CEDH · CASELAW;COMMUNICATEDCASES;ENG — 19 mai 2025

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .s379BC09C { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s339D85E6 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s665E407E { margin-top:66pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } Published on 10 June 2025   FOURTH SECTION Applications nos. 1544/21 and 24294/21 Zhanna Grigoryevna IVANENKO against Russia and Vyacheslav Vladimirovich VORONTSOV against Russia lodged on 23 November 2020 and 17 April 2021 respectively communicated on 19 May 2025 SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE The applications originate from the conflict in Crimea between Ukraine and the Russian Federation (see, for context, Ukraine v. Russia ( re   Crimea)   (dec.) [GC], nos. 20958/14 and 38334/18, §§   32-66, 16   December 2020). The applicants are Ukrainian nationals who are relatives (aunt and nephew) and who had Russian nationality imposed on them in May 2014. In June 2013 they opened savings accounts for one year with a Sevastopol branch of F.I., a Ukrainian bank (“the Bank”). Initially they had deposited 200   U.S.   dollars (USD) each and claimed to have additionally funded their accounts from June to November 2013 up to USD   13,721 (first applicant) and USD   19,105 (second applicant). The assertion of Russian jurisdiction over Crimea in 2014 led to a collapse of the peninsula’s banking system that was regulated by the National Bank of Ukraine (“the NBU”). On 1   April   2014 the Russian Parliament adopted the Federal Law no.   39-FZ on Protection of Interests of Depositors with Savings Accounts at Banks and Branches Registered and/or Acting in “the Republic of Crimea” and “the federal city of Sevastopol” (“the Law no.   39-FZ”). It provided that the funds deposited by individuals with Ukrainian banks in Crimea up until 2   April   2014 should be compensated, up to a limit of 700,000   Russian roubles (RUB, the equivalent of approximately USD   19,100 at the relevant time), by a specially designated “Depositors protection fund” (“the Fund”). Any deposits in foreign currencies were to be denominated in RUB at the official exchange rate as of 18 March 2014 (RUB   36.65 for USD   1). The compensation claims would be examined and decided upon within ten working days. On 25 May 2014 the applicants applied for compensation of their savings to the Fund. On 6 June 2014, upon the expiration of their one-year deposit agreements, the Bank transferred USD   13,721 and USD   19,105, respectively, to their current accounts, opened with the Bank. However, these funds and accounts remained inaccessible to the applicants in Crimea. In July-August 2014 the Fund allowed their applications in part and paid USD   1,470 (RUB   53,876.24) to the first, and USD   1,450 (RUB   53,143.23) to the second applicant. It refused compensating the whole claimed amounts stating that the applicants had only provided proof of the sums deposited on 1   June 2013 (USD   200 each) and 18   November   2013 (USD   1,270 for the first applicant and USD   1,250 for the second). In 2015 the Bank was filed for bankruptcy by the NBU. Following this, in November 2017, the applicants registered as internally displaced persons (“IDPs”) in Kherson, Ukraine. This ultimately allowed each of them to receive, in May 2018, an additional compensation of 200,000 Ukrainian hryvnia (UAH, the equivalent of approximately USD   7,600 at the relevant time) — a maximum amount guaranteed for the depositors of dissolved banks by the applicable Ukrainian law. Between 2015 and 2019 the applicants repeatedly inquired the Fund about compensation but to no avail. In 2016 they provided account extracts issued by the Bank confirming the sums deposited in June–November 2013. In 2019 they provided updated extracts with the balance of their current accounts as of 20   May   2019 – after the Ukrainian compensations had been deducted. According to those latest extracts (which did not deduct the Fund’s payouts), the first applicant had USD   7,685.20 left in her current account, and the second applicant USD   11,743.91. However, the Fund refused to consider these documents, treating them as either incomplete or submitted too late. In September 2019 each applicant lodged a claim against the Fund in the “Zheleznodorozhnyy District Court of Simferopol” claiming compensation of their savings: USD   4,603 and 10,007   USD, respectively, with the Fund’s payouts deducted. They also requested these sums to be denominated in RUB as of September 2019. On 5 November and 6   December 2019 this “court” allowed their claims in part and awarded the claimed sums, but denominated them under the exchange rate of 18 March 2014. It considered the account extracts of 2016 and 2019 and reasoned that the remaining sums had been duly confirmed and the Fund had to compensate them. In the first applicant’s case, that decision was overturned and her claim was rejected after the “Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea” allowed an appeal of the Fund on 6 February 2020 (upheld by the final decision of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation dated 6   October 2020). The higher courts reasoned that there was insufficient proof of the remaining sum, as the applicant’s savings had been paid out on 6 June 2014, while she had not officially applied to the Fund for compensation of the funds allegedly held in her current account. As to the extract from her current account of 2019, in the courts’ view it could not be taken into consideration for the same reason and also due to a lack of transactions breakdown for that account. The second applicant appealed against the judgment in his case, disputing the exchange rate applied to his compensation. He argued that the difference in exchange rates in March 2014 and September 2019 (RUB   36.65 against RUB   66.91 for USD   1) had resulted in an actual loss of RUB   302,757. The courts rejected his arguments referring to a foreign currency provision of the Law no.   39-FZ (final decision of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation dated 25   February   2021). Relying on Article   1 of Protocol   No.   1 to the Convention the first applicant complained that she had been arbitrarily deprived of her savings by Russian authorities. In her additional submissions she referred to a different outcome of the second applicant’s case as a proof of arbitrariness of the impugned decision. The second applicant complained under the same Article, stating that the denomination of compensation under the exchange rate of 18   March   2014 had constituted a de   facto deprivation of his possessions. He also stated that the judgment of 6 December 2019 has not been enforced as of the date of his application. QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES 1.     Has there been a violation of the first applicant’s right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No.   1 to the Convention on account of the refusal to award her compensation?   2.     Has there been an interference with the second applicant’s right to peaceful enjoyment of his possessions? If so, did it have a basis in “law” within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No.   1 ( Ukraine v. Russia ( re   Crimea) [GC], nos. 20958/14 and 38334/18, §§   942-46, 25 June 2024)?   In this regard, was the second applicant’s expectation for the amount of compensation to be adjusted to the exchange rate relevant at the material time legitimate ( Loizidou v. Turkey (merits), 18 December 1996, §   45, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-VI)?   3.     As concerns application no.   24294/21, has the judgment of the “Zheleznodorozhnyy District Court of Simferopol” of 6 December 2019 been enforced? If not, was such a situation compatible with the second applicant’s right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1?