CEDH · CASELAW;COMMUNICATEDCASES;ENG — 10 octobre 2025

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .s379BC09C { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s339D85E6 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s665E407E { margin-top:66pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } Published on 27 October 2025   SECOND SECTION Application no. 53295/22 Zsolt VÁRADY against Hungary lodged on 27 October 2022 communicated on 10 October 2025 SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE The application concerns the refusal by the Constitution Protection Office to provide personal data to the applicant on the grounds that it was classified. The applicant is the founder of IWIW, a Hungarian social media platform launched in 2002. In November 2014, he delivered speeches at demonstrations against the government’s proposal to tax Internet-based services. Some media outlets reporting on the events revealed that he had been involved in a criminal procedure for drug-related offences. At the applicant’s request, the Data Protection Authority investigated his allegations that (criminal) personal data had been unlawfully processed and/or disclosed by potential data controllers, including the Constitution Protection Office (“the CPO”). Following on-site inspections, the Data Protection Authority concluded that there was no indication that the CPO had unlawfully processed the applicant’s data. The applicant turned directly to the CPO which refused to provide him any information about the processing of his personal data. The applicant’s ensuing court action was to no avail. In those proceedings, on 15 November 2019 the CPO submitted evidence containing classified information for the court’s examination, marked as ‘confidential’, a qualification valid until 31   December 2023. The applicant subsequently filed a request with the CPO to access that particular piece of classified information under section 11 of Act no. CLV of 2009 on the protection of classified information. The request was rejected on 6 October 2020 on the grounds of the public interest in the effective functioning of the CPO. His request for judicial review of the decision was to no avail. His constitutional complaint was rejected on 21 June 2022. The Constitutional Court’s decision was served on the applicant’s representative on 29 June 2022. The applicant complains under Article 8, read alone and together with Article 13 of the Convention, that the CPO and the domestic courts refused him even partial access to the information gathered through covert measures and the opportunity to refute it. QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES 1.     Has there been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention?   (a)     In particular, has there been an “interference” with the applicant’s rights under Article   8 of the Convention? In particular, did the classified information in question contain data about the applicant? Was this information gathered and stored by the Constitution Protection Office (see, mutatis mutandis , Amann v. Switzerland [GC], no. 27798/95, §§ 69-70, ECHR 2000-II; Shimovolos v.   Russia , no.   30194/09, § 66, 21 June 2011; and Catt v. the United Kingdom , no.   43514/15, § 93, 24 January 2019)?   (b)     Did the refusal to grant the applicant access to the classified information and thus the refusal to inform him on whether that authority had gathered and stored data about him, and on the content of such data, amount to an “interference” (see, mutatis mutandis, Segerstedt-Wiberg and Others v.   Sweden , no. 62332/00, §   99, ECHR 2006-VII)? Was the decision coupled with a refusal to allow the applicant an opportunity to refute it and if so, did that refusal amount to an interference with the applicant’s right to respect for his private life (see, mutatis mutandis , Rotaru v.   Romania [GC], no.   28341/95, § 46, ECHR 2000-V)?   (c)     If there was an interference, was it “in accordance with the law” and “necessary in a democratic society” within the meaning of Article 8 § 2? Did   the applicable law provide effective safeguards against the abuse of monitoring powers (see, inter alia , Roman Zakharov v. Russia [GC], no.   47143/06, § 231, ECHR 2015; S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 30562/04 and 30566/04, §§ 99 and 103, ECHR 2008)?   2.     Did the applicant have at his disposal an effective domestic remedy for his complaint under Article 8, as required by Article 13 of the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, Rotaru, cited above, §§ 67-73 and Segerstedt-Wiberg and Others , cited above, §§ 116-122)?