CEDH · CASELAW;COMMUNICATEDCASES;ENG — 3 mai 2023

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .s379BC09C { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s339D85E6 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s665E407E { margin-top:66pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } Published on 22 May 2023   SECOND SECTION Application no. 38693/15 GRAFESCOLO S.R.L. against the Republic of Moldova lodged on 24 July 2015 communicated on 3 May 2023 STATEMENT OF FACTS In civil proceedings against the applicant company, the plaintiff (municipal council of V., a Moldovan town) asked for the annulment of a contract for the sale of land. The municipal council’s action was allowed by the first-instance court, but the appellate court overturned the decision, finding in the applicant company’s favour. V.’s mayor signed the appeal in cassation. The applicant company argued before the Supreme Court of Justice that the mayor did not have the power to represent the municipal council and that, under the applicable legislation, the appeal had to be dismissed as lodged by an unauthorised person. The Supreme Court of Justice noted that under the applicable legislation the mayor and the council were distinct entities. However, without taking a decision in respect of this admissibility issue, it accepted the council’s appeal and instructed the lower court to deal with the issue of the council’s representation. In addition, the Supreme Court of Justice relied on an argument (that V.’s mayoralty had no procedural standing in the case) which had not been raised by any of the parties, nor discussed during the hearing. The applicant company complains of a breach of the principle of “equality of arms” within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention because the Supreme Court of Justice accepted to examine an appeal lodged by an unauthorised person and relied on an argument never previously discussed and to which it did not have the opportunity to respond. QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES Did the applicant company have a fair hearing in the determination of its civil rights and obligations, in accordance with Article 6 § 1 of the Convention? Was the principle of “equality of arms” within the meaning of that provision respected? In particular, having regard to the proceedings as a whole ( Reg ner v. the Czech Republic [GC], no. 35289/11, § 161, 19   September 2017):   1.     Did the Supreme Court of Justice accept for examination the opposing party’s appeal on points of law, without deciding whether it had been lodged by a person not empowered to do so, as argued by the applicant company (see, mutatis mutandis , Wyn en v. Belgium , no. 32576/96, § 32, ECHR   2002 ‑ VIII)?   2.     In accepting that appeal, did the same court rely on an argument (that the V.’s mayoralty had no procedural standing in the case) of which the parties were not informed and which had not been discussed during the hearing (see Cli nique des Acacias and Others v. France , nos. 65399/01 and   3   others, §§ 36-43, 13 October 2005)?