CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 16 avril 1998

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                          AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                         Application No. 34618/97                       by Barbro JOHANSSON and Sven PETTERSSON                       against Sweden           The European Commission of Human Rights (Second Chamber) sitting in private on 16 April 1998, the following members being present:              MM     J.-C. GEUS, President                  M.A. NOWICKI                  G. JÖRUNDSSON                  A. GÖZÜBÜYÜK                  J.-C. SOYER                  H. DANELIUS            Mrs    G.H. THUNE            MM     F. MARTINEZ                  I. CABRAL BARRETO                  J. MUCHA                  D. SVÁBY                  P. LORENZEN                  E. BIELIUNAS                  E.A. ALKEMA                  A. ARABADJIEV              Ms     M.-T. SCHOEPFER, Secretary to the Chamber           Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;         Having regard to the application introduced on 22 December 1996 by Barbro JOHANSSON and Sven PETTERSSON against Sweden and registered on 28 January 1997 under file No. 34618/97;         Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission;         Having deliberated;         Decides as follows:   THE FACTS         The applicants, a cohabiting couple, are Swedish citizens.   They were born in 1952 and 1954, respectively, and reside in Saltsjö-Boo. Before the Commission they are represented by Mr Lennart Hane, a lawyer practising in Stockholm.         The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicants, may be summarised as follows.         On 30 April 1996 the president of the Social District Council (områdesnämnden - hereinafter "the Council") of Boo decided, pursuant to Section 6 of the Act with Special Provisions on the Care of Young Persons (Lagen med särskilda bestämmelser om vård av unga, 1990:52; hereinafter "the 1990 Act"), immediately to take the applicants' son L, born in 1987, into public care on a provisional basis.   The decision was effected the same day.         On 9 May 1996 the County Administrative Court (länsrätten) of the County of Stockholm confirmed the Council's decision.   The court noted that the applicants had been abusing alcohol and narcotics for several years.   Apparently, this had affected L who, according to his teachers, had a self-destructive behaviour at school.   The day before the Council's decision was taken, i.e. on 29 April, a friend of the first applicant had visited the family and had found the applicants in a state of intoxication.   The first applicant had been bleeding from the head and blood had been found on the floor of the hall and the kitchen.         Under Section 8 of the 1990 Act, the Council could apply for a care order concerning L within four weeks from the day its provisional decision had been put into effect.   Finding it necessary to make a psychological examination of L, the Council requested an extension of that time-limit.   By decision of 21 May 1996, the County Administrative Court granted the request and extended the time-limit until 18 June.         On 28 May 1996 the Administrative Court of Appeal (kammarrätten) in Stockholm upheld the County Administrative Court's decision of 9 May.         On 18 June 1996 the Council applied to the County Administrative Court for a care order.   The Council submitted a written opinion given by two psychologists appointed by the Council, according to which L had certain emotional problems which required professional treatment.   The court held an oral hearing in the case on 1 and 2 July during which it heard evidence from, inter alia, a psychologist proposed by the applicants.   That psychologist criticised the above written opinion. Contrary to the psychologists appointed by the Council, he found no evidence that L had emotional problems.   L's behaviour rather indicated that he had not been negatively affected by any conditions in his home. Moreover, relations between him and his parents were good.         By judgment of 4 July 1996, the County Administrative Court rejected the Council's application.   The court noted that, after the provisional taking into care of L, the applicants had refrained from using drugs and had started to undergo treatment.   Furthermore, the evidence in the case - including the statements made by several witnesses before the court - indicated that L was a happy young boy who was well-adapted to friends and school and had good relations with his parents.   Accordingly, the public care of L was discontinued.         On 25 July 1996 the Supreme Administrative Court (Regerings- rätten) refused leave to appeal against the Administrative Court of Appeal's decision of 28 May.     COMPLAINTS   1.     The applicants complain that the provisional taking into care, which was allegedly made to facilitate an unnecessary psychological examination of L, violated their right to respect for their family life under Article 8 of the Convention.   2.     The applicants contend that the County Administrative Court and the Administrative Court of Appeal, in confirming the Council's decision on provisional care, were not impartial as they failed to take proper account of the applicant's submissions in the case.   They invoke Article 6 of the Convention.         Furthermore, the applicants claim that the taking into public care is generally considered as beneficial to a child from a home which, on the face of it, appears unstable.   Allegedly, the courts' reliance on opinions given by psychologists endangers the judicial control of the public care.   In this respect, they invoke Article 17 of the Convention.     THE LAW   1.     The applicants complain that the provisional taking into care violated their right to respect for their family life.   They invoke Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention which provides the following:         "1.   Everyone has the right to respect for his private and       family life, his home and his correspondence.         2.   There shall be no interference by a public authority       with the exercise of this right except such as is in       accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic       society in the interests of national security, public       safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the       prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of       health and morals, or for the protection of the rights and       freedoms of others."         The Commission recalls that the public care of L was discontinued on 4 July 1996 following the County Administrative Court's rejection of the Council's application for a care order.   However, between 30 April and 4 July, L was in public care on a provisional basis.   The Commission finds that the provisional care interfered with the applicants' right to respect for their family life as ensured by Article 8 para. 1 (Art. 8-1) of the Convention.   It must therefore be examined whether that interference was justified under the terms of Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2).   In this respect, the Commission finds that the relevant decisions were in conformity with Swedish law. Moreover, the interference had a legitimate aim, namely the interests of the child, which in this case fall under the expressions "for the protection of health or morals" and "for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others".         It thus remains to be determined whether the interference was "necessary in a democratic society" in the interests of the child.   The Commission recalls that the County Administrative Court confirmed the Council's decision on provisional care, having had regard to the applicants' long-standing abuse of alcohol and narcotics, to the statements by L's teachers that L had a self-destructive behaviour and to the events which immediately preceded the provisional taking into care.   In the light of the foregoing the Commission finds that the provisional care of L was supported by relevant and sufficient reasons and that, having regard to their margin of appreciation, the Swedish authorities were reasonably entitled to think that it was necessary to take L into care on a provisional basis.   Moreover, the psychological examination of L must be considered as a relevant measure in cases like the present one where it is to be determined whether there are sufficient grounds for committing a child to public care.   Accordingly, the Commission concludes that the relevant decisions can reasonably be regarded as "necessary in a democratic society" within the meaning of Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the Convention.         It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill- founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   2.     The applicants contend that the courts, in confirming the Council's decision on provisional care, were not impartial as required by Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention.   Furthermore, they claim that the courts' reliance on opinions given by psychologists endangers the judicial control of the public care.   In this respect, they invoke Article 17 (Art. 17) of the Convention.         The Commission finds that the applicants' submissions fail to substantiate their claim that the courts deciding in the case were not impartial.   In so far as the allegation concerning the courts' reliance on psychologists' opinions refers to the present case, the Commission recalls that the County Administrative Court, by judgment of 4 July 1996, rejected the Council's application for a care order concerning L although the psychologists' opinion adduced by the Council appeared to support the application.   The court gave its judgment after having had regard to all the evidence in the case, including statements given by the psychologist proposed by the applicants and several other witnesses.   It appears that the court assessed the evidence independently and that it did not consider itself bound by conclusions drawn by certain psychologists.   In view of the above, the Commission finds that the present complaints fail to disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms of the Convention and in particular the Articles invoked.         It follows that this part of the application is also manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.         For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,         DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.            M.-T. SCHOEPFER                            J.-C. GEUS          Secretary                                President    to the Second Chamber                    of the Second Chamber