CEDH · CASELAW;CLIN;ENG — 12 avril 2011

.s3ABFC313 { font-size:10pt } .sEB86A30B { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt; page-break-after:avoid } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .sA241FE93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:18pt; text-align:justify; page-break-after:avoid; border-bottom:0.75pt solid #000000; padding-bottom:1pt } .s2EF62ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:12pt } .s4DDA3AA3 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s8F2B0B1B { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:12pt } .s9FF10068 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .s5F48796F { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify } .s5CB9E8AB { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; border-bottom:1pt solid #000000; padding-bottom:1pt } .sDF790F1E { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .s7ED160F0 { text-decoration:none } .s3DC36BA9 { font-family:Arial; text-decoration:underline; color:#0069d6 } Information Note on the Court’s case-law No. 140 April 2011 Hoare v. the United Kingdom (dec.) - 16261/08 Decision 12.4.2011 [Section IV] Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 Article 1 para. 1 of Protocol No. 1 Peaceful enjoyment of possessions Obligation to bear legal costs following reasonably foreseeable change in House of Lords’ interpretation of law on limitation periods: inadmissible   Facts – In 1989 the applicant was convicted of an attempted rape and sentenced to life imprisonment. His victim (Mrs   A) did not sue him for damages at the time because he was impecunious. However, in 2004 the applicant won approximately 7   million pounds sterling (GBP) on the National Lottery and, on learning this news, Mrs   A brought an action for trespass to the person against him. Her claim was dismissed at first instance and on appeal on the grounds that it was time-barred. In reaching that conclusion, the courts considered themselves bound by a decision in an earlier case, Stubbings v.   Webb *,in which the House of Lords had ruled that claims for injuries arising from complaints of deliberate assault or trespass to the person, such as Mrs   A’s, were subject to the general non extendable six-year limitation period imposed by section   2 of the Limitation Act 1980, rather than the special, extendable, three-year period applicable to actions in respect of personal injuries under section   11. Mrs A was, however, given leave to appeal to the House of Lords, which, in a judgment of 30   January 2008, unanimously decided to depart from its decision in Stubbings v.   Webb owing to the anomalous situation to which it had given rise in subsequent cases, as had been highlighted in a 2001 report by the Law Commission. It therefore ruled that the extendable limitation period laid down by section   11 of the Act applied and remitted the case to the High Court, which exercised its discretion to extend the time-limit and allowed Mrs   A to bring her action in damages. She was awarded GBP 50,000 in compensation. In addition, the applicant had to bear all the costs of the proceedings, amounting to some GBP 770,000. Law – Article 1 of Protocol No. 1: The applicant’s complaint was effectively that he had lost his case, and had therefore had to pay Mrs   A’s costs, as a result of an unforeseeable change in the law of limitation. The Court reiterated, however, that domestic courts could depart from their well-established case-law provided they gave good and cogent reasons for doing so. However clearly drafted a legal provision may be, in any system of law there was always an inevitable element of judicial interpretation. Equally, there would always be a need for elucidation of doubtful points and for adaptation to changing circumstances. The principle of legality was not offended where the development of the law in a particular area had reached a stage where judicial recognition of that development was reasonably foreseeable. These principles, which the Court had established in its judgment in the Article   7 case of C.R. v.   the United Kingdom **, could equally be applied to the applicant’s case as, by the time it reached the House of Lords, the unsatisfactory character of the law of limitation as it applied in sexual abuse cases had already been raised by the Law Commission in its 2001 report, which had recommended a complete overhaul of the law in this area. This had culminated in the Court of Appeal suggesting that the House of Lords itself might be able to remedy some of the very serious deficiencies and incoherencies in the law as it then stood. The House of Lords had given full and reasoned arguments in support of its revised interpretation of the relevant legislation, including a detailed account of the legislative history and of the legal developments which were considered to have brought the anomalies of Stubbings v.   Webb into sharp relief. Its decision had thus constituted no more than a reasonably foreseeable development of the law without any impropriety, let alone arbitrariness. Further, in keeping with the margin of appreciation of States in this area, it had been open to the domestic courts to interpret the rules of limitation in a way that was more favourable to victims of sexual abuse. Any interference with the applicant’s possessions had thus been lawful. The orders for costs had pursued the legitimate aim of acting as a disincentive to unnecessary litigation. Having regard to the fact that the applicant had refused an offer of settlement made by Mrs   A and that the level of costs the latter had incurred did not appear unreasonable for three levels of jurisdiction, there was nothing arbitrary in the way in which the applicable rules on costs were applied such as to upset the fair balance between the conflicting interests at stake. Conclusion : inadmissible (manifestly ill-founded). Article 6 § 1: The applicant’s complaint of a lack of fairness which, in his view, had resulted in his having to pay for a change in the law was essentially of a “fourth instance” nature. He was, in essence, unhappy with the outcome of the domestic proceedings. However, despite having been warned by his legal representatives that there was a risk that the House of Lords might find against him, notably by overturning its Stubbings v. Webb judgment, and despite an offer to settle from Mrs   A, he had decided to go ahead with the proceedings in the belief that the courts would find in his favour. Most importantly, he had clearly pursued the legal action because he was in a financial position to do so. This distinguished his situation from that of indigent litigants who were required to pay substantial sums by way of security for costs or court fees in the initial stages of the proceedings, thereby raising issues of access to court under Article 6 §   1. In the present case, the applicant had been able to afford legal representation throughout the proceedings owing to his lottery win. His right of access to court could not, therefore, be said to have been impaired. On the contrary, he had been given ample opportunity to put his case throughout the proceedings and the House of Lords had given detailed reasons for departing from its earlier case-law. His application accordingly did not disclose any appearance of unfairness. Conclusion : inadmissible (manifestly ill-founded). * Stubbings v. Webb [1993] AC 498. ** C.R. v. the United Kingdom , no.   20190/92, 22   November 1995.   © Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court. Click here for the Case-Law Information Notes