register “Budweiser” as a trade mark. The INPI did not grant the application immediately because “Budweiser Bier” had already been registered as a designation of origin on behalf of a Czechoslovak company, Budejovicky Budvar. In 1989 the applicant company sought a court order setting aside the registration of that designation, which was granted in 1995, and the INPI subsequently registered the “Budweiser” trade mark.   The Czech company challenged that decision in the Lisbon Court of First Instance, relying on the “1986 Agreement”, a bilateral treaty between Portugal and Czechoslovakia (now applicable in the Czech Republic) which came into force in 1987, protecting registered designations of origin. The Court of First Instance found against it, but the Court of Appeal overturned that decision and ordered the INPI to refuse to register “Budweiser” as a trade mark.   The applicant company appealed to the Supreme Court, which dismissed the appeal in 2001, holding that the designation of origin “Ceskebudejovicky Budvar”, which translated into German as “Budweis” or “Budweiss”, was protected by the 1986 Agreement. The registration of “Budweiser” as a trade mark on behalf of the applicant company was therefore set aside.   Relying on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (protection of property) to the European Convention on Human Rights, the applicant company complained that the application of the 1986 Agreement, which had come into force after it had applied for registration of the “Budweiser” trade mark, had infringed its right to the peaceful enjoyment of its possessions. It argued that, under existing international legal instruments, the right to protection of a trade mark was secured from the date on which the application to register it was made and that it had been deprived of that right without receiving any compensation, despite the fact that there had been no public-interest grounds to justify affording protection to a registered designation of origin on the basis of the treaty between Portugal and Czechoslovakia.   In its Chamber judgment of 11 October 2005 the Court held by five votes to two that there had been no violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.   The case was referred to the Grand Chamber (under Article 43 [1] of the Convention and Rule 73 of the Rules of Court) on 15 February 2006 at the request of the applicant association.   ***   Decisions, judgments and further information about the Court can be found on its Internet site ( http://www.echr.coe.int ).   Press contacts Emma Hellyer (telephone: 00 33 (0)3 90 21 42 15) Stéphanie Klein (telephone: 00 33 (0)3 88 41 21 54) Beverley Jacobs (telephone: 00 33 (0)3 90 21 54 21)   The European Court of Human Rights was set up in Strasbourg by the Council of Europe Member States in 1959 to deal with alleged violations of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights.       [1] Under Article 43 of the European Convention on Human Rights, within three months from the date of a Chamber judgment, any party to the case may, in exceptional cases, request that the case be referred to the 17 ‑ member Grand Chamber of the Court. In that event, a panel of five judges considers whether the case raises a serious question affecting the interpretation or application of the Convention or its protocols, or a serious issue of general importance, in which case the Grand Chamber will deliver a final judgment. If no such question or issue arises, the panel will reject the request, at which point the judgment becomes final. Otherwise Chamber judgments become final on the expiry of the three-month period or earlier if the parties declare that they do not intend to make a request to refer