CEDH · CASELAW;COMMUNICATEDCASES;ENG — 29 juin 2020

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .s379BC09C { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s339D85E6 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s665E407E { margin-top:66pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } Communicated on 29 June 2020 Published on 20 July 2020   SECOND SECTION Application no. 56002/19 OÜ PAREM KALLAS against Estonia lodged on 21 October 2019 SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE The application concerns a delay in establishing the amount of compensation for the applicant’s land which had been designated for public use. In 2001 a municipality made a zoning decision designating land belonging to the applicant, a legal person, for a street. Under the law the municipality had the subsequent obligation to purchase this land from the applicant for immediate and fair compensation but remained inactive. In 2004 the applicant asked a court to order the municipality to purchase the land. The court granted the request. In 2006 the municipality set the amount of compensation on the basis of an expert opinion. The court quashed the decision and ordered the municipality to decide again on the amount, reasoning that the expert opinion had not taken into account adequate factors. The Supreme Court noted that if the municipality had unlawfully delayed the administrative proceedings of the applicant’s claim to order the purchase and the applicant had suffered damage, the issue of such damage could not be resolved in the ongoing compensation proceedings. From 2012 to 2017 the municipality set consecutively three more times the amounts and twice again the courts quashed the decisions as flawed but upheld the last decision. In 2019 the judgment entered into force. The applicant complains under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that it had to undergo judicial proceedings for a total of 15 years, an unreasonable time, and under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention that it did not receive any compensation for 15 years.   QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES 1.     Was Article   6 §   1 of the Convention under its civil head applicable to the entirety of the proceedings comprising the set of administrative procedures by the municipality? In particular, did the relevant period begin in 2004 when the applicant asked the domestic court to order the municipality to purchase the land and end in 2019 when the judgment upholding the final decision of the municipality entered into force? (See Czajkowska and Others v. Poland , no. 16651/05, § 44, 13 July 2010; Richeux v. France , no. 45256/99, § 35, 12 June 2003; Siegel v. France , no.   6350/97, §§ 33-38, ECHR 2000 ‑ XII; Kiefer v. Switzerland , no.   27353/95, §§ 8 and 26, 28 March 2000.)   2.     If so, has the applicant exhausted all effective domestic remedies, as required by Article   35 §   1 of the Convention? In particular, was the possibility to file a claim against the municipality for the compensation of the delays, as implied by the Supreme Court in the 2012 judgment, an effective remedy within the meaning of this provision in respect of the applicant’s complaints under Article 6 § 1 and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1? More specifically, was the possible remedy capable of providing redress in respect of the applicant’s complaints and offering reasonable prospects of success in practice?   3.     Was the length of the proceedings in the present case in breach of the “reasonable time” requirement of Article   6 §   1 of the Convention?   4.     Has there been an interference with the applicant’s peaceful enjoyment of possessions, within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol   No.   1? Did that interference impose an excessive individual burden on the applicant? In particular, was there an unreasonable delay in the payment of compensation? (See Czajkowska and Others v. Poland , no. 16651/05, §§   60-63, 13 July 2010; Schembri and Others v. Malta , no. 42583/06, §§   38-42, § 45, 10 November 2009).