CEDH · CASELAW;CLIN;ENG — 21 juin 2005

.s3ABFC313 { font-size:10pt } .sEB86A30B { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt; page-break-after:avoid } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .sA241FE93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:18pt; text-align:justify; page-break-after:avoid; border-bottom:0.75pt solid #000000; padding-bottom:1pt } .s2EF62ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:12pt } .s4DDA3AA3 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s8F2B0B1B { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:12pt } .s9FF10068 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .s5F48796F { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify } .s5CB9E8AB { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; border-bottom:1pt solid #000000; padding-bottom:1pt } .sDF790F1E { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .s7ED160F0 { text-decoration:none } .s3DC36BA9 { font-family:Arial; text-decoration:underline; color:#0069d6 } Information Note on the Court’s case-law No. 76 June 2005 Milatová and Others v. the Czech Republic - 61811/00 Judgment 21.6.2005 [Section II] Article 6 Civil proceedings Article 6-1 Fair hearing Adversarial trial Non-communication of observations in proceedings before the Constitutional Court: violation   Facts :In 1991 the first applicant and her husband claimed restitution of their real property pursuant to the Land Ownership Act, alleging that they had been forced in 1985 to sell it to the State (the then Defence Ministry) under conditions that had been imposed on them. In 1995 the Land Office declared the applicants as the owners of a major part of the property, having found that the contract of sale had been concluded under duress on strikingly unfavourable conditions, within the meaning of the Land Ownership Act. In 1996 the Regional Court quashed that decision and sent the case back for further consideration as the existence of grounds for restitution of the property had not been sufficiently established. In 1997 the Land Office again decided that the applicants were the owners of the property. In 1998 the Regional Court, after having held a hearing and having received the applicants’ further comments, again quashed the administrative decision, finding that the Land Office had not proved to its satisfaction that the sale had been carried out under duress. The case was again remitted to the Land Office, which issued a fresh decision in 1998. In accordance with the opinion of the Regional Court, by which it was bound by virtue of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Land Office now ruled that the applicants were not the owners of the property because the contract of sale had not been concluded under duress. It was thereforeunnecessary to examine whether the contract of sale had been concluded on strikingly unfavourable conditions. This decision was upheld by the Regional Court later in 1998. In 1999 the applicants lodged a constitutional appealagainst the Regional Court’s two judgments of 1998 and the Land Office’s decision of the same year. They challenged the assessment of the evidence and the Regional Court’s incorrect interpretation of the notion of “duress”. They also criticised the failure of the Regional Court to assess properly the notion of “strikingly unfavourable conditions”. A judge rapporteur of the Constitutional Court invited the Regional Court and the various parties joined to the proceedings to submit written observations on the appeal. Observations were submitted by the Military Repair Enterprise, arguing that the appeal should be dismissed, and by the Regional Court, noting, inter alia, that the appeal had been lodged outside the sixty-day time-limit in so far as directed against its first judgment of 1998. The Constitutional Court Act did not oblige the judge rapporteur to transmit any such observations to the appellant, and they were not sent in the present case. The Constitutional Court eventually found, without having held a public hearing, that the appeal, in so far as directed against the Regional Court’s first judgment of 1998 had been filed out of time and was unsubstantiated to the extent that it concerned that court’s second judgment of that year. Law : For the applicants to have to consult the case file at the Constitutional Court and obtain a copy of any written observations was not of itself a sufficient safeguard to secure their right to an adversarial procedure. As a matter of fairness it was incumbent on the Constitutional Court to inform them that observations had been filed and that they could, if they so wished, comment on them in writing. The Regional Court had examined the applicants’ appeal against the Land Office’s decisions at a public hearing covering both the facts and the law, enabling them to submit any evidence they considered useful or necessary in support of their case. Whereas the proceedings in the Constitutional Court had been conducted without a public hearing, those proceedings had been limited to points of law. Accordingly, the fact that no public hearing was held in those proceedings was sufficiently compensated by the public hearings held at the decisive stage of the proceedings, when the merits of the applicants’ restitution claims had been determined. The Constitutional Court had not expressly relied on documentary evidence which had not previously been adduced by the Military Repair Enterprise or the applicants in support of their arguments in the proceedings before the Land Office and the Regional Court. Nevertheless, the defendant’s written observations and those of the Regional Court had been submitted in reply to the applicants’ constitutional appeal and constituted reasoned opinions on the merits of that appeal, manifestly aiming to influence the decision of the Constitutional Court by calling for the appeal to be dismissed. Thus, having regard to the nature of the issues to be decided by the Constitutional Court, it could be assumed that the applicants had a legitimate interest in receiving a copy of the written observations of the defendant and the Regional Court. The Court did not need to determine whether the omission to communicate the document had caused the applicants prejudice, the existence of a violation being conceivable even in the absence of prejudice. As it was for the applicants to judge whether or not a document called for their comments, the onus was on the Constitutional Court to afford the applicants an opportunity to comment on the written observations prior to its decision. Accordingly, the procedure followed had not enabled the applicants to participate properly in the constitutional proceedings and had deprived them of a fair hearing. Conclusion :violation (unanimously). Article 41: The Court held that the finding of a violation constituted sufficient just satisfaction for any non-pecuniary damage but awarded a certain amount in costs and expenses incurred in the Convention proceedings.   © Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court. Click here for the Case-Law Information Notes