CEDH · CASELAW;COMMUNICATEDCASES;ENG — 27 octobre 2025

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .s379BC09C { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s339D85E6 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s665E407E { margin-top:66pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .sC7D66CED { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .sA1D3DA2E { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify } Published on 17 November 2025   SECOND SECTION Application no. 25191/23 CC against the United Kingdom lodged on 21 June 2023 communicated on 27 October 2025 SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE The applicant was born in 2013 and has been diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder, pathological demand avoidance, sensory processing disorder and Ehlers-Danlos Syndrome (Type 3). Between September 2017 and October 2019 he attended a mainstream school (“L School”) where he was subjected to sanctions imposed by school staff, including physical restraints. On 2   October 2019 the applicant commenced proceedings in the First-tier Tribunal (Special Educational Needs and Disability) (“FTT”) alleging discrimination on grounds of disability in respect of his treatment at L School. The FTT had exclusive jurisdiction to hear such claims and could make any order it thought fit, but under paragraph 5(3)(b) of Schedule 17 to the Equality Act 2010 had no power to award compensation if unlawful disability discrimination was found to have occurred. The applicant therefore also commenced judicial review proceedings in the High Court arguing that the impugned provision breached his Convention rights as it discriminated against him on grounds of disability compared to school pupils with other protected characteristics and disabled students at further or higher education institutions, all of whom were entitled to claim compensation for unlawful discrimination. On 12 February 2021 the FTT held that the physical restraints applied to the applicant between September 2017 and December 2018 had been disproportionate and constituted unlawful disability discrimination under the 2010 Act. It ordered L School to apologise to the applicant and to review its behavioural policies. On 23 June 2022 the High Court dismissed the applicant’s judicial review claim in respect of the compatibility of the legislation with the Convention. The Court of Appeal refused permission to appeal on 23 February 2023. The applicant complains that the legislation precluding a compensation award in his case violates Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article   8 of the Convention and/or Articles   1 and/or 2 of Protocol No.   1 to the Convention. QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES 1.     Does the applicant’s complaint of discrimination as a result of paragraph 5(3)(b) of Schedule 17 to the Equality Act 2010 which precluded a compensation award in his case fall within the ambit of Article   8 of the Convention and/or Articles   1 and/or 2 of Protocol No.   1 to the Convention (see, for example,   T.H. v. Bulgaria , no.   46519/20, §§   90-91, 11   April 2023, and Fabris v.   France [GC], no.   16574/08, §§   48-55, ECHR 2013 (extracts))?   2.     Has the applicant been treated differently from others in an analogous situation (see, for example, Djeri and Others v. Latvia , nos.   50942/20 and 2022/21, §§   138-42, 18 July 2024, and Stott v. the United Kingdom , no.   26104/19, §§   94-95 and 98-105, 31   October 2023)? In particular:   (a)   What is/are the appropriate comparator group(s)?   (b)   In respect of such group(s), has the applicant established that he enjoys a “status” protected by Article   14?   3.     Did any difference in treatment pursue a legitimate aim and did it have a reasonable justification? In so far as applicable, were there “very weighty reasons” for such difference in treatment (see Alajos Kiss v.   Hungary , no.   38832/06, §   42, 20   May 2010, and J.D. and A v. the United Kingdom , nos.   32949/17 and 34614/17, §   97, 24   October 2019)?