CEDH · CASELAW;COMMUNICATEDCASES;ENG — 7 février 2024

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .s379BC09C { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s339D85E6 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s665E407E { margin-top:66pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } Published on 26 February 2024   FOURTH SECTION Application no. 32398/19 ÇOBANTUR TURİZM TİCARET VE NAKLİYAT LTD. ŞTİ, against Serbia lodged on 10 June 2019 communicated on 7 February 2024 SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE The present application concerns the seizure and confiscation of the applicant company’s vehicle in criminal proceedings. In particular, the applicant company’s heavy-duty vehicle was seized after it had been found to have transported illegal migrants. The driver of the vehicle, not the applicant company, was ultimately convicted and the vehicle itself was confiscated. The domestic courts took the view that in cases where a vehicle had been used for the commission of a crime, domestic law required its confiscation regardless of whether its owner was involved in it. The applicant company complains under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that the domestic authorities had applied the domestic law arbitrarily, i.e. without considering its own good faith and its property rights. The applicant company thus maintains that the confiscation in question was neither fair nor proportionate. QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES Has there been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in the present case? In particular, did the confiscation of the applicant company’s vehicle amount to an interference with its possessions in the public interest, and in accordance with the conditions provided for by law, within the meaning of this provision? If so, was that interference necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest? Lastly, did that interference impose an excessive individual burden on the applicant company (see B.K.M.   Lojistik Tasimacilik Ticaret Limited Sirketi v.   Slovenia , no. 42079/12, §§   35-53, 17 January 2017, and Andonoski v.   the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia , no. 16225/08, §§ 28-42, 17   September 2015)?