CEDH · PRESS;CHAMBERJUDGMENTS;ENG — 5 juillet 2005

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s40F41F73 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s7ED160F0 { text-decoration:none } .s653E6C45 { font-family:Arial; font-size:6.67pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } .s4DDA3AA3 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic } .sDF26EFCC { width:26.76pt; display:inline-block } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .s23C4D561 { width:163.51pt; display:inline-block } .s6E6905B9 { width:31.46pt; display:inline-block } .s9793A85B { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt } .s78C65442 { width:130.14pt; display:inline-block } .s36D07EA { width:103.49pt; display:inline-block } .s37CDBE05 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s1F5805B3 { width:315.32pt; display:inline-block } .s5CB28A0E { width:116.57pt; display:inline-block } .s33165EBA { font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } .sC70B85C6 { width:24.78pt; display:inline-block } .s6C8591A { width:13.22pt; display:inline-block } .sADADF4A7 { font-family:Arial; text-decoration:underline } .sCB9E0544 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:left } .s9F8EB0C0 { width:18.63pt; display:inline-block } .s9E97F54A { width:85.05pt; display:inline-block } .sF6A12959 { width:33%; height:1px; text-align:left } .s2EB42ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt } EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS   376 5.7.2005   Press release issued by the Registrar   Chamber judgments concerning the Czech Republic, France, Finland, Hungary, the   Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and the Ukraine   The European Court of Human Rights has today notified in writing the following ten Chamber judgments, of which only the friendly-settlement judgments are final [1] .   A repetitive case (in which the Court has reached the same findings as in similar cases raising the same issues under the European Convention on Human Rights) can be found at the end of this press release.   Exel v. the Czech Republic (application no 48962/99)   Violation of Article 6 § 1 The applicant, Ivo Exel, is a Czech national who was born in 1955 and lives in Slavičín-Divnice (Czech Republic).   On 26 February 1993 he entered into an agreement with the National Property Fund for the purchase of part of an arms factory which the State had decided to nationalise. On an application by the Fund, the applicant was declared bankrupt by a commercial court, which appointed a judicial administrator. The decision was upheld on appeal by the Prague High Court and a subsequent appeal on points of law by the applicant was dismissed.   The applicant lodged a series of constitutional appeals arguing, inter alia , that the bankruptcy proceedings had not been held in public. All these appeals were dismissed.   The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (right to a fair hearing) that the proceedings had been unfair as he had not been given a hearing in public before an independent and impartial court.   In the circumstances of the case before it, the Court found that the applicant had not unequivocally waived his right to a hearing in public before the High Court. There was no need to examine whether the case raised issues of public interest that would have made a hearing in public necessary.   The Court noted that the financial repercussions of the bankruptcy order on the applicant had been considerable and his rights had subsequently been limited by the appointment of the judicial administrator. In addition, there had been a degree of complexity to the legal issues. Accordingly, a hearing would have been both advisable and helpful.   However, the Court found that no hearing had been necessary before the Court of Cassation, whose decision had been confined to the issue of the admissibility of the appeal on points of law. The same applied to the Constitutional Court, in which the proceedings concerned only constitutional issues that did not entail a complete, direct assessment of the applicant’s rights.   Consequently, the Court held unanimously that there had been a violation of Article 6 § 1 on account of the lack of a hearing in public before the commercial court and the High Court. It considered that the finding of a violation constituted in itself sufficient just satisfaction for the non-pecuniary damage sustained by the applicant. (The judgment is available only in French.)   Ivanoff v. Finland (no. 48999/99)   Friendly settlement The applicant, Leevi Ivanoff, is a Finnish national who was born in 1942 and lives in Helsinki.   On 13 October 1997 the applicant was convicted of aggravated vandalism and aggravated fraud and given a one-year suspended prison sentence for deliberately setting fire to a snack bar he had run with his wife and claiming compensation from an insurance company. He appealed, asking for an oral hearing and an expert opinion on the reasons why the snack bar had caught fire.   The subsequent hearing before the Court of Appeal on 20 May 1998 dealt only with the fire which had started in the storage room of the snack bar (“fire 2”); another fire (“fire 1”) had started in the area where the snacks were prepared. The applicant was refused permission to call witnesses who could, he claimed, give evidence about “fire 1” and about the reasons why the snack bar had caught fire and how the fire had then spread to the whole building.   According to the applicant, statements made by the prosecution witnesses concerning “fire 1” as well as the reasons why the snack bar had caught fire were accepted by the court. According to the Finnish Government, no such evidence was given before the Court of Appeal.   On 13 August 1998 the Court of Appeal turned down the applicant’s request for an expert opinion and upheld his conviction.     Leave to appeal was refused.   The applicant relied, among other things, on Article 6 § 1 (right to a fair hearing) and Article 6 § 3 (d) (right to obtain attendance and examination of witnesses).   The case has been struck out following a friendly settlement in which EUR 4,000 is to be paid for any pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage and for costs and expenses. (The judgment is available only in English.)   Lomaseita Oy and Others v. Finland (no. 45029/98)   Violation of Article 6 § 1 The applicant, Kaisaleena Laaksonen, is a Finnish national who was born in 1947 and lives in Espoo (Finland). She at least partly owned the two applicant companies, Lomaseita Oy and CPT Data Oy, which are both limited liability companies.   In 1987, Kaisaleena Laaksonen co-founded a company called CPT Informations Systems Oy (“CPT IS”). On 20 October 1993 the company was ordered to be wound-up.   The official receiver of the estate of CPT IS, instituted civil proceedings against Kaisaleena Laaksonen and the applicant companies and requested that assets allegedly transferred from CPT IS to the applicants before the winding-up order was issued be returned to its estate. On 31 January 1996, the District Court found in favour of the estate in so far as the Kaisaleena Laaksonen was concerned and partly in favour of the estate insofar as the applicant companies were concerned.   The parties to the proceedings appealed. After the relevant time-limit for appeal had elapsed, the estate on two occasions in August 1997 submitted additional documentary material, including a police report, to the Court of Appeal, requesting that it be taken into account. On 23 December 1997 the Court of Appeal found in favour of the estate, stating that the additional material had not been taken into consideration.   On 18 June 1998 the Supreme Court refused the applicants leave to appeal. Having received the Supreme Court's decision, the applicants’ representative at the time requested copies of all the relevant documents from the Court of Appeal. He found out that the judicial secretary of the Court of Appeal had in fact made a substantial number of remarks about the additional documentary material.   On 30 November 1998, the applicants requested that the Supreme Court reopen the proceedings, claiming that they had been denied a fair trial before the Court of Appeal as the estate’s submissions – which had clearly been relevant and which had been taken into account even though there was a statement to the contrary in the Court of Appeal's judgment – had not been communicated to them. They also noted that it appeared from the invoice concerning the estate’s legal costs included in the court file, that the official receiver had consulted the Court of Appeal’s judicial secretary several times during the proceedings and that they had not been informed of any such discussions.   On 31 January 2001 the Supreme Court refused to reopen the proceedings.   The applicants complained that the proceedings were unfair, in particular because the Court of Appeal failed to communicate to them the additional material submitted by the other party to the proceedings and to inform them about discussions between the representative of the other party and the judicial secretary of the Court of Appeal. They relied on Article 6 § 1 (right to a fair hearing).   The European Court of Human Rights observed that documentary material appeared to have been studied in connection with the preparation of the case before the Court of Appeal, despite the expiry of the relevant time-limit, which was not communicated to the applicants. The Court considered that the material was of relevance for all three applicants   The Court reiterated that only the parties could properly decide whether or not the submissions called for their comments.   The representative of the estate expressed his opinion on the relevance of the supplementary police report and the additional legal submission to the Court of Appeal, thereby intending to influence the court’s judgment. The Court considered that procedural fairness required that the applicants should also have been given an opportunity to assess the relevance and weight of the material and to formulate any such comment on it as they deemed appropriate. In the light of those considerations, the Court found that the procedure did not enable the applicants to participate properly and in conformity with the principle of equality of arms in the proceedings before the Court of Appeal. The Court therefore held, unanimously, that there had been a violation of Article 6 § 1 concerning the failure to communicate to the applicants the material that the other party submitted to the Court of Appeal. The Court also found that no separate issue arose concerning the applicants’ complaint that they were not informed of discussions between the judicial secretary and the estate’s representative.   The Court awarded Kaisaleena Laaksonen EUR 2,000 for non-pecuniary damage and awarded CPT Data Oy EUR 4,000 for costs and expenses. (The judgment is available only in English.)   Osváth v. Hungary (no. 20723/02)   Violation of Article 5 § 4 The applicant, Lászlo Osváth, is a Hungarian national who was born in 1949 and lives in Budapest.   Criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant on a charge of misappropriation and, on 23 May 2001, the National Police Department ordered his 72-hour arrest. In the ensuing proceedings he was assisted by defence counsel of his choice.   On 24 May 2001 the Budapest Regional Public Prosecutor’s Office lodged an application for the applicant’s detention on remand. On 25   May 2001 the district court heard the applicant and ordered his detention on remand until 25 June 2001. The court subsequently prolonged his detention until 25   August   2001, then until 25 October and 25 December 2001, each time on the basis of applications from the public prosecutor’s office. Neither the applicant nor his defence counsel had been notified of those applications before the decisions were taken.   On 18 December 2001 the Supreme Court decided in camera to prolong the applicant’s detention until 25 April 2002.   On 1 March 2002 the public prosecutor’s office ordered the applicant’s release.   The applicant alleged that, when his pre-trial detention was prolonged, he did not benefit from an adversarial procedure, in breach of Article 5 § 4 (right to liberty and security).   The European Court of Human Rights observed that the applicant’s pre-trial detention was repeatedly prolonged without him having been served in advance with copies of the prosecution’s applications. The Court considered that, even if the applicant were able to appear in person or be represented at the court hearings concerning his detention, that possibility was not sufficient to afford him a proper opportunity to comment on the relevant applications. Moreover, the Court noted that the applicant could not appear in person or be represented before the Supreme Court, which decided in camera to prolong his detention on remand. In those circumstances, the Court was satisfied that the applicant did not receive the benefit of a procedure that was really adversarial.   The fact that the Supreme Court prolonged the applicant’s detention on remand on a ground which had not previously been referred to, and was consequently quite unexpected for the applicant, aggravated the absence of an adversarial procedure.   The Court therefore held, unanimously, that there had been a violation of Article 5 § 4 and that the finding of a violation constituted in itself sufficient just satisfaction for the non-pecuniary damage sustained by the applicant. (The judgment is available only in English.)   Üner v. the Netherlands (no. 46410/99)   No violation of Article 8 The applicant, Ziya Üner, is a Turkish national who was born in 1969 and lives in Eskişehir, (Turkey).   The applicant came to the Netherlands with his mother and two brothers in 1981, when he was 12 years old to join his father. He was granted a residence permit ( vergunning tot verblijf ) which was valid for one year at a time, and, in 1988, he obtained a permanent residence permit ( vestigingsvergunning ).   Between 1989 and 1992 the applicant was once convicted of breach of the peace and twice of violence against persons.   In or around June 1991 the applicant started living with a Netherlands national. The couple had a son, born on 4 February 1992. The applicant moved out in November 1992, but remained in close contact with both his partner and his son.   The applicant was convicted of manslaughter ( doodslag ) and assault ( zware mishandeling ) on 21   January   1994 and sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment.   While serving his prison sentence, he took various courses. His partner and son visited him in prison at least once a week and regularly more often. A second son was born to the applicant and his partner on 26   June 1996, whom he also saw every week. Both his children have Netherlands nationality and have been recognised ( erkend ) by the applicant. Neither his partner nor his children speak Turkish.   By decision of 30   January 1997, the Deputy Minister of Justice ( Staatssecretaris van Justitie ) withdrew the applicant’s permanent residence permit and imposed a ten-year exclusion order ( ongewenstverklaring ) on him in view of his conviction of 21   January 1994. The applicant lodged an objection, which was rejected. He also appealed unsuccessfully.   The applicant was deported to Turkey on 11   February 1998. However, it appeared that he returned to the Netherlands soon afterwards and was once more deported to Turkey on 4 June 1998. He again appealed unsuccessfully.   The applicant complained that, as a result of the withdrawal of his residence permit and the imposition of a ten-year exclusion order, he had been separated from his wife and two children, who are Netherlands citizens and cannot be expected to follow him to Turkey. He relied on Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life).   The European Court of Human Rights noted that the expulsion order against the applicant constituted an interference with the applicant’s right to respect for his family life and that the interference was in accordance with Netherlands law and pursued legitimate aims, namely public safety and the prevention of disorder or crime.   Concerning whether the interference was “necessary in a democratic society”, the Court observed that in 1994 the applicant was convicted of manslaughter and assault. There could be no doubt that those acts constituted particularly serious, violent offences, whose gravity was also reflected in the severity of the punishment imposed on the applicant: seven years’ imprisonment. Neither was that the applicant’s first conviction. In 1989, only eight years after his arrival in the Netherlands, he had been convicted of a public-order offence. One year later, and then again in 1992, he was convicted of violent offences. Against that background, the Court was satisfied that there was a legitimate basis for assuming that the applicant constituted a danger to public order and security.   As to the applicant’s conduct since the offences were committed, the Court considered that no information relating to the applicant’s behaviour following his release had been made available from which it could be deduced that the fears that he constituted a danger to public order and security for the future had been mitigated. On the contrary, the Court observed that, notwithstanding the fact that an exclusion order had been imposed on him, the applicant returned to the Netherlands soon after having been deported from that country in contravention of immigration rules.   At the time of the decision of 30 January 1997 to withdraw his residence permit and to impose an exclusion order on him, the applicant had been lawfully resident in the Netherlands for 16 years, having moved to that country at a relatively young age (12). His close relatives had thus also been residing in the Netherlands for a long time. Even so, the Court reiterated that family ties between adults did not necessarily attract the protection of Article 8. The Court was furthermore not persuaded that the applicant had become so estranged from the country where he spent the first 12 years of his life that he would no longer be able to settle in Turkey. It also attached no relevance to his claim, made in the domestic proceedings, that he spoke little or no Turkish, having regard to the fact that he was assisted by an interpreter at the hearing before the Advisory Board on Matters Concerning Aliens.   Although the Court accepted that moving to Turkey might entail a certain level of social hardship for the applicant’s partner and his children, it found no indication that there were any insurmountable obstacles for them to settle with him in Turkey.   In that context the Court further noted that, when the exclusion order became final, the applicant’s children were still very young   – six and one and a half years old respectively   – and so of an adaptable age. In addition, only one of the children actually lived with the applicant, and that was for a relatively short time, when the child was six months old. Therefore, if the applicant’s partner were to decide to stay in the Netherlands with the children, the disruption of their family life would not have the same impact as it would if they had been living together as a family for a much longer time.   Finally, the Court had also taken into account the fact that the exclusion order was not of unlimited duration.   In the circumstances of the applicant’s case, the Netherlands State could not be said to have failed to strike a fair balance between the applicant’s interests on the one hand and its own interest in preventing disorder or crime on the other. The Court therefore held, by six votes to one, that there had been no violation of Article 8. (The judgment is available only in English.)     Violation of Article 6 § 1 Turczanik v. Poland (no. 38064/97)   No violation of Article 13 The applicant, Bronisław Turczanik, is a Polish national who was born in 1934 and lives in Wrocław (Poland).   On 25 November 1983 the Wrocław Regional Bar Council registered the applicant on its list of practising lawyers, but refused to register his office address as he had not joined a law firm ( zespół adwokacki ). The National Bar Council dismissed an appeal by the applicant, citing in its decision a lack of places and a policy of giving priority to trainee lawyers. On an appeal by the applicant, the Supreme Administrative Court set both decisions aside and gave directions regarding the registration of lawyers’ office addresses.   The National Bar Council then registered the applicant as practising in Trzebnica (approximately 25 kilometres from Wrocław), and gave him permission to live outside the area in which he was registered as practising. In a judgment of August 1998 the Supreme Administrative Court set that decision aside on the ground that the Bar Council had failed to comply with its directions.   On 21 April 1999 Regional Bar Council finally registered the applicant as practising in Wrocław.   The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (right to a fair hearing within a reasonable time) of the length of the proceedings. He further submitted that he had not had an effective remedy to enable him to compel the Bar Council to comply with the Supreme Administrative Court’s decisions and to reduce the delays.   The Court found that the proceedings, which had begun with the Regional Bar Council’s registration of the applicant and had ended with its registration of his office address, had taken approximately 15 years and five months. However, the Court could only take into account the period of approximately six years that had begun on 1 May 1993, when Poland recognised the right of individual application. In the light of those circumstances, the Court found a failure to comply with the “reasonable-time” requirement. It accordingly held unanimously that there had been violation of Article 6 § 1.   The Court noted that the Bar Council had shown a clear intention to disregard a decision by a competent higher judicial authority. There could be no justification for such dilatory conduct, which had deprived the applicant of effective protection. Consequently, the Court unanimously held that there had also been a violation of Article 6 § 1 on account of the applicant’s inability to secure compliance with the Supreme Administrative Court’s directions.   The Court decided to examine the complaint of the lack of a remedy for the delays under Article 13. On the basis of previous decisions in which it had held that the Polish legal system afforded remedies for delays in administrative proceedings, the Court held unanimously that there had been no violation of Article 13.   The Court awarded Mr Turczanik EUR 7,500 for non-pecuniary damage and EUR 40 for costs and expenses. (The judgment is available only in French.)     Moldovan and Others v. Romania (nos. 41138/98 and 64320/01) Friendly settlement The case concerns 25 Romanian nationals of Roma origin. At the material time, they lived in Hădăreni in Romania.   In September 1993 a row broke out between three Roma men and another villager in Hădăreni that led to the death of the latter’s son who had tried to intervene. The three men fled to a nearby house. A large, angry crowd gathered outside, including the local police commander and several officers. The house was set on fire. Two of the men managed to escape from the house, but were pursued by the crowd and beaten to death. The third was prevented from leaving the building and died in the fire. The applicants alleged that the police had encouraged the crowd to destroy more Roma property in the village. By the following day, 13 Roma houses had been completely destroyed and several more had been very badly damaged. Much of the applicants’ personal property was also destroyed.   In the aftermath of the incident the Roma residents of Hădăreni lodged a criminal complaint with the Prosecutors’ Office.     In September 1995 all charges against the local police officers were dropped.   On 17 July 1998 five villagers were convicted of extremely serious murder and 12 villagers, including the former five, were convicted of other offences. The court sentenced them to between one and seven years’ imprisonment. The appellate court convicted a sixth villager of extremely serious murder and increased the sentence of one of the defendants; the other defendants had their sentences reduced. In November 1999 the Supreme Court upheld the convictions for the destruction of property but reduced the charge of extremely serious murder to one of serious murder for three of the defendants.     In 2000 two of the convicted villagers received a presidential pardon.   Shortly after the attack on Roma property, the Romanian Government allocated 25,000,000 Romanian lei (ROL) [2] for the reconstruction of the houses damaged or destroyed. Only four houses were rebuilt with these funds. In November 1994 the Government allocated a further ROL 32,000,000 [3] and four more houses were rebuilt. The applicants have submitted photographs to show that those houses were very badly rebuilt.   Three houses have not been rebuilt to date.   Certain applicants were awarded pecuniary damages for houses which had not or which had only partly been rebuilt and maintenance allowances for the children of the Roma killed during the riots. The applicants’ claims for loss of personal property and for non-pecuniary damages were all dismissed as unsubstantiated. Subsequently, on 24 February 2004 the applicants were awarded non-pecuniary damages.   The applicants submitted that in general, following the events of September 1993, they were forced to live in hen-houses, pigsties, windowless cellars or in extremely cold, over-crowded and deplorable conditions, which lasted for several years and in some cases were still continuing. As a result, many applicants and their families fell ill. The illnesses contracted included: hepatitis, a heart condition (leading to a fatal heart attack), diabetes, and meningitis. The applicants relied on Articles 3 (prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment), 6   §   1 (right to a fair trial), 8 (right to respect for private and family life) and 14 (prohibition of discrimination).   The case has been struck out, in so far as it concerns 18 of the applicants, following a friendly settlement in which a total of EUR 262,000 (individual awards ranging from EUR 11,000 to EUR 28,000) is to be paid for any pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage and for costs and expenses. The Court also decided, unanimously, to adjourn the case concerning the remaining seven applicants. (The judgment is available only in English.)     Krumpel and Krumpelová v. Slovakia (no. 56195/00)   Violation of Article 6 § 1 The applicants, Ondrej Krumpel and Anna Krumpelová, are Slovakian nationals who were born in 1935 and 1938 respectively and live in Bratislava.   In 1990 the applicants paid 600,000 Slovakian   korunas (SKK) to M, the owner of a building company for a plot of land and a family home, which was to be built.   M. failed to comply with the contract.   On 5 February 1991 the applicants sued M’s company. The proceedings were discontinued, however, because the applicants had not paid the court fee.   In 1991 criminal proceedings were brought against M,. as he was suspected of fraud. The applicants declared that they wished to claim damages from M. in the context of the criminal proceedings as they believed that they had a better prospect of actually recovering the sum in question.   On 24 November 2004 Bratislava Regional Court convicted M.   in proceedings concerning charges which were not related to the applicants’ claim. He was sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment and ordered to pay SKK 58 million to the Ministry of Finance. The proceedings are currently pending. Bratislava Regional Court is expected to start determining the remaining charges against M. (which concern fraud in respect of more than 20 individuals including the applicants) in the course of 2005.   The applicants complained about the length of the criminal proceedings to which they were parties, relying on Article 6 § 1 (right to a fair hearing within a reasonable time). The period to be taken into consideration began only on 18   March   1992, when the recognition by the former Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, to which Slovakia is one of the successor States, of the right of individual petition took effect. The period in question has not yet ended. It has therefore lasted 13 years and more than two months.   Having examined all the material submitted to it and having regard to its case-law on the subject, the European Court of Human Rights Court considered that the length of the proceedings was excessive and failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement. The Court therefore held unanimously that there had been a violation of Article 6 § 1 and awarded the applicants EUR 10,000 for non-pecuniary damage. (The judgment is available only in English.)       Violation of Article 6 § 1 Agrotehservis v. Ukraine (no. 62608/00)   Violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 The applicant, Agrotehservis, is a Latvian-Ukrainian joint venture based in Riga.   On 13   May   1992, under the intergovernmental agreement of 21   April   1992 between the Republic of Latvia and Ukraine, the applicant concluded a contract with the Kherson Refinery, which was later transformed into the “Khersonnaftopererobka” Joint-Stock Company (hereinafter “the Refinery”). Under the contract the applicant was to supply oil to the Refinery and the latter had to provide it with oil products in return.   On 10   December   1996 the applicant lodged a claim with the Highest Arbitration Court of Ukraine ( Вищий арбітражний суд України , hereinafter “the HAC”) against the Refinery for failing to honour the contract.   On 10   April   1998 the HAC found for the applicant. The court established that in June 1992 the applicant had supplied 60,000 tonnes of oil to the defendant and was to receive 17,852 tonnes of oil products from the defendant in return. As the oil products had not been supplied, the HAC awarded them to the applicant. The court also awarded the applicant UAH 10,000 in legal costs.   In August 1998 the applicant lodged a claim with the HAC to change the manner of enforcement of the judgment of 10   April   1998. On 26   August   1998 the court allowed the claim and ordered the Refinery to pay the applicant UAH   7,011,186 [4] in lieu of the 17,852 tonnes of oil products.   On five occasions between 2   June   1998 and 21 December 1999 the General Prosecutor’s Office of Ukraine ( Генеральна Прокуратура України , “the GPO”) lodged an appeal for supervisory review with the Review Panel of the HAC seeking to quash the judgment of 10   April   1998. The first four appeals were unsuccessful. On 28   January   2000 the Presidium of the HAC allowed the last appeal and quashed the judgment of 10   April   1998.   On 21   January   2002 the Supreme Court of Ukraine quashed the decision of the Presidium of the HAC of 28   January   2000 and confirmed the validity of the judgment of 10   April   1998 given in the applicant’s favour.   The applicant alleged, in particular, that the final and binding judgment given in its favour was quashed in violation of Article 6 § 1 (right to a fair trial) and Article 1 of Protocol No.   1 (protection of property).   In the light of its consistent case-law on this issue, the European Court of Human Rights found that the fact that the applicant’s claims were ultimately satisfied did not by itself remove the effects of the legal uncertainty which the applicant endured for two years after the final judgment of 10   April   1998 was quashed, given that the State did not offer any compensation for the pecuniary or non-pecuniary damage sustained by the applicant.   By using the supervisory review procedure to set aside the judgment of 10 April 1998, the Presidium of the Highest Arbitration Court infringed the principle of legal certainty and the applicant’s “right to a court”. The court therefore held, unanimously, that there had been a violation of Article 6 § 1. The Court recalled that a judgment debt might be regarded as a “possession” for the purposes of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. Furthermore, quashing such a judgment after it had become final and unappealable would constitute an interference with the judgment beneficiary’s right to the peaceful enjoyment of that possession.     However, in the applicant’s case, unreasonable uncertainty was created as to the applicant’s right to the finalised judgment debt because   it was continually challenged by the GPO through the   extraordinary supervisory review procedure between June 1998 and   January 2002. The Court therefore held unanimously that there had been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.   The Court awarded the applicant joint venture EUR 5,000 for non-pecuniary damage. (The judgment is available only in English.)   Repetitive Case   In the following cases the Court has reached the same findings as in similar cases raising the same issues under the Convention:     Marie-Louise Loyen and Another v. France (n° 55929/00) Violation of Article 6 § 1 The applicants are two French nationals, Marie-Louise Loyen and her daughter Sophie Bruneel. Mrs Loyen was born in 1942 and lives in Mouvaux (France) and Mrs Bruneel was born in 1961 and lives in Tourcoing (France).   They complained of procedural unfairness in proceedings which their deceased husband/father had brought in the administrative courts after he was confined to a psychiatric hospital from 1985 to 1987. They argued in particular that the presence of the Government Commissioner at the deliberations of both the administrative court of appeal and the Conseil d’État had infringed Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (right to a fair hearing).   Citing the higher interest of the litigant, who had to have the guarantee that the Government Commissioner would not be able, through his presence at the deliberations, to influence their outcome, the Court held by six votes to one that there had been a violation of Article 6 § 1. It held that the finding of a violation constituted in itself sufficient just satisfaction for the applicants’ alleged non-pecuniary damage and awarded them jointly EUR 500 for costs and expenses. (The judgment is available only in French.)   *** These summaries by the Registry do not bind the Court. The full texts of the Court’s judgments are accessible on its Internet site ( http://www.echr.coe.int ).   Registry of the European Court of Human Rights F – 67075 Strasbourg Cedex Press contacts:   Roderick Liddell (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 24 92)   Emma Hellyer (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 90 21 42 15)   Stéphanie Klein (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 21 54) Fax: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 27 91 The European Court of Human Rights was set up in Strasbourg by the Council of Europe Member States in 1959 to deal with alleged violations of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights. Since 1 November 1998 it has sat as a full-time Court composed of an equal number of judges to that of the States party to the Convention. The Court examines the admissibility and merits of applications submitted to it. It sits in Chambers of 7 judges or, in exceptional cases, as a Grand Chamber of 17 judges. The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe supervises the execution of the Court’s judgments. [1] Under Article 43 of the European Convention on Human Rights, within three months from the date of a Chamber judgment, any party to the case may, in exceptional cases, request that the case be referred to the 17 ‑ member Grand Chamber of the Court. In that event, a panel of five judges considers whether the case raises a serious question affecting the interpretation or application of the Convention or its protocols, or a serious issue of general importance, in which case the Grand Chamber will deliver a final judgment. If no such question or issue arises, the panel will reject the request, at which point the judgment becomes final. Otherwise Chamber judgments become final on the expiry of the three-month period or earlier if the parties declare that they do not intend to make a request to refer. [2] Nowadays this would convert to around 720 euros (EUR) [3] Around 920 EUR [4] .     1,096,598.4544 euros (‘EUR”)