CEDH · CASELAW;COMMUNICATEDCASES;ENG — 23 février 2018

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .sA6BC7FA7 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:right } .s9793A85B { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s8229ABDD { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center } .s68C46B95 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center } .s3F59B822 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-transform:uppercase } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic }   Communicated on 23 February 2018   THIRD SECTION Application no. 7202/18 Elvira Rashitovna DMITRIYEVA against Russia lodged on 22 January 2018 SUBJECT MATTER OF the CASE The application concerns the applicant’s conviction of an administrative offence for campaigning for participation in a public event which the local authorities had refused to approve. QUESTIONS tO THE PARTIES 1.     Did the applicant’s conviction of an administrative offence for calling for participation in a public event amount to an interference with her freedom of expression or freedom of assembly within the meaning of Articles 10 § 1 and 11 § 1 of the Convention? If so, was that interference compatible with the requirements of Articles 10 § 2 and 11 § 2? In particular: –     Was the interference prescribed by law? Do the relevant laws and regulations meet the “quality of law” requirements and are they sufficiently precise and foreseeable in their application? In particular, did Russian law draw a clear distinction between “campaigning for participation” and informing prospective participants about the aims, type, location, time and estimated number of participants in the public event (see the Constitutional Court’s judgment of 14 February 2013 no. 4-П)? –     Did the interference pursue a legitimate aim and was necessary in a democratic society? –     Was the decision-making process leading to the interference fair and such as to afford due respect to the interests safeguarded to the individual by the Convention (see, as a recent authority, Karácsony and Others v.   Hungary [GC], nos.   42461/13 and 44357/13, §   133, ECHR 2016)? In particular, did the domestic courts recognise that the case involved a conflict between the rights to freedom of expression and assembly and other legitimate interests and perform a balancing exercise, that is did they apply the “necessity in a democratic society” and “proportionality” tests, as required by the Plenary Supreme Court of Russia in its ruling no. 21 of 27   June 2013 (in particular, paragraphs 5 and 8)?   2.     Did the lack of a prosecuting party and the allegedly excessively active role of the trial court in the administrative offence proceedings entail violations of the principles of the equality of arms, adversarial procedure and impartiality under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (see Karelin v.   Russia , no.   926/08, 20   September 2016)?