CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;ADMISSIBILITY;ENG — 18 septembre 2001

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Costa , President ,   Mr   W. Fuhrmann ,   Mr   L. Loucaides ,   Sir   Nicolas Bratza ,   Mrs   H.S. Greve ,   Mr   K. Traja ,   Mr   M. Ugrekhelidze , judges , and    Mrs S. Dollé , Section Registrar . Having regard to the above application introduced with the European Commission of Human Rights on 21 November 1997 and registered on 21   January 1998, Having regard to Article 5 § 2 of Protocol No. 11 to the Convention, by which the competence to examine the application was transferred to the Court, Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the applicant’s letter of 6 August 2001, Having deliberated, decides as follows: THE FACTS The applicant, Douglas Phillip Crouch, is a United Kingdom national, born in 1969 and living in Farnborough. He is represented before the Court by Mr T. Bowman, a community care worker from the Citizens Advice Bureau, Farnborough. A.     The circumstances of the case The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. The applicant and his wife were married in 1990 and had two children, born in 1993 and 1996. The applicant’s wife died in 1997, aged 26 years. The applicant is the administrator of his wife’s estate. The applicant’s wife was employed as a cleaner for approximately six years, and thus contributed to the joint income of the marriage. She paid full social security contributions as an employed earner until her death. The applicant gave up work to care for the children. On 13 May 1997, the applicant applied to the Benefits Agency for the payment of social security benefits. He applied for benefits equivalent to those which a widow, whose husband had died in similar circumstances to those of his wife, would have been entitled, namely a Widow’s Payment and a Widowed Mother’s Allowance, payable under the Social Security and Benefits Act 1992. By a letter dated 15 May 1997, the Benefits Agency informed the applicant that no such benefits existed for widowers and that his claim accordingly had failed. The applicant lodged a statutory appeal against this decision on 2 June 1997. The Social Security Appeal Tribunal dismissed the applicant’s appeal on 11 February 1998 on the grounds that, in order to qualify for widow’s payment or widow’s pension, the claimant must be “a woman who has been widowed”, and that the applicant clearly did not fall within this definition. A widow in a similar situation to that of the applicant could claim Widow’s Payment and Widowed Mother’s Allowance, which are payable regardless of income and savings. The Widow’s Payment is a one-off payment of GBP 1,000.   COMPLAINTS The applicant originally complained that British social security legislation discriminated against him on grounds of sex, in breach of Article 14 of the Convention, taken in conjunction with both Article 8 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. THE LAW The Court notes that the applicant’s representative indicated in a letter dated 6 August 2001 that the parties had agreed a friendly settlement whereby the sum of GBP 60.79 per week would be paid to the applicant to cover the period from the date of his application for benefits until 9 April 2001. However, no actual payment would be made to the applicant because the sums concerned would be set off against other, more substantial, social security benefits already paid to the applicant over that period. In the light of the agreement reached, the applicant’s representative requested that the application be struck out of the list of cases. The Court also notes that under the Welfare Reform and Pensions Act 1999 bereavement benefits became available to both men and women as of 1 April 2001. Having regard to Article 37 § 1 (b) of the Convention, the Courts finds that the matter has been resolved. Furthermore, in accordance with Article   37 § 1 in fine , the Court finds no special circumstances regarding respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and its Protocols which require the examination of the application to be continued. Accordingly, the case should be struck out of the list. For these reasons, the Court, unanimously, Decides to strike the application out of its list of cases.   S. Dollé   J.-P. Costa   Registrar   President