CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 6 septembre 2022

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margin-left:34pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:-17pt; text-align:justify } .sE5BF05B1 { width:2.33pt; font:7pt 'Times New Roman'; display:inline-block } .s2D9C6089 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s69DCC830 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sA04AE28A { width:35.22pt; display:inline-block } .s264C88EB { width:142.43pt; display:inline-block } .s5A65B3DC { width:46.56pt; display:inline-block } .s44B8752F { width:177.11pt; display:inline-block } .s9793A85B { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt } .s379BC09C { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s76CF415B { page-break-before:always; clear:both }   THIRD SECTION CASE OF BODALEV v. RUSSIA (Application no. 67200/12)     JUDGMENT Art 10 • Freedom of expression • Insufficient reasons for convicting applicant of administrative offences for peaceful, non-disruptive performances in public space amounting to political expression or protest • No justification provided for treating the performances as “assemblies” and thereby requiring prior notification under domestic law Art 11 • Freedom of peaceful assembly • Insufficient reasons for administrative offence convictions for attending protest rallies • Disproportionate sentences, conducive to creating a “chilling effect” on legitimate recourse to protests   STRASBOURG 6 September 2022   FINAL   06/12/2022   This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Bodalev v. Russia, The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Georges Ravarani, President,   Georgios A. Serghides,   María Elósegui,   Darian Pavli,   Peeter Roosma,   Andreas Zünd,   Mikhail Lobov, judges, and Milan Blaško, Section Registrar, Having regard to: the application (no.   67200/12) against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Russian national, Mr Ivan Sergeyevich Bodalev on 13 September 2012; the decision to give notice to the Russian Government (“the Government”) of the complaints under Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention and to declare inadmissible the remainder of the application; the parties’ observations; Having deliberated in private on 25 January and 28 June 2022, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last ‑ mentioned date: INTRODUCTION 1.     The present case concerns the applicant’s prosecution in relation to his participation in peaceful assemblies. THE FACTS 2.     The Government were initially represented by Mr M. Galperin, former Representative of the Russian Federation to the European Court of Human Rights, and later by his successor in this office, Mr M. Vinogradov. 3.     The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. Protest rally on 4 December 2011 4.     On 4 December 2011 the applicant took part in a rally in St   Petersburg protesting against the alleged fraud committed during the election to the State Duma on the same day. 5 .     Before the Court the applicant referred to a video accessible at an Internet video hosting service. The video appeared to show that rally from different angles and at different moments. The video showed a police officer speaking to a loudspeaker and indicating that the rally had not received official approval from the competent authority, that it therefore was in breach of the Public Events Act (hereinafter “the PEA”); and that participants’ actions could amount to an administrative offence. The officer also asked the journalists who were present at the venue of the rally not to impede the police in carrying out their duties. That text was repeated, in nearly identical terms, several times. 6.     The applicant was arrested and taken to the police station. He was released on 5   December 2011. 7.     On 7 February 2012 a justice of the peace sentenced the applicant to fines of 700 Russian roubles (RUB; 18 euros (EUR)) for the offences under Articles 19.3 §   1 and 20.2 § 2 of the Code of Administrative Offence (CAO) (see paragraphs 41 and 42 below). On both charges the justice of the peace held that the public event in the form of a meeting ( митинг ) had not been notified to the competent authority in breach of section 5 of the PEA and sub ‑ paragraph 2 of paragraph   3 of section 6 of the PEA (see paragraphs 38 and 39 below); the police had informed the participants accordingly several times and had instructed them to stop the meeting and to disperse. 8.     The applicant appealed before the Kirovo-Chepetskiy District Court of the Kirov Region, arguing that there had been no evidence that he (rather than the “event” itself or other people) had not complied with the statutory obligation to respect the “public order” under sub-paragraph 2 of paragraph   3 of section 6 of the PEA. 9.     The applicant was notified of the appeal hearing but decided to not participate in it. On 26 March 2012 the District Court upheld the trial judgments. 10.     The applicant received copies of the appeal decisions on an unspecified date. On 25 May and 14   August 2012 he sought review under Article 30.12 of the CAO in respect of his convictions under Articles 19.3 §   1 and 20.2 § 2 of the CAO respectively. On 22 June and 6   September 2012 the Deputy President of the Kirov Regional Court confirmed those convictions on review. He stated that it was not “possible” in a CAO case to ascertain whether the police had acted lawfully. Protest rally on 6 December 2011 11.     On 6 December 2011 the applicant took part in another protest rally relating to the recent election. It was held at around 7.30 p.m. on a weekday near one of the entrances to a metro station. 12.     Before the Court the applicant referred to a video accessible at an Internet video hosting service. Its content was similar to the video relating to the rally on 4 December 2011 (see paragraph 5 above). 13.     The police arrested a number of people, including the applicant. 14.     The police compiled an offence report in respect of the applicant, indicating that the rally in the form of a meeting was in breach of section 6 §   3 (2) of the PEA; that Officer A. and other officers had made several warnings to the participants, specifying that breach and instructing them to disperse; that the applicant had not complied with that order and thereby committed an offence under Article   19.3 §   1 of the CAO. 15 .     On 7 December 2011 a justice of the peace sentenced the applicant to eleven days of detention for that offence. On 12 March 2012 the Kuybyshevskiy District Court of St Petersburg heard the applicant and upheld the judgment in substance. It also stated that the meeting had been held next to an entrance to a metro station during the time when the passenger traffic had been intense; in view of the political nature of the event entailing expressions of discontent and the large number of demonstrators, there had been a “real threat to other people”. 16.     On 16   March 2012 the applicant sought review of the court decisions mentioned above. On 10 April 2012 the St Petersburg City Court upheld them. On 17 August 2012 the Supreme Court of Russia upheld them on the second review. “Performance” on 26 November 2012 17 .     On 26 November 2012 the applicant and several other people staged a “performance” aimed at “reviving” the Russian Constitution and consisting of a coffin filled with the brochures containing its texts, and a speech. The applicant held a poster saying “Let us resurrect the Constitution” and uttered several slogans like “Follow your own laws”, “Stop the police state” and “We need a different Russia”. 18.     The police were present during that “performance”. After it ended, the applicant was arrested and taken to the local police station. 19.     On 17 December 2012 a justice of the peace sentenced him to a fine of RUB 15,000 (EUR 373) under Article 20.2 § 5 of the CAO. The justice of the peace considered that the “performance” amounted to a “public event” regulated under the PEA; that that event had not been notified to the competent authority and “had been in breach of section 6 of the PEA”; and that the applicant had taken part in that unlawful event. 20.     The applicant appealed, arguing that a lawful conviction under paragraph 5 of Article   20.2 of the CAO required proof that as a participant he had breached the obligations or bans listed in section 6 §§ 3 and 4 of the PEA; that neither the offence report nor the trial judgment described and held against him any failure to comply with any ban or obligation. 21.     On 6   June 2014 the Kuybyshevskiy District Court of St Petersburg upheld the judgment in a summary manner. 22.     The applicant sought review of the court decisions mentioned above. He reiterated his arguments concerning the interpretation and application of section 6 of the PEA. 23 .     On 9 September 2014 the City Court upheld those court decisions. It held that it was established that the applicant had held a poster and had distributed leaflets during the event; that thereby he had taken part in a “public event”, which had not been notified to the competent authority. Protest rally on 31 December 2012 24 .     On 31 December 2012 the applicant took part in another rally at which the police were present. He was arrested during that rally, allegedly, prior to hearing any specific order from the police and, a fortiori , prior to disobeying it. 25 .     By separate judgments issued on 1 January 2013 the Kuybyshevskiy District Court of St Petersburg sentenced him to fines of RUB   700   and RUB   20,000 (EUR 17 and 497 respectively) under Article 19.3 § 1 and Article 20.2 § 5 of the CAO respectively. The District Court held in relation to the charge under Article   20.2   §   5 that the police officer had informed the participants that the event had not been notified and “had explained the consequences of taking part in such an event”. 26 .     On 31   January 2013 the City Court held an appeal hearing. The applicant was present at it. At the closure of the hearing the court delivered the operative part of the appeal decisions to uphold the trial judgments. It appears that the applicant received the texts of the appeal decisions on 21   February 2013. The City Court held in relation to the charge under Article   20.2 §   5 that the participants “had been publicly notified by a police officer about the violation of the law”. On 12 April 2013 the Deputy President of the City Court confirmed those court decisions on review. rally on 5 April 2013 27 .     On 5 April 2013 the applicant took part in a public assembly together with less than twenty people, near the building of the St Petersburg Administration of the Bank of Russia. It appears that the event was aimed at carrying the message that the Russian Government needed to prevent the removal of the State-owned enterprises’ revenues to offshore jurisdictions. 28.     According to the applicant, when the event was about to end, the police arrived and arrested him and some other participants. 29 .     With reference to a video recording, the applicant was sentenced to a fine of RUB 1,000 (EUR 21) under Article 19.3 of the CAO for disobedience to a lawful police order to disperse, despite a repeated order from the police. On appeal, the City Court watched the video recording and concluded that a police officer had once pronounced a phrase that the event had been unlawful; the recording did not confirm that he had made any repeated statements or orders to cease participation in the event; the officer had not been examined at the trial as regards the relevant circumstances. The appeal court quashed the conviction. The first-instance court then returned the case to the police. The proceedings were not pursued thereafter. 30.     Instead, on 10 June 2013 the Nevskiy District Court of St   Petersburg convicted the applicant under Article   20.2 § 2 of the CAO for organising and holding the public event that had not been notified to the competent authority. On 20 August 2013 the City Court upheld the judgment. The City Court held that it was irrelevant for the offence under paragraph 2 of Article 20.2 of the CAO whether the police had ordered a dispersal. 31.     The applicant sought review of those court decisions under Article   30.12 of the CAO. Referring to the video recording, the applicant argued that the police had only announced once their position on the legality of the event while making, and even less repeating, no specific order to disperse. On 21   November 2013 the Deputy President of the City Court reclassified the case under Article   20.2 § 5 of the CAO and held as follows: “Thus, a participant’s obligations as provided by the law are not related to the fact whether that person took part in a public event, which was or was not approved by the executive authority. Irrespective of that, a participant is required to comply with the obligations and bans provided for by [the Public Events Act] ... It follows from the circumstances of the case that [the applicant] participated in a public event in the form of a meeting, which had not been approved by [the authority]. Thus, he was a participant rather than the organiser of that event. At the same time, by participating in the meeting and after being informed by the police that it was being held in breach of the requirement under the [Public Events Act] concerning notification of a public event, [the applicant] did not comply with the lawful order from the police to stop the meeting and to disperse. Thus, he violated the obligations imposed on him as a participant of a public event, namely the obligation to comply with all lawful instructions ... from the police. Therefore, his actions should be classified under paragraph 5 of Article 20.2 of the CAO.” The Deputy President sentenced the applicant to a fine of RUB   20,000 (EUR 450 at the time), noting that he had previously been prosecuted for similar offences. 32 .     On 11 March 2014 the Supreme Court of Russia upheld the judgment of 21 November 2013. The Supreme Court confirmed, inter alia , the finding that a participant’s statutory obligations under section 6 § 3 of the PEA applied both to notified and non-notified public events. “Performance” on 27 June 2013 33 .     On 27 June 2013 the applicant and five others came in front of the building of the local office of the Federal Migration Service (FMS) in St   Petersburg. Once there, one of them put a ladder to the wall of the building. The applicant and another person climbed by that ladder onto the balcony at the first floor of the building. There they shouted slogans “FMS in Dushanbe” and “Freedom to the people” and unfolded a red flag with a white circle with a picture of a grenade. Apparently, that flag was related to The Other Russia , a non-registered political party (see Lashmankin and Others v. Russia , nos.   57818/09 and 14 others, § 123, 7 February 2017, and Karuyev v. Russia , no. 4161/13, § 2, 18 January 2022). 34.     It appears that a migration officer opened the balcony door and invited the applicant and the other person to enter inside. They complied. The FMS office called the police. Police officers arrived and took the applicant to the local police station. An offence report was compiled accusing him of an offence under Article 20.2 § 2 of the CAO because the police considered that the “performance” amounted to an assembly regulated by the Public Events Act and thus required a prior notification to the city administration. However, no such notification had been submitted to it. 35.     On 8   October 2013 the Dzerzhinskiy District Court of St   Petersburg convicted the applicant under Article   20.2 § 2 of the CAO and sentenced him to a fine of RUB   20,000 (EUR 456). The court considered that the event concerned criticism of the legislation on migration, amounted to a “public event” regulated by the PEA, specifically a group static demonstration (a “picketing”); that the applicant was the organiser of that event; that he had not notified it to the competent authority in breach of the PEA. 36 .     The applicant appealed.   On 19   December 2013 the City Court considered that the applicant had participated in the demonstration and had not been its organiser. The appeal court reclassified the charge under Article   20.2 § 5 of the CAO and upheld the fine, finding as follows: “In the judgment of 8 October 2013 the district court established that [the applicant] had voluntarily participated in a public event in the form of a static demonstration; and that that demonstration had not been notified as required by the law ... Article 20.2 § 2 of the CAO... only concerns an organiser of a public event, who violated section 5 § 5 of the [Public Events Act] prohibiting running a public event without notifying a public authority. A participant’s action or inaction during [that] event should be classified under paragraph 5 of Article 20.2 of the CAO ... Since [the applicant] had participated in the static demonstration which had not been notified to [the authority], he had acted as a participant rather than the organiser of that demonstration.” Noting that the applicant had already been convicted of similar offences in 2012 and 2013 the appeal court decided that the fine of RUB 20,000 was appropriate. The applicant had not been present at the appeal hearing. The text of the appeal decision was dispatched to him on 31 January 2014. RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE 37.     For a summary of the relevant domestic law see Lashmankin and   Others v. Russia (nos.   57818/09   and 14 others, §§   216-312, 7 February 2017), and Navalnyy v. Russia ([GC], nos. 29580/12 and 4   others, §§ 43-48, 15 November 2018). The provisions directly relevant to the present case are set out below. Public Events Act 38 .     The Federal Law on Gatherings, Meetings, Demonstrations, Processions and Pickets, no.   54-FZ of 19 June 2004 (“the Public Events Act” or “PEA”) provides that the organiser of a public event must   notify the executive or municipal authority of the event (sections 5 and 7 of the Act). 39 .     Section 6 § 3 of the PEA provides as follows: “3.     During a public event the participants must: 1) comply with all lawful instructions [ требования ] given by the event organiser, the persons designated by the organiser, the designated representative of the executive authority of the constituency of the Russian Federation or the municipality, or by law enforcement officers; 2) respect the public order [ общественный порядок ] and the programme of the public event; 3) comply with regulations aimed at ensuring transport safety and traffic security ... where vehicles are used for the public event ...” The Constitutional Court considered that where during a public event a participant uses symbols or other elements of visual support which are prohibited by Russian law, this may amount to a breach of the obligation to respect the “public order” under paragraph 3 of section 6 of the PEA (decision   no.   3089-O of 26 November 2018). In June 2012 section 6 § 4 was added to the PEA. It states that public event participants are not allowed (1) to cover their face, including by way of using masks or other objects specially designed to impede a person’s identification; (2) to be in possession of arms or objects used as such, beer or beverages produced from it; 3) to be in a state of alcoholic intoxication at the venue of the public event. 40 .     Pursuant to section 16 of the Act, the grounds for ending a public event shall be (i)   the emergence of a genuine threat to citizens’ lives or health, and to the possessions of physical or legal persons; (ii) commission by the participants of unlawful acts or a deliberate breach by the organiser of the rules for the conduct of public events established by the Act; (iii) since 2012, non-compliance by the organisers with the obligations set out in section 5 of the Act. Section 17 provides that if it is decided to end the public event the representative of the executive or municipal authority (1)     shall give an order to the organiser of the public event to end the public event, having explained the reasons for its termination, and within twenty ‑ four hours, shall issue this order in writing and serve it on the organiser of the public event; (2)     shall set the time for compliance with the order to end the public event; (3)     if the organiser does not comply with the order to end the public event, shall directly address the participants of the public event and set an additional time for compliance with the order to end the public event. In the event of non ‑ compliance with the order to end the public event the police shall take the necessary measures to end the public event. That procedure for ending a public event shall not apply in the event of mass disorder, mob violence, arson, or other situations requiring urgent action. Code of Administrative Offences 41 .     Article 19.3 § 1 of the CAO provided at the time that the following conduct was punishable with a fine of RUB 500 to 1,000 or administrative detention for up to fifteen days: (i) disobedience to a lawful order or request made by a police officer, a military officer or a detention facility officer, in connection with the exercise of his or her duties relating to securing public order and public safety; (ii) resistance to those officers in the exercise of their official duties. 42 .     Article 20.2   § 2 of the CAO provided, prior to June 2012, that violation of the rules for running a public event was punishable by a fine of RUB 1,000 to 2,000 as regards organisers and a fine of RUB 500 to 1,000 for participants. Subsequently, Article 20.2 of the CAO was amended. Since June 2012 it contained a new paragraph 5 concerning participants. It provided that the following conduct was punishable   with a fine   of   from RUB   10,000 to 20,000 or up to forty hours of community work:   violation by   a   participant in a public event of the rules for running a public event. 43 .     On 26   June 2018 the Plenary of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation adopted the Resolution “On certain questions arising during judicial examination of administrative cases and cases on administrative offences related to the application of the legislation on public events”. To ensure consistency in judicial practice the Supreme Court provided the judiciary with guidelines on application of the legislation, primarily the PEA and the CAO, in resolving administrative disputes and applying administrative liability, indicating that: (a)     the violation by a participant in a public event of the established procedure for running ( порядок проведения ) a public event – constituting an offence under Article 20.2 § 5 of the CAO – is only established where the demonstrator did not comply with (or violated) one of the obligations and prohibitions incumbent on demonstrators under section   6 §§ 3 and 4 of the Public Events Act. For instance, one such obligation requires compliance with all legal orders made by the police, military officers or National Guard officers; and (b)     the failure by a participant in a public event to comply with lawful orders or instructions of the police was to be classified under Article 20.2 §   5 of the CAO, which was in these circumstances to be regarded as a lex specialis in relation to Article   19.3 §   1 of the Code (§   33 of the Resolution). 44.     In Ruling no. 19-P of 17 May 2021 the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation held that the constitutional right of peaceful assembly implies a real opportunity – through organising and participating in public events regulated under the Public Events Act – to influence the activities of public authorities by way of maintaining a civilised dialogue between civic society ( гражданское общество ) and the State. This does not exclude the protest nature of such events or criticism directed at specific acts or actions on the part of public authorities or at their policies. Therefore, the authorities’ reaction to those events should be neutral and – irrespective of political, cultural or other views expressed by organisers or demonstrators – should be aimed at facilitating the lawful exercise of freedom of peaceful assembly, including by way of elaborating precise regulations for organising and holding public events and by avoiding restrictions that exceed what is acceptable in a democratic State based on the rule of law. Legislative, regulatory or other measures on the part of public authorities in this regard should not unjustifiably restrict the constitutional right of peaceful assembly. Restrictions should be based on the principles of necessity and proportionality, with due regard to the presumption in favour of the organisers’ and demonstrators’ willingness to maintain the peaceful nature of the event. Article 20.2 of the CAO, which uses a “blanket reference” technique, should be interpreted and applied with reference to the contents of the relevant legislation and regulations. It is precisely their breach, specifically as regards the notification procedure for public events, that constitutes an element of the administrative offence. Police Act 2011 45 .     Section 13 § 1 (1) and (7) of the Police Act (Federal Law no. 3-FZ of 7   February 2011) provides that outside the context of public events being held lawfully the police is authorised to make an (oral) order requiring citizens to disperse or to go to another location, where the amassing of people poses a threat to their lives or health, the lives or health of other citizens, possessions ( объекты собственности ) or interferes with the work of organisations or impedes the traffic of vehicles or pedestrians. THE LAW ALLEGED VIOLATIONs OF ARTICLEs 10 and 11 OF THE CONVENTION 46.     The applicant complained that (i) his convictions on account of the “performances” on 26 November 2012 and 27   June 2013 had violated Article   10 of the Convention; (ii) his participation in the peaceful rallies on 4   and 6 December 2011, 31   December 2012 and 5 April 2013 had violated Articles 10 and/or 11 of the Convention. 47.     The thrust of the complaint in relation to the “performances” concerns the applicant’s exercise of the right to freedom of expression and the respondent State’s choice to “interfere” with it by way of a conviction for violating the rules applicable to political rallies. The Court will examine this complaint under Article 10, in the light of the principles applicable under Article 11 of the Convention. The Court will examine the complaints about the other events under Article 11. 48.     Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention read as follows: Article 10 “1.     Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority ... 2.     The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.” Article 1 “ 1.     Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly ... 2.     No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others ...” Admissibility 49.     The Government have not argued that the complaints were belated. However, the Court reiterates that the six-month rule under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, as applicable at the relevant time, concerns its jurisdiction and will first examine this matter. 50 .     The appeal decisions on the applicant’s convictions relating to the rallies on 4   and 6 December 2011 were delivered on 26 March and 12   March 2012 respectively. He did not specify when he received the text of the appeal decision of 26 March 2012. The applicant was neither represented nor present at the appeal hearing on 26 March 2012. There is no indication that he did not become aware of the content of the appeal decision of 12   March 2012 on the same date. He lodged the related complaints before the Court only on 12   October 2012 and 13   September 2012 respectively, that is more than six months after the appeal decisions mentioned above but within six months of the court decisions upholding them in the review proceedings under Article   30.12 of the CAO. 51.     The CAO did not specify the rules applicable to the review procedure such as a time-limit for initiating it. In 2006 the Constitutional Court of Russia indicated that the rules of the Code of Commercial Procedure such as a three-month period specified there, could be applied by analogy. In 2008 the provisions of the CAO concerning the review procedure were redrafted, albeit no time-limit was specified in the CAO. The Court has previously noted that, at least in 2009, there were uncertainties, inter alia , as to whether recourse to the review procedure as amended in 2008 was (deemed to be) subject to any time-limit (see Annenkov and Others v. Russia , no. 31475/10, § 109, 25 July 2017), namely the three-month period mentioned above. However, in Smadikov v.   Russia   ((dec.), no.   10810/15 , § 49, 31 January 2017) the Court stated that, at least as of August 2014, the review procedure was not a remedy to be exhausted prior to lodging an application before the Court and thus, as a rule, a review decision upholding lower court decisions would not be taken into account for the purpose of calculating the six-month period under Article   35 § 1 of the Convention. 52.     The present case concerns the review procedure in 2012 (see paragraph 50 above). The Court notes that the applicant immediately sought review in respect of the court decisions relating to the event on 6 December 2011. As regards the event on 4 December 2011, he lodged applications for review within some two and five months of the appeal decision dated 26   March 2012. None of those applications were rejected as belated. 53.     In the Court’s view, in 2012 the applicant could legitimately rely on the findings made by the Constitutional Court. The fact that one of his applications that was lodged, for unspecified reasons, five months after the appeal decision was, nevertheless, processed cannot be held against the applicant as regards his compliance with the six-month rule under Article 35 §   1 of the Convention (see, in the same vein, Annenkov   and   Others , cited above, §§ 109-10). 54.     Accordingly, the Court does not dismiss as belated the complaints relating to the rallies on 4 and 6   December 2011. 55.     The Court notes that the complaints are neither manifestly ill-founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article   35 of the Convention. They must therefore be declared admissible. Merits The parties’ submissions (a)    The applicant 56.     The applicant argued that prosecution under Article 20.2 § 5 of the CAO required the courts to establish that a public-event participant had not fulfilled one of the statutory obligations listed in paragraphs 3 and 4 of section   6 of the PEA (see paragraph 39 above). The list did not include any statutory obligation for a participant to notify the competent authority of an event. Therefore, a participant could presume that the event had been properly notified unless a competent public official informed him or her that it had not been notified. Even where such information had been given, nothing in section 6 of the PEA prohibited a participant from continuing to participate in the event. If the authorities wanted him or her to stop participation, they had to deliver a lawful order to that effect. That order would have to follow the procedure prescribed in sections 15 to 17 of the PEA. Only the participant’s refusal to comply with such an order would constitute a lawful basis for prosecuting him or her under Article   20.2 § 5 of the CAO. Still, such prosecution would have to be convincingly shown to have been “necessary in a democratic society”. 57.     Except for the cases relating to the events on 6 December 2011 and 27 June 2013, the only reason for dispersing the events concerned the fact that the dates and the timing of the events had not been notified to the competent authority under the PEA. The appeal court mentioned some unspecified “real threat to unrelated citizens” in relation to the event on 6   December 2011 (see paragraph 15 above). Before the Court the Government mentioned that the lighting of smoke flares on 27 June 2013 had amounted to a breach of order. However, the national courts had not made any factual or legal findings on that account. 58.     The applicant argued that during the rallies on 4 and 6 December 2011 the police had given no specific order to disperse. The police had only made vague requests such as “to not impede police officers to perform their duties” or “to stop unlawful actions” without explaining what exactly had to be done (for example, to leave the venue of the rally). Moreover, those events had been spontaneous assemblies and a direct response to the reports of fraud during the election on 4 December 2011 and prior to the publication of the final results on 9 December 2011, in order to encourage the general public, observers and the authorities to investigate and rectify the alleged fraud. In such circumstances it had been impossible to comply with the statutory requirement to lodge a notification of an event well in advance. The authorities should have shown an appropriate degree of tolerance toward such genuinely spontaneous and peaceful assemblies. In any event, the police had been aware that such protests had been possible and thus had been enabled to ensure the smooth and safe conduct of them. The overall reaction of the authorities (the applicant’s arrests and convictions, especially the one resulting in an eleven-day detention) had been disproportionate. 59.     Referring to some video recordings from the file in the CAO case relating to the event on 31 December 2012, the applicant alleged that he had been arrested immediately after the police had started to announce that the event had been unlawful and long before they had ordered the participants to disperse. In any event, the rally could not be classified an event falling within the scope of the PEA. 60.     As to the event on 5 April 2013, the police had only announced that it had been unlawful; no order to disperse had been given. The applicant referred in that regard to some video recordings in the file concerning the related CAO case and the fact that the proceedings under Article 19.3 of the CAO had not been pursued (see paragraph 29 above). 61.     The applicant argued that the “performances” on 26 November 2012 and 27 June 2013 had been a form of artistic expression and should not have been classified as “public events” in the meaning of section 2 of the PEA (see paragraph 38 above). The events had not been “accessible to all” because they had not been advertised to the general public and had not involved any participation of the public; the performance on 27 June 2013 had been held on a balcony of the migration service building. That performance had involved two people, including the applicant, and thus should not have been classified as a static demonstration (a “picket”) under Russian law. The performance on 26 November 2012 did not match any of the types of “public events” that had to be notified under the PEA. Thus he could not have been lawfully prosecuted for participating in a non-notified “public event”. In any event, on 26 November 2012 the police had not made any warnings to the participants about unlawfulness of the event and had not issued any order to stop unlawful actions. No such circumstances had been established or relied upon by the courts. The police had not been present during the performance; after the event had been completed and while the participants, including the applicant had been leaving the venue, a plain-clothed police officer had approached him and had asked him to come to the police station. On 27 June 2013 the applicant had been asked to stop the performance by a migration service officer and had complied. He had then been “handed over” to the police that had arrived half an hour later. Lastly, the applicant argued that the fines of RUB 15,000 and 20,000 had been significant and had been comparable to fines for certain criminal offences such as battery or deliberate destruction of property. (b)    The Government 62.     The Government submitted that during each public event in question the police had repeatedly warned the participants that the event had been unlawful and had ordered them to cease their unlawful actions. Nevertheless, the participants, including the applicant, had continued their participation in the unlawful events and thereby had committed disobedience to lawful orders. The applicant’s arrests had been aimed at establishing his identity and at putting an end to the ongoing administrative offences. 63.     The statutory obligations imposed on public-event participants under paragraph 3 of section 6 of the PEA had been applicable to both notified and non-notified public events. Under section 17 of the PEA a participant’s failure to comply with lawful orders from the police could entail liability. The procedure for terminating a public event only applied to lawful events, specifically events that had been notified to (approved by) the competent authority. The termination of the unlawful events in the present case, including the measures affecting the applicant as a participant, had had basis in the general police powers relating to maintaining order and ensuring public safety. Thus, for instance, the event on 6 December 2011 had been in breach of sub-paragraph   2 of paragraph 3 of section 6 of the PEA; the police had ordered the participants to cease participation in the event and to disperse. The order had been repeated several times and the participants had been afforded time to disperse. 64.     The event on 27 June 2013 had amounted to a “picketing” regulated by the Public Events Act; the use of smoke flares had amounted to a breach of public order. The Court’s assessment 65.     The Court considers that there has been an “interference” with the applicant’s right to freedom of expression on account of his conviction in relation to the “performances” on 26 November 2012 and 27 June 2013, and his right to freedom of peaceful assembly on account of his conviction in relation to the rallies on 4   and 6 December 2011, 31   December 2012 and 5   April 2013. An “interference” infringes Article 10 or 11 of the Convention unless it satisfies the requirements of paragraph 2 of that provision. It thus has to be determined whether the interference was “prescribed by law”, sought to pursue one or more legitimate aims as defined in that paragraph, and was “necessary in a democratic society” to achieve those aims. (a)    Prescribed by law 66.     The Court reiterates that the expression “prescribed by law” requires that the impugned measure should have a basis in domestic law. It also refers to the quality of the law in question, which should be accessible to the persons concerned and foreseeable as to its effects, that is that it is formulated with sufficient precision to enable the persons concerned – if need be, with appropriate advice – to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail and to regulate their conduct (see Öztürk v. Turkey   [GC], no.   22479/93, § 54, ECHR   1999 ‑ VI). The phrase “prescribed by law” implies, inter alia , that domestic law must be sufficiently foreseeable in its terms to give individuals an adequate indication as to the circumstances in which and the conditions on which the authorities are entitled to resort to measures affecting their rights under the Convention (see Fernández Martínez v.   Spain [GC], no. 56030/07, § 117, ECHR 2014 (extracts)). “Law” includes everything that goes to make up the written law, including enactments of lower rank than statutes, and the relevant case-law authority (ibid.). It is primarily for the national authorities, notably the courts, to   interpret and apply   domestic law, the Court’s role consisting in ascertaining whether the effects of such an interpretation are compatible with the Convention (see Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], no.   14305/17, § 249, 22 December 2020). 67 .     It is common ground between the parties that participation in a non ‑ notified/non-approved public event could entail liability under Article   20.2 § 5 of the CAO if it was proven that the participant had violated statutory duties or prohibitions prescribed under paragraphs 3 and 4 of section   6 of the Public   Events Act respectively (see paragraph 39 above). This was also reiterated by the Plenary Supreme Court in 2018 (see paragraph   43 above). 68.     The prohibitions listed in paragraph 4 of section 6 of the PEA were clearly not applicable and were not breached by the applicant. Thus the Court will focus on paragraph 3 of section 6 of the PEA. It is noted that it contained sub-paragraphs 1 and 2 which required participants to comply with lawful orders issued by the police and to respect the “public order” ( общественный   порядок ), respectively. 69 .     The Government