CEDH · CASELAW;CLIN;ENG — 11 février 2003

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Norway - 56568/00 Judgment 11.2.2003 [Section III] Article 6 Article 6-2 Presumption of innocence Award of damages in civil proceedings against person previously acquitted of criminal offence concerning the same facts: violation Facts : The applicant was convicted of violent assault, sexual assault and homicide. He was also ordered to pay compensation of 100,000 kroner to the victim’s parents. The applicant appealed to the High Court which, after taking evidence, acquitted him, accepting the jury’s verdict. The following day, after hearing legal argument on behalf of both the applicant and the victim’s parents, the court upheld the award of compensation. It observed that it had to be clear “on the balance of probabilities that the accused has committed the offences” and found it “clearly probable” that the applicant had “committed the offences”. The Appeals Selection Committee of the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal in so far as the appeal concerned the assessment of evidence but granted leave in so far as the applicant challenged the High Court’s procedure and interpretation of the law. However, the Supreme Court rejected the appeal. Law : Article 6 § 2 – The fact that the applicant remained “charged” until the acquittal gained legal force was of no relevance to the compensation proceedings, which had their basis in the Damage Compensation Act 1969. Criminal liability was not a prerequisite for liability to pay compensation and even where the victim opted to join the compensation claim to the criminal proceedings it would still be considered as “civil”. Indeed, the Supreme Court described it as such. Thus, the compensation claim was not viewed as a “criminal charge” under domestic law. As to the nature of the proceedings, the claim was to be determined on the basis of principles proper to the civil law of tort. The outcome of the criminal proceedings was not decisive for the civil claim; the compensation issue was to be the object of a separate legal assessment based on criteria and evidentiary standards which in several important respects differed from those that applied to criminal liability. The fact that an act that might give rise to a civil claim was also covered by the objective constituent elements of a criminal offence could not provide a sufficient ground for regarding the defendant as being “charged with a criminal offence”, nor could the fact that evidence from the trial was used to determine the civil law consequences. Otherwise, Article 6 § 2 would have the undesirable effect of pre-empting the victim’s possibilities of claiming compensation, entailing an arbitrary and disproportionate limitation on the right of access to court. Such an extensive interpretation was not supported by either the wording of Article 6 § 2 or any common approach in Contracting States. Consequently, an acquittal should not preclude the establishment of civil liability to pay compensation arising out of the same facts on the basis of a less strict standard of proof. However, if the decision on compensation contained a statement imputing criminal liability to the defendant, this could raise an issue falling within the ambit of Article   6 § 2. It was therefore necessary in the present case to examine whether the domestic courts had acted in such a way or used such language as to create a clear link between the criminal case and the ensuing compensation proceedings, so as to justify extending the scope of the application of Article   6(2). The High Court had found it “clearly probable that [the applicant had] committed the offences” and the Supreme Court, by upholding that judgment, albeit using more careful language, had not rectified the matter. The language employed overstepped the bounds of the civil forum, thereby casting doubt on the correctness of the acquittal and there was accordingly a sufficient link to the earlier criminal proceedings. Article 6 § 2 was therefore applicable to the compensation proceedings and had been violated. Conclusion : violation (unanimously). Article 41 – The Court awarded the applicant 20,000 € in respect of non-pecuniary damage.   © Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court. Click here for the Case-Law Information Notes