CEDH · CASELAW;COMMUNICATEDCASES;ENG — 10 avril 2013

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .s523616E0 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s3E839E41 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:30pt; text-align:center } .s58ABC179 { margin-top:30pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s2D57E2E { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; text-transform:uppercase } .s87F05BA2 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s11869A80 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:18pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s7EE1C8F0 { margin-top:18pt; margin-left:29.2pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:-17.6pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .s684F2214 { margin-top:18pt; margin-left:29.2pt; margin-bottom:24pt; text-indent:-17.6pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s25BD2B45 { margin-top:24pt; margin-left:36.6pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:-15.05pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s984A15CA { margin-top:6pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .sEC177689 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:36pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s967D43C6 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } FIRST SECTION Application no. 31154/07 Ljubica NIKOLOVA against the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia lodged on 10 July 2007 STATEMENT OF FACTS   The applicant, Ms Ljubica Nikolova, is a Macedonian national, who was born in 1931 and lives in Veles. A.     The circumstances of the case The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows. The applicant was the owner of a plot of undeveloped land, the total surface area of which was 558m2 (“the land”). On 30 June 1987 the Council of the Municipality of Kavadarci (“the Municipality”) confiscated the land. As stated in the confiscation order, the confiscation was carried out for the benefit of the Municipality and in the interest of the then company K. ( во корист на општина Кавадарци, а за потребите на ООЗТ „К.) in order to construct a storehouse ( стовариште ). On 25 July 1989 the Municipality requested, in non-contentious proceedings, that the Kavadarci Court of First Instance (“the first-instance court”) determines the amount of compensation to be paid to the applicant. The request was submitted after the parties (the applicant and the Municipality) had failed to reach an agreement on the issue. On 20 August 1997 the first-instance court ordered that the State paid to the applicant the equivalent to 11,500 euros (EUR) in compensation for the land, the total surface area of which was, according to the judgment, 644m2. The court determined the amount of compensation and the total surface area of the land on the basis of two expert reports. On 23 April 1998 the Skopje Court of Appeal quashed that judgment and remitted the case for a fresh consideration due to substantial procedural flaws. On 29 December 1999 the first-instance court awarded the applicant the equivalent to EUR 8,000 in compensation for the confiscated land (558m2). It ordered that the compensation is paid by a company M.K., the successor of the company K. and the State. The former was ordered to pay compensation for part of the land that it had used and the latter, to pay compensation for the remainder which had been reserved for the construction of a public road. The court further dismissed the claim against the Municipality finding that it had no capacity to be sued ( недостаток на пасивна легитимација ). On 20 April 2000 the Skopje Court of Appeal accepted appeals lodged by the State and the company M.K. and remitted the case for renewed examination. It held that bankruptcy proceedings were pending against the company M.K. and that any claims should be established in those proceedings. It further found that the lower court had incorrectly established that the State should pay compensation. On 11 December 2001 the first-instance court ordered that the Municipality paid compensation, which amount was set at approximately EUR 9,000, since the 1987 confiscation order had specified it as the beneficiary of the confiscation. It dismissed the claim as regards the State and the company M.K. due to lack of capacity to be sued. On 27 February 2003 that judgment was quashed by the Skopje Court of Appeal, which held that inter alia the lower court had not established who had been the final beneficiary of the land. On 27 May 2004 the first-instance court, relying inter alia on section 11 of the Expropriation Act (see “Relevant domestic law” below), held that the company M.K.2000, the legal successor of the company M.K., and the Public Road Fund ( Фонд за магистрални и регионални патишта Скопје ), should pay compensation, which amount was equivalent to approximately EUR 8,650, which corresponded to the market value of the land. It dismissed the claim as regards the State and the Municipality for lack of standing. It further held that each party to the proceedings should cover their own trial costs. On 16 November 2005 the Skopje Court of Appeal upheld the lower court’s judgment, with the exception of the trial costs, which was remitted for fresh consideration. On 10 February 2006 the first-instance court ordered the company M.K.2000 and the Public Road Fund to pay the trial costs incurred by the applicant. No information was provided whether that judgment became final. On 25 April 2007 the Supreme Court accepted a legality review request ( барање за заштита на законитоста ) in which the public prosecutor complained about the lower courts’ judgments ordering the company M.K.2000 and the Public Road Fund to compensate the applicant for the confiscated land. The Supreme Court overturned the first-and second-instance courts’ judgments and dismissed the request that they paid compensation to the applicant. Relying on sections 3 and 11 of the Expropriation Act, the court held that the company M.K.2000 and the Public Road Fund could not be held responsible to pay any compensation for the land confiscated in the interest of the company K., which had ceased to exist. The land had been a State-owned developed land. The company M.K.2000 and the Public Road Fund did not have accordingly the requisite standing to be sued. B.     Relevant domestic law Expropriation Act, with the amendment of 1998 (Official Gazette nos. 33/1995 and 20/1998) Section 3 of the Expropriation Act provided that the State was the beneficiary of the expropriation. The expropriation could be ordered for the benefit of legal and physical persons with a view to the construction of objects in the public interest. The 1998 amendment modified sub-section 2 of this paragraph and included the municipalities among the beneficiaries of the expropriation. Section 11 provided that compensation for an expropriated land and costs of expropriation were to be paid by the beneficiary of the expropriation in whose interest the expropriation was ordered. COMPLAINTS The applicant complains under Article 6 of the Convention that the proceedings lasted too long. She also complains under Article 1 of Protocol   No. 1 in view of the fact that she received no compensation for the confiscated land.       QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES   1.     Was the length of the non-contentious proceedings in the present case in breach of the “reasonable time” requirement of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention?   2.   Has there been an interference with the applicant’s peaceful enjoyment of possessions, within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, given the fact that, on the basis of the Supreme Court’s judgment of 25 April 2007, she received no compensation for the confiscated land? If so, was that interference proportionate within the meaning of this provision?