CEDH · CASELAW;COMMUNICATEDCASES;ENG — 8 mars 2021

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .s379BC09C { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s339D85E6 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s665E407E { margin-top:66pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s6B505E72 { margin:0pt; padding-left:0pt } .s5E8F5A28 { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:25.5pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .s3AAE10DF { margin-top:14pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s3CA22BA { font-family:Arial; text-transform:uppercase } .s5FFF0A75 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:7pt } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s76CF415B { page-break-before:always; clear:both } .sA9DE1872 { width:90.42%; border-collapse:collapse } .s52F4971 { width:8.32%; border:0.75pt solid #949494; padding:1.02pt 5.03pt; vertical-align:top; background-color:#dfdfdf } .s2EF62ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:12pt } .sEECE831 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#474747 } .sB438F7A6 { width:28.44%; border:0.75pt solid #949494; padding:1.02pt 5.03pt; vertical-align:top; background-color:#dfdfdf } .sDFB9C7DB { width:26.16%; border:0.75pt solid #949494; padding:1.02pt 5.03pt; vertical-align:top; background-color:#dfdfdf } .s82F61666 { width:19.9%; border:0.75pt solid #949494; padding:1.02pt 5.03pt; vertical-align:top; background-color:#dfdfdf } .s272290D8 { width:17.18%; border:0.75pt solid #949494; padding:1.02pt 5.03pt; vertical-align:top; background-color:#dfdfdf } .sE3D8A520 { width:8.32%; border:0.75pt solid #949494; padding:1.02pt 5.03pt; vertical-align:top } .sE58FF9D5 { margin-left:15.01pt; padding-left:2.84pt; font-family:Arial; font-size:12pt } .s2A6347A1 { width:28.44%; border:0.75pt solid #949494; padding:1.02pt 5.03pt; vertical-align:top } .sB32B2777 { width:26.16%; border:0.75pt solid #949494; padding:1.02pt 5.03pt; vertical-align:top } .sF9B97F6F { width:19.9%; border:0.75pt solid #949494; padding:1.02pt 5.03pt; vertical-align:top } .sB72187F6 { width:17.18%; border:0.75pt solid #949494; padding:1.02pt 5.03pt; vertical-align:top } Published on 29 March 2021   SECOND SECTION Application no. 30247/20 Vladislav GRIBINCEA and Others against the Republic of Moldova lodged on 10 July 2020 communicated on 8 March 2021 STATEMENT OF FACTS A list of the applicants is set out in the appendix. The circumstances of the case The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicants, may be summarised as follows. The five applicants were at the relevant time leaders of influential NGOs, journalists and a vice-president of one of the main opposition parties in Moldova. On 14 June 2019 RISE-Moldova, an investigative journalists’ association, published a report about the interception of communications of 51 persons during 2016-2018, which included the applicants. This included wiretapping, covert photo and video recording and monitoring of GPS data. RISE also published several documents from the criminal investigation files. On 25 January 2019 the Ministry of Interior replied to RISE that three criminal investigation files had been opened on 5 April 2016, 11 January and 17 July 2017 respectively concerning organisation of mass and violent disorder. According to the first applicant, he suspected for some time that he was being monitored. On 20 February 2019 he asked several authorities about whether he had been subjected to wiretapping. All three institutions (the Chișinău district court, the Information and Security Service and the Prosecutor General’s Office) replied that the information sought was confidential and that they could neither confirm nor deny that special investigative measures in his respect had taken place. On 25 June 2019, after the publication by RISE mentioned above, the first applicant asked the Prosecutor General’s Office for information about interception of his communications. After this was refused, he complained to the investigating judge, who dismissed the complaint on 4 June 2020 since the criminal investigation was still pending and access to the materials of the case would be given after it was finished. The judge also found that persons without any procedural status could be the subject of interception of their communications. In the meantime, on 14 August 2019 the criminal investigation mentioning the first applicant’s name was discontinued because no crime had been committed. The first applicant asked the Prosecutor General’s Office how he could access the materials of the case. In reply, he was informed on 23 September 2019 that his communications had been intercepted. However, since he had had no procedural status in the investigation, he had no right to access the materials. A criminal investigation was started on 2 September 2019 concerning the unlawful initiation of the investigation concerning, inter alias , the first applicant. In it a prosecutor found that there had been no reasons to start the investigation, which did not correspond to the facts of the case. On 28   May 2020 the first applicant was heard as a witness in that investigation. He asked to be acknowledged as a victim of an unlawful interception of his communications and for the punishment of all those responsible for that offence. COMPLAINTS 1.     The applicants complain under Article 8 of the Convention about the unlawful interception of their communications, as well as the video recording in the home of some of them. 2.     They also complain under Article 18 of the Convention that the secret surveillance measures were taken in their regard not in order to genuinely investigate a criminal act, but were in fact aimed at preventing and discouraging peaceful protests against the plans of those in power at the relevant time to change the electoral system.       QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES 1.     Has there been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention ( Iordachi and Others v. Moldova , no. 25198/02, 10 February 2009)? In particular: (i) were each of the applicants’ communications intercepted (and in respect of some applicants was there covert video surveillance, including in their homes)? (ii) if so, was the interference with the applicant’s rights prescribed by law, did it pursue one of the legitimate aims provided for in Article 8 § 2 and was it “necessary in a democratic society”? (iii) did the legislation offer sufficient guarantees to persons under covert surveillance, notably of an efficient supervision of the interception of communications, as well as of being eventually informed of such measures in order to effectively challenge them and claim compensation?   2.     Was there a breach of Article 18 in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention ( Aliyev v. Azerbaijan , nos. 68762/14 and 71200/14, §§ 197-216, 20 September 2018)?       APPENDIX     No. Applicant’s Name Year of birth/registration Nationality Place of residence   Vladislav GRIBINCEA 1980 Moldovan Chisinau   Arcadie BARBĂROȘIE 1949 Moldovan Ialoveni   Alexandru COZER 1988 Moldovan Chisinau   Dan PERCIUN 1991 Moldovan Chisinau   Vladimir SOLOVIOV 1980 Moldovan Slobozia