CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 4 mars 1998

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                          AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                         Application No. 34180/96                       by Ladislav HAAS and Zlatica HAASOVÁ                       against the Slovak Republic          The European Commission of Human Rights (Second Chamber) sitting in private on 4 March 1998, the following members being present:              MM     J.-C. GEUS, President                  M.A. NOWICKI                  G. JÖRUNDSSON                  A. GÖZÜBÜYÜK                  J.-C. SOYER                  H. DANELIUS            Mrs    G.H. THUNE            MM     F. MARTINEZ                  I. CABRAL BARRETO                  J. MUCHA                  D. SVÁBY                  P. LORENZEN                  E. BIELIUNAS                  E.A. ALKEMA                  A. ARABADJIEV              Ms     M.-T. SCHOEPFER, Secretary to the Chamber          Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;        Having regard to the application introduced on 17 October 1996 by Ladislav HAAS and Zlatica HAASOVÁ against the Slovak Republic and registered on 16 December 1996 under file No. 34180/96;        Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission;        Having deliberated;        Decides as follows:   THE FACTS        The applicants are Slovak nationals born in 1948 and 1953 respectively.   They are spouses and reside in Levoca.   Before the Commission the applicants are represented by Mr. M. Taragel, a lawyer practising in Spisská Nová Ves.        The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicants, may be summarised as follows.   A.    The particular circumstances of the case        On 6 September 1989 the applicants bought a house in Levoca for 295,570 Czechoslovak crowns.   They concluded the purchase contract with the State which had transferred the house to its ownership in 1988 after the spouses F., its original owners, had emigrated from Czechoslovakia.   On 7 December 1988, i.e. prior to the date when the house was offered to the applicants, an expert appointed by the State had evaluated the house at 306,810 Czechoslovak crowns, and the evaluation was later adjusted to 301,260 crowns.        After the entry into force of the Law on Extrajudicial Rehabilitation (Zákon o mimosúdnych rehabilitáciách, see "The relevant domestic law" below) the spouses F. requested that the applicants restore the house to them.   Since the applicants failed to do so, spouses F. brought an action for restitution of the house before the Spisská Nová Ves District Court (Okresny súd).   On 9 November 1994 the latter granted the claim and ordered the applicants to vacate the house.        The District Court noted that the house had been transferred to State ownership without any relevant legal ground within the meaning of Section 6 para. 2 of the Law on Extrajudicial Rehabilitation.        An expert appointed by the court evaluated the house, at the moment of its purchase by the applicants, at 391,000 crowns.   A chief expert opinion ordered by the court stated that in accordance with Price Regulation No. 205/88 (Vyhláska o cenách stavieb, pozemkov, trvalych porastov, úhrade za zriadenie práva osobného uzívania pozemkov, trvalych porastov a náhrade za docasné uzívanie pozemkov), the value of the house had been 430,908 crowns.   Since the actual purchase price had been considerably lower, the court concluded that the applicants had acquired the house contrary to the legal rules then in force within the meaning of Section 4 para. 2 of the Law on Extrajudicial Rehabilitation.        The District Court further dismissed the applicant's request that they should be ordered to vacate the house only after they were provided with alternative accommodation.        The court noted that the applicants had not been responsible for the erroneous evaluation of the house and held that they had not benefited from an unfair advantage in the purchase within the meaning of Section 4 para. 2 of the Law on Extrajudicial Rehabilitation.   It therefore decided that the applicants did not have to reimburse the costs of the proceedings.   Since the applicants were unsuccessful in the proceedings, the court charged them the court fees of 17,200 Slovak crowns.        The applicants appealed and claimed, inter alia, that they had acquired the house in good faith.   They alleged that Price Regulation No. 205/88 provided for maximum permissible prices and that the sale of real property at a lower price could not, therefore, be considered as being contrary to the rules in force.   Finally, the applicants requested that they should be granted alternative accommodation.        On 25 September 1995 the Kosice Regional Court (Krajsky súd) upheld the first instance judgment.   It noted that Price Regulation No. 205/88 had been binding and that the purchase price paid by the applicants had been considerably below the value of the house under that Regulation.   The Regional Court therefore concluded that the sale of the house had not conformed to the rules then in force.        The Regional Court further found that the applicants' claim for alternative accommodation had no legal basis in Slovak law.        On 8 December 1995 the applicants restored the house to the spouses F.        On 7 February 1996 the applicants claimed compensation for all costs relating to the purchase of the house and to its restitution to the original owners.        On 30 May 1996 the Ministry of Finance decided to reimburse the purchase price to the applicants pursuant to Section 11 of the Law on Extrajudicial Rehabilitation.   The Ministry further informed the applicants that their remaining claims for compensation had no legal basis in Slovak law.   B.    Relevant domestic law        In the preamble to Law No. 87/1991 of 23 March 1991 on Extrajudicial Rehabilitation the Federal Assembly of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic affirmed its will to prevent wrongs which had been committed in the past from re-occurring.        Section 1 para. 1 of the Law defines its aim as follows:        "This Law shall mitigate certain material and other wrongs arisen      between 25 February 1948 and 1 January 1990 and caused by acts      falling within the sphere of civil law, labour law and by      administrative acts which are incompatible with the principles      of a democratic society respecting the rights of citizens as      enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations [and] the      Universal Declaration of Human Rights..."        Pursuant to Section 4 para. 2 of the aforesaid Law, individuals who acquired property from the State are liable to restore it if such an acquisition was either contrary to the legal rules then in force or if they benefited from an unfair advantage and provided that the State had taken possession of such property in circumstances defined in Section 6.        Under Section 6 para. 2 of the Law on Extrajudicial Rehabilitation, the obligation to restore property includes cases when the State took possession of such property without any legal ground.        Section 11 of the Law on Extrajudicial Rehabilitation entitles individuals who are under the obligation to restore property to recover the price for which they had acquired such property from the State.   COMPLAINTS        The applicants complain, under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and Article 8 of the Convention, that they were ordered to vacate the house which they had acquired in good faith.   In particular, they allege that the erroneous evaluation of the house, which resulted in its restitution to the original owners, is imputable to the State and complain that they were not compensated in full for the damage in this respect and that they were not provided with alternative accommodation. They add that the value of the house at the time of its restitution was 945,961 crowns.   THE LAW   1.    The applicants complain that they were ordered to vacate the house which they had acquired in good faith.   They allege a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) which reads as follows:        "Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful      enjoyment of his possessions.   No one shall be deprived of his      possessions except in the public interest and subject to the      conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of      international law.        The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair      the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary      to control the use of property in accordance with the general      interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions      or penalties."        The Commission recalls that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) comprises three distinct rules.   The first rule, set out in the first sentence of the first paragraph, is of a general nature and enunciates the principle of peaceful enjoyment of possessions.   The second rule, contained in the second sentence of the same paragraph, covers deprivation of possessions and makes it subject to certain conditions. The third rule, stated in the second paragraph, recognises that Contracting States are entitled, amongst other things, to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest (see Eur. Court HR, Fredin v. Sweden judgment of 18 February 1991, Series A no. 192, p. 14, para. 41).        In the present case the applicants were ordered, pursuant to the relevant provisions of the Law on Extrajudiciary Rehabilitation, to vacate a house which they had earlier purchased in good faith from the State.   In these circumstances, the Commission considers that the applicants were deprived of their possessions within the meaning of the second sentence of the first paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1).        In order to be justified, it must be shown that the deprivation of possessions was in accordance with the conditions provided for by law and in the public interest.   Furthermore, not only must the aim of the deprivation of property be in the public interest, but there must also be a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised (see Eur. Court HR, Holy Monasteries v. Greece judgment of 9 December 1994, Series A no. 301-A, p. 34, para. 70).   This implies that a fair balance must be struck between the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirement to protect the individual's fundamental rights, which balance would not be found if the individual was found to have bornean excessive burden (see Eur. Court HR, Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden judgment of 23 September 1982, Series A no. 52, pp. 26-28, paras. 69- 73).        The Commission observes in this respect that the applicants were ordered to restore the house to its original owners pursuant to Section 4 para. 2 of the Law on Extrajudicial Rehabilitation as they had purchased it at a price which had not conformed to Price Regulation No. 205/88 then in force.   Thus the deprivation of possessions in question was provided for by law.        As to the requirement of a legitimate aim in the public interest, the Commission recalls that the deprivation of property in pursuance of legitimate social, economic or other policies may be in the public interest, even if the community at large has no direct use or enjoyment of the property (see Eur. Court HR, James and Others v. the United Kingdom judgment of 21 February 1986, Series A no. 98, p. 32, para. 45).   Moreover, because of their direct knowledge of their society and its needs, the national authorities are in principle better placed than the international judge to appreciate what is "in the public interest".   In performing their assessment the national authorities therefore enjoy a wide margin of appreciation (ibidem, p. 32, para. 46).        The Commission recalls that the aim of the Law on Extrajudicial Rehabilitation is to mitigate certain wrongs caused by acts which are incompatible with the principles of a democratic society respecting the rights of citizens.   When adopting this Law, the legislators affirmed that it was their intention to prevent wrongs which had been committed in the past from re-occurring.   Thus the Law on Extrajudicial Rehabilitation pursues a legitimate aim to safeguard the legality of legal transactions.   It promotes the principles of a democratic society and provides redress in cases where wrongs were committed in disrespect of such principles.   In these circumstances, and having regard to the State's margin of appreciation, the Commission accepts that the deprivation complained of took place not only in the interest of the original owners of the house, but also in the general interest of the society as a whole.        There must, however, also be a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised.   In this respect, the Commission finds that in view of the wide margin of appreciation enjoyed by the Contracting States in this area, an order to restore property which was not acquired in conformity with the relevant legal rules may be regarded as proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued (see, mutatis mutandis, No. 33456/96, Zvolensky and Others v. the Czech Republic, Dec. 14.1.98, unpublished).   The Commission has also noted that the applicants received the purchase price, and had been living in the house for more than five years.         Accordingly, there is no appearance of a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) in the particular circumstances of this case.        It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill- founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   2.    The applicants further allege a violation of Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention which provides as follows:        "1.    Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family      life, his home and his correspondence.        2.     There shall be no interference by a public authority with      the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with      the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests      of national security, public safety or the economic well-being      of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the      protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the      rights and freedoms of others."        The Commission considers that the order to vacate the house in which the applicants were residing amounts to an interference with their right to respect for their home as guaranteed by Article 8 para. 1 (Art. 8-1).   It must therefore be established whether this interference was compatible with the requirements set out in para. 2 of this Article.        The Commission has found above that the interference complained of had as its basis Section 4 para. 2 of the Law on Extrajudicial Rehabilitation and it sees no reason why this basis should not be considered as being accessible, foreseeable and in accordance with the rule of law (see Eur. Court HR, Kruslin v. France judgment of 24 April 1990, Series A no. 176-A, p. 20, para. 27).        The Commission further notes that by the interference complained of the Slovak authorities sought, inter alia, to protect the rights of the original owners of the house, which is a legitimate aim under Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the Convention.        It remains to be determined whether the interference in question was necessary in a democratic society within the meaning of the aforesaid Article.   The Commission recalls that the notion of necessity implies that the interference corresponds to a pressing social need and, in particular, that it is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.   In determining whether an interference was "necessary in a democratic society" the Convention organs have to take into account that a margin of appreciation is left to the Contracting States (see, mutatis mutandis, Eur. Court HR, Olsson v. Sweden judgment of 24 March 1988, Series A no. 130, pp. 31-31, paras. 67-68).        The Commission has found above, when examining the applicants' complaints under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1), that an order to restore property which was not acquired in conformity with the relevant legal rules may be a proportionate measure for enforcement of the legitimate aims pursued, and it sees no reason why it should depart from this conclusion when examining the case under Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention.   In the Commission's view, the domestic courts' finding that the applicants had no right to alternative accommodation under Slovak law cannot affect the position in the present case.        It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill- founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.        For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,        DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.      M.-T. SCHOEPFER                               J.-C. GEUS       Secretary                                   President to the Second Chamber                       of the Second Chamber