CEDH · CASELAW;CLIN;ENG — 10 octobre 2024

.s3ABFC313 { font-size:10pt } .sD4B5322E { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .sA241FE93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:18pt; text-align:justify; page-break-after:avoid; border-bottom:0.75pt solid #000000; padding-bottom:1pt } .s2EF62ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:12pt } .s4DDA3AA3 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s8F2B0B1B { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:12pt } .s97EB40D9 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:14pt; page-break-after:avoid } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .s5F48796F { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify } .s7ED160F0 { text-decoration:none } .s3DC36BA9 { font-family:Arial; text-decoration:underline; color:#0069d6 } .s8B6C6D43 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; border-bottom:1pt solid #000000; padding-bottom:1pt } .sDF790F1E { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } Legal summary October 2024 Medvid v. Ukraine - 7453/23 Judgment 10.10.2024 [Section V] Article 3 Degrading punishment Inhuman punishment Clear and realistic prospect of reducibility of life sentences after new release on parole mechanism became fully operational but not before: no violation; violation Facts – On 6   November 2022 Law no.   2690-IX of 18   October 2022 entered into force amending the Criminal Code by providing the possibility for a person sentenced to life imprisonment to apply, after having served at least fifteen years of the original sentence, for its commutation into fixed-term imprisonment from fifteen to twenty years, to be served from the moment of the commutation. The period of fixed term imprisonment can be further reduced for good behaviour. Secondary legislation was subsequently introduced clarifying the procedure for the assessment of the degree to which life prisoners were reformed. On 18   June 2003 the applicant was sentenced to life imprisonment for committing a double murder – a sentence upheld by the Supreme Court on 2   October 2003. Before the introduction of the new amendments the applicant had lodged several unsuccessful applications with the domestic courts for his life sentence to be commuted to fifteen years’ imprisonment as well as an unsuccessful application for release on parole. Following the amendments, a commission convened in the prison where he is detained to examine the degree to which the applicant had been reformed; it found that he did not qualify to lodge an application for the commuting of his life sentence to a fixed term of imprisonment. The applicant complained that his life sentence could not be reduced in breach of Article   3 and maintained that the new release on parole mechanism for life prisoners did not remedy the situation. Law – Article   3: In view of the fact that States were in principle free to choose their own criminal-justice systems and while the introduced release on parole mechanism did not foresee the possibility of direct release from life imprisonment apart from through the commutation thereof by means of a court decision, such an approach to the possibility of reducing life sentences had been examined by the Court before and had been found to be satisfactory. It appeared from the relevant legislation that a life prisoner could expect his life imprisonment to be commuted as early as the point at which that prisoner had served fifteen years of the original sentence calculated from the start of the prisoner’s pre-trial detention. It provided the prisoner with the hope that if he had engaged in good behaviour and shown signs of resocialisation, the original life sentence would be downgraded in practice to a fixed term of imprisonment of thirty years. Furthermore, if the prisoner remained on the path of reform, he or she could expect to be released after serving twenty-six years and three months of the original sentence. Such a system provided a life prisoner with a sufficiently defined procedure that offered a clear timeframe and indicated an attempt to achieve a proper balance between the interests of the person concerned and the society to which he or she strove to return. The system allowed for a uniformity of approach to the assessment of prisoners’ rehabilitation and reformation. When considered in conjunction with the relevant legislative provisions, it appeared clear that the assessments to determine whether the prisoner in question was ready for the commutation of his sentence or for early release were not conducted at the same time. Depending on the expected outcome, the two types of assessment could be arguably said to be focused on different questions: – namely, (i) the progress that a prisoner had made in reforming (which could lead to a commutation of the sentence), and (ii) the degree of a prisoner’s rehabilitation (which could lead to early release). A commission convened within a prison was not qualified to assess the suitability of a life prisoner for early release but had to determine the degree of rehabilitation he/she had achieved for the purpose of deciding whether to commute the life sentence to a fixed term of imprisonment. Therefore, it could not be said that the contested methodology was confusing, misleading or insufficiently clear. Furthermore, the ultimate decision in all assessments of life prisoners’ suitability for a reduction in their sentence was taken by the domestic courts, which had jurisdiction to review any findings reached by prisons and to assess all material contained in a prisoner’s prison file, with the participation of the prisoner and his/her lawyer. Lastly, the respondent State had not overlooked the need for life prisoners to undergo continuous rehabilitation – even after a life sentence had been changed to a fixed-term sentence, with a view to possible release on parole and eventual reintegration into society; a measure in conformity with Article   3. In the light of the above considerations and the fact that some life prisoners had succeeded in securing the commutation of their life sentence to a fixed-term sentence, it could not be said that the system was not efficient in theory or in practice. The Court considered that the release on parole mechanism had only become fully operational on 3   March 2023 when amending Order no.   631/5 of the Ministry of Justice had entered into force. From that date the mechanism had offered the applicant the realistic opportunity to have his life sentence reviewed within the above-noted well‑defined timeframe and under clear conditions. Thus, there had been no violation of Article   3 after that date. Conclusion: no violation (unanimously). However, during the period before that date starting from the applicant’s final sentencing to life imprisonment (2   October 2003), the applicant had been in a situation of uncertainty without any clear and realistic prospects of early release. Conclusion: violation (unanimously). Article   41: finding of a violation sufficient in respect of non-pecuniary damage. (See also Petukhov v.   Ukraine (No.   2) , 41216/13, 12   March 2019, Legal Summary ; Dardanskis and Others v.   Lithuania (dec.), 74452/13 et al , 18   June 2019)   © Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court. To access legal summaries in English or French click here . For non-official translations into other languages click here .