CEDH · CASELAW;COMMUNICATEDCASES;ENG — 8 février 2022

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .s379BC09C { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s339D85E6 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s665E407E { margin-top:66pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .sA1D3DA2E { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } Published on 28 February 2022   FIFTH SECTION Application no. 26074/18 V against the Czech Republic lodged on 30 May 2018 communicated on 8 February 2022 SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE The application concerns the death of the applicant’s brother, hospitalised in a psychiatric hospital, following the use of a taser by the police and administration of a tranquiliser by a hospital nurse, as well as the ensuing criminal investigation into the circumstances of his death. The applicant’s constitutional complaint was dismissed as manifestly ill-founded (IV.   ÚS   4150/16). Before the Court the applicant relies mainly on Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention. QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES 1.     Has the applicant’s brother’s right to life, guaranteed by Article 2 of the Convention, been violated in the present case? In particular:   (a)     Was the State responsible under Articles 2 or 3 of the Convention for the death of the applicant’s brother, in view of the fact that no specific cause of his death has been established by the experts?   (b)     If so, did the applicant’s brother’s death result from a use of force which was absolutely necessary and strictly proportionate to the achievement of the aims set out in the subparagraphs of Article 2 of the Convention (see Saoud v. France , no. 9375/02, §§ 88-90, 9 October 2007)?   (c)     Did the domestic authorities comply with their positive obligation to protect the life of the applicant’s brother who was in a state of particular vulnerability due to his mental illness?   (d)     Can it be stated, in the circumstances of the present case, that the respondent State was equipped with the necessary legislative, administrative and regulatory measures defining the limited circumstances in which law-enforcement officials may use a taser (see , mutatis mutandis , Makaratzis v.   Greece [GC], no. 50385/99, §§ 56-59, ECHR 2004 ‑ XI, and Tekın and Arslan v. Belgium , no. 37795/13, § 84, 5 September 2017)?   (e)     Did the domestic authorities comply with their positive obligation to train their law-enforcement officials in such a manner as to ensure their high level of competence in their professional conduct so that no one is subjected to treatment that runs counter to the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis , Bouyid v. Belgium [GC], no. 23380/09, § 108, ECHR 2015, and Tiziana Pennino v. Italy , no. 21759/15, § 45, 12 October 2017)?   The Government are invited to specify whether there exists, and existed at the time of the impugned events, an established policy, protocol, or practice by reference to which police officers must operate when dealing with individuals in the situation of the applicant’s brother, in particular with regard to the use of restraint and immobilisation techniques, including recourse to the taser.   The Government are also invited to provide detailed information concerning the initial and continuous training of law enforcement officers in communicating and dealing with persons with psychosocial disabilities, individuals who are in a highly agitated state or otherwise vulnerable, and in particular with regard to the use and prioritisation of restraint and immobilisation techniques, both at the present time and at the time of the impugned events. In this latter connection, they are invited to specify whether or not the law enforcement officers involved in the impugned events had received such training.   2.     Having regard to the procedural protection of the right to life and recalling the Court’s general approach of examining the investigation proceedings as a whole (see Armani Da Silva v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 5878/08, § 286, 30 March 2016), was the investigation conducted by the domestic authorities in breach of Article 2 of the Convention? In particular, have the cause of the applicant’s brother’s death and the multiple use of the taser been duly investigated into? Has the police intervention been duly documented (video-recordings, detailed official records)?   3.     Has the applicant’s brother been subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment at the hands of the hospital and the police, in breach of the substantive limb of Article   3 of the Convention?   4.     As regards the alleged violation of Article 3, did the authorities discharge their obligation to conduct an effective investigation in that regard?