CEDH · CASELAW;COMMUNICATEDCASES;ENG — 12 mai 2025

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .s379BC09C { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s339D85E6 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s665E407E { margin-top:66pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } Published on 2 June 2025   SECOND SECTION Application no. 21380/24 R.S. against Lithuania lodged on 16 July 2024 communicated on 12 May 2025 SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE The application concerns a temporary protection order issued against the applicant. The applicant is married to M. and they have two children, born in 2006 and 2008. On an unspecified date M. and the applicant started divorce proceedings. The applicant moved out of the family home, whereas the children remained living with M. According to the applicant, on 25 February 2024 at around 3 p.m. she returned her daughter to M.’s house. An argument arose between M. and her and he punched her several times. She left the house shortly after 4   p.m. It appears that M.’s parents called the police after the applicant had left. On the same day the applicant lodged a complaint with the police, accusing M. of assaulting her, and was notified that a pre-trial investigation had been opened. On the same day (25 February 2024) at 4.26 p.m. the police issued a protection order ( apsaugos nuo smurto aplinkoje artimoje orderis ) against the applicant, banning her from approaching or contacting M. and their children for fifteen days, in accordance with Article   8 §   2 of the Law on Protection from Domestic Violence. The applicant was notified of that order by e-mail. The order did not contain reasons. The applicant complained about the order, first with the police and later with the courts, but her complaints were dismissed. The Alytus District Court (in the decision of 29   February 2024) and the Kaunas Regional Court (in the final decision of 18 March 2024) held that the risk of domestic violence had to be assessed in accordance with a list of criteria approved by the Minister of Interior; such a risk was considered to be present when at least three of those criteria were met. The situation at hand had met five criteria: (i) the conflict between the applicant and M. had taken place in the presence of children; (ii) children lived with one of the persons between whom the conflict had occurred, in the house where it had happened; (iii)   the alleged victim (M.) feared that the alleged perpetrator (the applicant) would use violence against him or those who lived with him; (iv) the alleged victim asked to isolate the alleged perpetrator from him; and (v) the alleged perpetrator had threatened to commit or attempted suicide. According to M.’s statements given to a crisis centre, the applicant regularly sent him humiliating e-mails and text messages, threatened to use her official position against him and threatened to commit suicide. During the conflict of 25   February 2024, she had lifted a chair, as if to throw it at M., but had put it down after their daughter had asked her to. Moreover, a video-recording from the latter incident, provided by M., showed the applicant screaming that she was being assaulted, although no assault was taking place at that time. The courts concluded that the protection order had been based on an appropriate risk assessment. The Kaunas Regional Court also emphasised that such an order could be issued not only when there was a risk of physical violence but also when there was a risk of psychological or other forms of violence. The applicant complains under Article 8 of the Convention that the protection order against her was unjustified. She submits that the domestic law allows for a protection order to be adopted solely on the basis of the alleged victim’s oral statements, without any objective evidence, and the police are not required to hear the alleged perpetrator, which leaves it open to abuse. In the present case, the police had relied, inter alia , on M.’s allegation that the applicant had threatened to commit suicide, which was not true; the police had disregarded the divorce proceedings pending between her and M., the fact that there was no record of her having ever been violent, and the fact that a pre-trial investigation had been opened against M. She submits that police officers do not have the necessary competence to assess whether a protection order is justified in the circumstances and that the there is no requirement to provide reasons in the order, which makes it difficult to appeal against it. Lastly, she contends that the ban on her contacting her children for fifteen days was disproportionate in the circumstances. QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES Has there been a violation of the applicant’s right to respect for her private and family life, contrary to Article 8 of the Convention, on account of the protection order issued against her? In particular:   (a)     Was the protection order issued on the basis of an appropriate assessment of the risk which the applicant allegedly posed to her husband and/or their children (see, mutatis mutandis , Kurt v. Austria [GC], no.   62903/15, §§   167-76, 15 June 2021)?   (b)     Were the restrictions imposed on the applicant by virtue of the protection order proportionate, having regard to the nature and severity of the assessed risk (see, mutatis mutandis , ibid., § 183)?   (c)     Did the domestic legal framework and practice provide the applicant with adequate procedural safeguards (see, mutatis mutandis , ibid., § 182)? The Court refers, in particular, to the applicant’s complaints that the protection order was issued without hearing her and that she did not have an effective possibility to challenge that order because it did not contain any reasons.