CEDH · CASELAW;COMMUNICATEDCASES;ENG — 4 mai 2026

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .s379BC09C { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s339D85E6 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s665E407E { margin-top:66pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } Published on 26 May 2026   THIRD SECTION Application no. 1093/22 Alketa NUSHI against Albania lodged on 23 December 2021 communicated on 4 May 2026 SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE The application concerns the applicant’s vetting by the Independent Qualification Commission (IQC) and the Special Appeal Chamber (SAC) (see Xhoxhaj v. Albania , no. 15227/19, 9 February 2021, and Sevdari v.   Albania , no. 40662/19, 13 December 2022). Having started her prosecutorial career in 2008, at the time of her vetting the applicant was serving at the Kukës Prosecution Office. On 27 June 2019 she was dismissed from office by the IQC. On 23 June 2021 the SAC, although it admitted some of her grounds of appeal, ultimately upheld her dismissal on the grounds that she was professionally unfit for office under section 61(4) of the Vetting Act (law no. 84/2016) which had entered in force on 8 October 2016 (see Xhoxhaj , §§ 114 and 142-43). The SAC examined three cases prosecuted by the applicant between 2012 and 2017 and, having found a number of professional lapses, concluded that the applicant should be dismissed as her lack of legal qualification could not be remedied through further training at the School of Magistrates. The applicant submitted, among others, that under section 41(3) of the Vetting Act the SAC could review only cases that she had dealt with before the entry in force of that Act, therefore the 2017 case should have been excluded from the SAC’s assessment. The SAC held that other provisions of the act did not provide for such limitation. The applicant invokes Article 8 of the Convention. QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES Has there been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention on account of the applicant’s dismissal from office (see, for applicable principles, Xhoxhaj v.   Albania , no. 15227/19, §§ 359-413, 9 February 2021; and Sevdari v.   Albania , no. 40662/19, §§ 83-97, 13 December 2022)? More specifically:   a)     Was the applicant’s dismissal in accordance with the law? In particular, was it open to the SAC to review cases prosecuted by the applicant after the entry in force of the Vetting Act?   b) Was the applicant’s dismissal “necessary in a democratic society” and proportionate to the breaches she was found to have committed? Did her alleged failures amount to serious professional breaches capable of justifying the dismissal of a tenured prosecutor (see, mutatis mutandis , Xhoxhaj v.   Albania , no. 15227/19, § 410, 9 February 2021; Juszczyszyn v. Poland , no.   35599/20, § 276, 6 October 2022; and Ovcharenko and Kolos v. Ukraine , nos. 27276/15 and 33692/15, § 104, 12 January 2023)?