CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;COMMITTEE;ENG — 12 mars 2013

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HUNGARY   (Application no. 31069/11)             JUDGMENT       STRASBOURG   12 March 2013       This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.   In the case of Sándor v. Hungary, The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:   Peer Lorenzen, President,   András Sajó,   Nebojša Vučinić, judges, and Françoise Elens-Passos, Deputy Section Registrar, Having deliberated in private on 19 February 2013, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: PROCEDURE 1.     The case originated in an application (no. 31069/11) against the Republic of Hungary lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Hungarian national, Mr József Sándor (“the applicant”), on 13 May 2011. 2.     The Hungarian Government (“the Government”) were represented by Mr Z. Tallódi, Agent, Ministry of Public Administration and Justice. 3.     On 23 November 2011 the application was communicated to the Government. In accordance with Protocol No. 14, the application was allocated to a Committee of three Judges. THE FACTS THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE 4.     The applicant was born in 1966 and lives in Zsujta. 5.     On 4 December 1996 a private individual brought an action against the applicant before the Encs District Court, requesting the court to establish the invalidity of an agreement. 6.     Due to hospitalisation, the applicant did not appear at the hearings held between 21 July and 7 October 1997. 7.     On 7 June 2001 the applicant submitted a counter-claim against the plaintiff based on unjust enrichment. 8.     On 13 June 2006 the District Court gave judgment. On appeal, the Borsod-Abaúj-County Regional Court upheld the first-instance decision in part, that is, in respect of the original action brought against the applicant, and remitted the remainder of the claims concerning unjust enrichment to the District Court on 21 November 2006. 9.     In the resumed proceedings the District Court gave judgment on 10   December 2007. On appeal, the second-instance court accepted some claims and remitted the remainder to the first-instance court on 3 June 2008. 10.     In the meanwhile, on 8 January 2010 the applicant brought a separate action in compensation under section 349 of the Civil Code against the courts acting in his case, claiming that the proceedings had lasted an unreasonably long time. The proceedings are currently pending before the Nyíregyháza High Court. 11.     As regards the proceedings concerning the applicant’s counter-claim, several hearings were held. Following another remittal by the Regional Court, the District Court finally accepted the applicant’s counter-claim on 28 April 2010. On appeal, the Regional Court reversed the judgment and dismissed the applicant’s claim on 18 November 2010. This judgment was upheld by the Supreme Court on 19 May 2011. THE LAW 12.     The applicant complained that the length of the proceedings had been incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement of Article   6   § 1 of the Convention. The Government contested that argument, arguing in particular that the application was premature, since the applicant’s action in compensation lodged against the domestic courts dealing with his case was still pending before the High Court (see paragraph 10 above). They submitted that as the applicant had not exhausted all effective domestic remedies, the complaint before the Court should be declared inadmissible. 13.     The Court has already pointed out that an a posteriori official liability action cannot be considered an effective remedy to be exhausted in   respect of the unreasonable length of proceedings (see Kósa v. Hungary   (dec.), no. 43352/98, 12 March 2002; Simkó v. Hungary (dec.), no.   42961/98, 12 March 2002). In the present circumstances the Court finds that the compensation proceedings pending before the High Court, not having been demonstrated to be capable of accelerating the proceedings, constitute no effective remedy to exhaust. The Government’s objection must therefore be rejected. 14.     The Government further argued that the period to be taken into consideration in respect of the length of the proceedings had only started on 7   June 2001, when the applicant had submitted his counter-claim regarding unjust enrichment. 15.     The Court accepts that the District Court could not start to deal with the entirety of the claims in dispute prior to 7 June 2001 when the applicant submitted his counter-claim. The period which preceded this date cannot therefore be imputed to the Government. As a consequence, the period to be taken into consideration began only on 7 June 2001. It ended on 19   May   2011. The case thus lasted nine years and eleven months before three instances. In view of such lengthy proceedings, and in the absence of any other reason for inadmissibility, this part of the application must be declared admissible. 16.     The Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present application (see, among many other authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII). Having examined all the material submitted to it, the Court considers that the Government have not put forward any fact or convincing argument capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present circumstances. Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers that the length of the proceedings was excessive and failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement. There has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1. 17.     The applicant also complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention about the outcome of the proceedings. However, the procedure related to a dispute between private parties with no deprivation of property imputable to the State. In the absence of any indication of arbitrariness, this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention. 18.     Relying on Article 41 of the Convention, the applicant claimed 24,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. The Government contested the claim. The Court considers that the applicant must have sustained some non-pecuniary damage and awards him EUR 6,400 under this head. 19.     The applicant did not submit any costs claim. 20.     The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points. FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY 1.     Declares the complaint concerning the excessive length of the proceedings admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;   2.     Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention; 3.     Holds (a)     that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, EUR 6,400 (six   thousand four hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage, within three months, to be converted into Hungarian forints at the rate applicable at the date of settlement: (b)     that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;   4.     Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction. Done in English, and notified in writing on 12 March 2013, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court. Françoise Elens-Passos   Peer Lorenzen   Deputy Registrar   President