CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;ADMISSIBILITYCOM;ENG — 12 décembre 2023

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s2EF17D91 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:2pt } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s339D85E6 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:14pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s5FFF0A77 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:1pt } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sB9D5CABB { width:28.35pt; display:inline-block } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .s3AAE10DF { margin-top:14pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s3CA22BA { font-family:Arial; text-transform:uppercase } .s9F46BEC9 { margin-top:14pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; font-size:14pt } .s2D9C6089 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s84651E4E { margin-top:14pt; margin-left:14.2pt; margin-bottom:3pt; text-align:justify } .s69DCC830 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s4598CDF { width:70.9pt; display:inline-block } .sB6A7F5BF { width:17.54pt; display:inline-block } .s235C1871 { width:137.76pt; display:inline-block } .s5D826FD4 { width:25.88pt; display:inline-block } .s1B61D60 { width:156.43pt; display:inline-block }     SECOND SECTION DECISION Application no. 56132/21 A.T. against Norway   The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting on 12   December 2023 as a Committee composed of:   Jovan Ilievski , President ,   Lorraine Schembri Orland,   Diana Sârcu , judges , and Dorothee von Arnim, Deputy Section Registrar, Having regard to: the application (no.   56132/21) against the Kingdom of Norway lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 8   November 2021 by a Norwegian national, Ms A.T. (“the applicant”), who was born in 1983 and lives in R.; the decision not to disclose the applicant’s name; Having deliberated, decides as follows: SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE 1.     The application concerns proceedings in which a care order in respect of the applicant’s child, X, was issued. 2.     X was born in 2018 and the child welfare services monitored the child from her birth, as they had already been in contact with the family due to notices of concerns related to the applicant’s older children. Guidance in respect of childcare was given to X’s parents up to three times weekly but the parents frequently cancelled those appointments. A stay at a family centre was also offered to them, but they declined. As from 2019 the family was referred to the child and adolescent psychiatry unit (an outpatient specialist health service that is independent of the child welfare services and that offers services to children and their families). 3 .     On 8 April 2020 a decision to place X in an emergency foster home was taken and the child welfare services applied to the County Social Welfare Board for a care order. The hearing before the Board was originally to be held in June 2020 but was rescheduled in order to await an assessment by a psychologist, whom the Board, following a meeting on 12 June 2020 to plan the proceedings, appointed as an expert on 15 June 2020. The applicant and X’s father opposed the appointment of the expert. The expert submitted her report on 25 September 2020 and the hearing was held on 26 and 27   October 2020. 4 .     On 5 November 2020, after hearing the parents, the court-appointed expert and eleven witnesses, the Board issued a care order in respect of X. The applicant and X’s father’s contact was set at two hours twelve times per year. In its decision, the Board examined, inter alia , X’s care needs and whether the applicant – with further assistance – could meet those needs; the parents had separated at that time and there was an agreement that the applicant would have custody over X. The Board noted that X was born with a heart defect and that, since the age of 5 months, she had struggled with low weight gain. The child and adolescent psychiatry unit had raised concerns about X’s delayed development and noted that she had a particular need for care and developmental support to prevent future maldevelopment. The Board further observed that the applicant struggled with her mental health and did not appear to understand X’s particular needs. Before the care order was issued, X had had an apparent relapse in her development and gave little eye contact. Her hygiene was not taken care of, and she had a 40% absence from kindergarten. The Board also noted that the applicant’s older daughter at some point had contacted the child welfare services to inform them that the conditions in their home were not good. After X had moved to the foster home, the expert psychologist described that there was a clear improvement in her linguistic development. It was further reported from the hospital that she had gained weight and was less exposed to infectious diseases. X appeared calmer, made more eye contact, and had a positive development in her social skills. The Board considered whether the positive development seen while X was in public care could be obtained in the applicant’s care with the necessary assistance measures. It noted that different assistance measures had been attempted, including approximately 72 hours of family guidance and economic support to make sure X attended kindergarten. The Board stated that the applicant had shown no signs of a permanent change and that she had not been able to adopt the guidance that had been offered. Since the measures attempted had not enabled the applicant to provide X with the adequate emotional and supportive care, it was considered to be in X’s best interest to uphold the care order. In its assessments, the Board took account of the appointed psychologist’s considerations. 5 .     On 19 March 2021 the District Court, endorsing the reasons given by the Board, upheld the Board’s decision and granted contact rights two hours twelve times per year. The parents could choose to have individual contact sessions (which were set at two hours eight times per year for the applicant, and two hours four times per year for X’s father). In accordance with the expert’s recommendation, the child welfare services had the right to supervise the contact sessions and / or the foster mother could be present, should this be deemed necessary to improve the quality of the contact sessions. The applicant and X’s father had no objection to the decision on supervision   / attendance of the foster mother. 6.     On 31 May 2021 the High Court rejected an appeal lodged by the applicant and X’s father against the District Court’s judgment and on 7   July 2021 the Supreme Court dismissed appeals by the applicant and X’s father against the High Court’s decision. 7.     Relying on Article 8 of the Convention, the applicant submitted, firstly, that the time taken by the Board to process the case had not been in accordance with the expediency requirements set out in domestic law. She submitted, secondly, that the relapse in X’s development had not been due to deficiencies in her provision of emotional care and that the threshold applied for the issuance of a care order had been too low. THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT 8.     The Court finds that the care order which was issued in respect of X entailed an interference with the applicant’s right to respect for her family life for the purposes of Article 8 § 1 of the Convention. 9 .     That interference was in accordance with domestic law, namely the 1992 Child Welfare Act, which was applicable at the material time. 10.     Furthermore, the Court considers that the interference pursued the legitimate aim of protecting X’s “rights” and her “health”. The remaining question is whether it was “necessary” within the meaning of Article 8 § 2 of the Convention. 11.     The general principles relevant to the necessity test were extensively set out in Strand Lobben and Others v. Norway ([GC], no. 37283/13, §§   202   13, 10 September 2019) and have since been restated in a number of cases, including Abdi Ibrahim v. Norway ([GC], no. 15379/16, §   145, 10   December 2021). From those principles, it follows that the Court must determine whether, in the light of the entirety of the case, the reasons adduced to justify the measures in question were relevant and sufficient for the purposes of Article 8 § 2 and whether the parents have been adequately involved in the decision-making process seen as a whole (see Strand Lobben and Others , cited above, §§ 203 and 212). With a view to the applicant’s specific submissions, the Court also reiterates that it recognises that the authorities enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in assessing the necessity of taking a child into care (ibid., § 211). 12.     As to the reasons provided in the instant case, the Court notes that both the Board and the District Court examined X’s care needs in detail and the applicant’s ability to meet those needs, including whether sufficient competence could be attained by the use of assistance measures (see paragraphs 4 and 5 above). Both the Board and the District Court made a concrete assessment based on, inter alia , statements given by the applicant, other witnesses and information provided by the expert psychologist. In this connection it was found that X, while in the applicant’s care, had had a relapse in her development, that she was restless and nervous, struggled socially, and gave little eye contact. Her hygiene was not taken care of, she had recurring infectious diseases, and 40% absence from kindergarten. The Court does not, in the present case, find any grounds for setting aside the considerations made by the authorities as to the facts, including the expert psychologist’s description of the relapse in X’s development, which are matters of evidence that are normally for the domestic courts to assess (see Strand Lobben and Others , cited above, § 213). Regarding assistance measures, the expert psychologist had stated that preventive measures had been attempted over time without success and that available measures would be insufficient to compensate for the lack of care at the time. In the Court’s assessment, the domestic authorities explained why a care order was necessary in a manner that included both relevant and sufficient reasons. 13 .     With a view to the complaint in so far as it relates to the processing of the case by the Board and the alleged consequences of the extra time taken to process the case on account of the appointment of the expert (see paragraph 3 above), the Court reiterates with regard to the authorities’ decision-making process that in cases relating to public-care measures such as the present one, there is always the danger that any procedural delay will result in the de facto determination of the issue submitted to the court before it has held its hearing (see Strand Lobben and Others , cited above, § 212). At the same time the means to ascertain the relevant facts are also as a general rule for the domestic authorities to assess (ibid., § 213). In the instant case the Court, observing the complexity of the case before the domestic authorities, does not find a basis for considering that the Board’s decision to mandate an expert entailed a shortcoming in its decision-making process or in any other manner had a detrimental effect on the outcome. The Court observes that that appointment entailed a postponement of the hearing that had originally been scheduled for June 2020 to October 2020 (see paragraph 3 above) and that the Board’s reasons in any event do not indicate that sole importance was given to X’s attachment to her emergency foster home. 14.     In view of the above, the Court considers that the interference with the applicant’s right to respect for her family life was proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued and thus was “necessary in a democratic society” for the purposes of Article 8 § 2. The application is therefore manifestly ill ‑ founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) and must therefore be rejected in accordance with Article   35 §   4 of the Convention. For these reasons, the Court, unanimously, Declares the application inadmissible. Done in English and notified in writing on 18 January 2024.     Dorothee von Arnim   Jovan Ilievski   Deputy Registrar   President