CEDH · CASELAW;COMMUNICATEDCASES;ENG — 3 novembre 2017

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .sA6BC7FA7 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:right } .s9793A85B { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s8229ABDD { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center } .s68C46B95 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center } .s3F59B822 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-transform:uppercase } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic }   Communicated on 3 November 2017   FOURTH SECTION Application no. 51456/17 Dmytro Sergiyovych PONOMARENKO and Rayisa Oleksandrivna PONOMARENKO against Ukraine lodged on 20 July 2017 SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE The application concerns lack of adequate medical treatment and assistance for Mr   D. Ponomarenko (“the first applicant”) during his pre-trial detention. It further raises issues with regard to handcuffing of the first applicant in hospitals, as well as the lack of adequate reasoning for extension of his pre-trial detention. The case also concerns the allegations of Ms   R. Ponomarenko (“the second applicant”) that the State should be held responsible for the death of her son (the first applicant) and for her serious suffering caused by inhuman and degrading treatment of her son. The first applicant was held in pre-trial detention since 7 April 2016. According to the medical documents, he suffered from AIDS (IV clinical stage), tuberculosis, cryptococcal meningitis etiology. On 21 July 2017 the Court applied Rule 39, indicating to the Government that they should secure access for the first applicant to a specialised medical treatment. On 7 August 2017 the first applicant died in pre-trial detention. The second applicant maintained the application of the first applicant and submitted further complaints as specified below. Relying on Article 3 of the Convention, the first applicant complained that (i) he had not been provided with adequate medical treatment; (ii) he had not received relevant care and assistance in detention given his serious physical disability; (iii)   he had been handcuffed and tied to bed during the periods when he underwent medical treatment in hospitals. The first applicant further complained under Article 5   §   3 of the Convention that his lengthy pre-trial detention had not been based on the relevant and sufficient reasons. The second applicant complains under Article 2 of the Convention that the lack of medical treatment and special care during the long period of the first applicant’s pre-trial detention brought to the death of the latter. The second applicant further complains under Article 3 of the Convention that she has endured serious mental suffering by witnessing the ill-treatment to which the first applicant had been subjected during his pre-trial detention. QUESTIONS tO THE PARTIES 1.     Was the first applicant subjected to ill-treatment prohibited by Article   3 of the Convention in view of his allegations that:   (i) he had not been provided with adequate medical treatment;   (ii) he had not received relevant care and assistance in detention given his serious physical disability (see Helhal v. France , no. 10401/12, §§   49 ‑ 52, 19   February 2015);   (iii)   he had been handcuffed and tied to bed during his medical treatment in hospitals?   2.     Was the overall period of the first applicant’s pre-trial detention compatible with requirements of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention?   3.     Has the first applicant’s right to life, ensured by Article 2 of the Convention, been violated in the present case?   4.     Was the second applicant subjected to ill-treatment prohibited by Article 3 of the Convention?   5.     Having regard to the interim measure indicated by the Court and the subsequent death of the first applicant in detention, was there a hindrance by the State in the present case with the effective exercise of the right of application, ensured by Article 34 of the Convention?