CEDH · CASELAW;CLIN;ENG — 20 janvier 2009

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Hungary - 12188/06 Judgment 20.1.2009 [Section II] Article 10 Article 10-1 Freedom of expression Refusal of courts to allow the respondent in a libel case to prove the veracity of his statements because of the manner in which they had been made: violation   Facts : The applicant, who was employed with company G, was the chairman of a trade union representing its members in numerous companies. In 1999 the applicant was dismissed from work, but his dismissal was subsequently found to have been unlawful by the competent courts. At one of the company meetings, the managing director S.K. had accused the applicant of allegedly “supporting criminals who had worked in the company”. Following a complaint by the applicant, S.K. was found guilty of defamation. In 2002 company G sought to buy another company D, where the trade union had also been active. Dissatisfied with the planned takeover, company D's employees asked the trade union to organise a demonstration against it, in relation to which the applicant – as the trade union chairman – gave several newspaper interviews. In one of them he stated that company G had “trampled on its employees' constitutional and labour rights” and called its employees criminals. S.K. then brought proceedings against the applicant claiming that his statements had damaged his reputation. During the proceedings, the district court refused the applicant's request to take evidence or hear witnesses who might have been able to prove the veracity of his assertions. Finding his statements in any event exaggerated and offensive, the court concluded that the applicant had tarnished the plaintiff's reputation, and ordered him to publish a rectification and to pay costs. On appeal, the regional court upheld the lower court's judgment concluding that the applicant's statements had been expressed in a wholly unlawful manner since he had articulated his views in an “insulting, offensive and harsh way”. Law : The domestic courts found that the applicant's impugned statements had been expressed in such a harsh and exaggerated way that they had given rise to a violation of the plaintiff's personality rights irrespective of their veracity. In the Court's view, however, although part of the applicant's remarks merely assessed the general conduct of company G towards its employees and clearly amounted to a value judgment, the statement that company G had called its employees criminals was one of fact, which had at least in part been susceptible of proof. The Court was therefore struck by the fact that the national courts gave the applicant no opportunity to prove the veracity of either of his statements. Given that he had previously been illegally dismissed from work, that the plaintiff had been convicted of defamation on account of accusing him of supporting “criminals” within the company and that company G had indeed had numerous labour proceedings pending against it at the material time, it was more than likely that the applicant's statements were well-founded or at least had been imparted in good faith. Therefore, the domestic courts should have at least provided him with the opportunity to substantiate his statements. Indeed, allowing a restriction on the expression of substantiated statements solely on the basis of the manner in which they were voiced would be contrary to the very spirit of Article 10 of the Convention. Moreover, the impugned statements had been made in the context of a public debate concerning a collective labour dispute, which often resulted in heated discussion and required a high level of protection under Article 10. In view of the foregoing, the Court concluded that the domestic courts had erred in finding that the applicant had overstepped the limits of acceptable criticism. They had thereby failed to strike a fair balance between the need to protect his right to freedom of expression and the need to protect the plaintiff's reputation. Conclusion : violation (unanimously). Article 41 – EUR 3,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.   © Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court. Click here for the Case-Law Information Notes