CEDH · CASELAW;COMMUNICATEDCASES;ENG — 12 mai 2026

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .s379BC09C { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s339D85E6 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s665E407E { margin-top:66pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } Published on 1 June 2026   FIRST SECTION Application no. 21483/20 Guido CASAMONICA against Italy lodged on 25 May 2020 communicated on 12 May 2026 STATEMENT OF FACTS The application concerns the applicant’s placement under special police supervision and the imposition of a compulsory residence order requiring him to reside in the Municipality of Rome by the competent domestic court pursuant to Article 6 of Legislative Decree No. 159 of 6 September 2011 ( Codice delle leggi antimafia e delle misure di prevenzione , “Decree No.   159/2011”), as well as the confiscation of assets belonging to the applicant pursuant to Article 24 of the same Decree. The applicant was declared socially dangerous pursuant to Article   1 §   1   (a) and (b) of Decree No. 159/2011 ( pericolosità generica , or “ordinary dangerousness”) as a person who, based on factual evidence, may be regarded as a habitual offender and who habitually lives off the proceeds of crime. The applicant challenged the measures before the competent domestic courts, contesting the finding of social dangerousness and asserting the lawful origin of the resources used for certain purchases. Respectively on 23 January 2018 and on 22 October 2019, the Rome Court of Appeal and the Court of Cassation dismissed the applicant’s appeals, holding that the domestic courts had sufficiently established the applicant’s social dangerousness and confirmed the imposition of the special police supervision and the confiscation, finding that the assets had presumably been acquired through the proceeds of prior criminal activity. Relying on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, the applicant complains of the alleged lack of clarity and foreseeability of the legal basis of the confiscation of his assets, and of the domestic courts’ failure to provide sufficient evidence demonstrating that the assets had been acquired through the proceeds of crime. He further alleges that the measure was disproportionate and highlights the significant lapse of time between the alleged criminal conduct generating illicit proceeds, the purchases subject to confiscation and the related proceedings within which the preventive measure was issued. Under Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention, the applicant complains of an alleged lack of clarity and foreseeability of the legal basis regarding the individuals to whom special police supervision may be applied. QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES 1.     Was the interference with the applicant’s right to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions in accordance with Article 1 of Protocol No.   1 to the Convention? In particular:   (a)     Was the interference provided for by law? Specifically, were provisions (a) and/or (b) of Article 1 § 1 of Decree no.   159/2011 sufficiently precise and clear, foreseeable in their application and consequences, and compatible with the rule of law, in respect of the applicant (see De Tommaso v. Italy [GC], no.   43395/09, § 126, 23   February 2017), as clarified by the Constitutional Court’s judgment no. 24 of 27 February 2019?   (b)     Was the interference proportionate to the aim pursued? In answering this question, the parties are invited to address, in particular: (i)     whether the nature of the crimes justified the presumption that the applicant’s assets were proceeds of unlawful activities (compare   Bongiorno and Others v. Italy , no.   4514/07, § 45, 5 January 2010;   Gogitidze and Others v.   Georgia , no.   36862/05, § 107, 12 May 2015;   Telbis and Viziteu v.   Romania , no.   47911/15, §§ 74 and 77, 26 June 2018; and   Balsamo v.   San   Marino , nos.   20319/17   and   21414/17, § 91, 8   October   2019); (ii)     whether the domestic authorities showed that the confiscated assets could have been the proceeds of crimes in a reasoned manner, on basis of an objective assessment of the factual evidence and without relying on a mere suspicion, also in light of the date of their acquisition (see   Todorov and Others v. Bulgaria , nos.   50705/11   and 6 others, §§ 212 and 215, 13   July 2021).   2.     Was the interference with the applicant’s right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence in accordance with the law, as required by Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention? In particular, were provisions (a) and/or (b) of Article 1 § 1 of Legislative Decree No. 159/2011 sufficiently precise, clear and foreseeable in their application and consequences, and compatible with the rule of law, with respect to the applicant ( De Tommaso , cited above, §§ 117-18 and 126)?