CEDH · CASELAW;COMMUNICATEDCASES;ENG — 9 janvier 2024

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .s379BC09C { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s339D85E6 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s665E407E { margin-top:66pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s5FFF0A75 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:7pt } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s25D5DE94 { margin-top:66pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:7pt } .s1DE04B9 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:7pt } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } Published on 29 January 2024   THIRD SECTION Application no. 48040/19 Chrysoula KARAMADOUKI against Greece lodged on 4 September 2019 communicated on 9 January 2024 SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE The applicant is a judge at the Court of Auditors. While she was serving as Vice-President, the Ministerial Council proposed six judges for the appointment of the General Secretary at that court including the applicant. The applicant did not attend the interview conducted by the Parliament, which was required to provide an opinion on the appointment, invoking serious family reasons. Following a vote, the candidate with the most votes was candidate M.A.. On 10 October 2017 the Minister of Justice proposed the applicant for the post and she was finally appointed by a Presidential Decree published on 14 November 2017. The applicant lodged an action for annulment against her appointment before the Supreme Administrative Court. She argued that because of the four-year term of office for the Secretary General, she would have to leave the service on 14 November 2021, at the age of sixty-one, instead of retiring on 3 June 2027 at the age of sixty-seven which was the retirement age of judges. This constituted an early dismissal from the service as a judge and transfer to a non-judicial post against her consent which was violating the constitutional principle that judges serve a life term and their independence. For six years (2021-2027) she would suffer an excessive financial burden because (i) she would not receive any pension until the age of sixty-seven when she would acquire her pension rights, (ii) she would have to pay social security contributions of a total amount of EUR 108,040.50 during this time-span and (iii) she would be deprived of the judge’s salary until the age of sixty-seven. The Supreme Administrative Court by judgment no. 435/2019 dismissed her application stating that consent was required for the appointment at the post and that a non-explicit opposition to an appointment constitutes consent to it. It ruled that at the scheduled interview she had been given the opportunity to provide her consent or not, irrespective of the fact that she had not appeared. It was therefore unfounded that she had been appointed without her consent. It dismissed also the ground that her appointment was an unfavourable transfer against the principle of irremovability. The applicant complains under Article 6 §   1 of the Convention that the interpretation of the Supreme Administrative Court which led to the dismissal of her application violated her right to a fair trial. She also complains of a breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.         QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES 1.     Did the applicant have a fair hearing in the determination of her civil rights and obligations, in accordance with Article   6 §   1 of the Convention on account of the domestic court’s decision that it was unfounded that the applicant had been appointed without her consent, as non-explicit opposition to an appointment constitutes consent to it, considering also the principles of judicial independence and irremovability ( see also Baka v. Hungary [GC], no. 20261/12, 23 June 2016)?   2.     Has there been an interference with the applicant’s peaceful enjoyment of possessions, within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention? If so, has that interference been in compliance with the requirements of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1?