CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 3 décembre 1997

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                          AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                         Application No. 28409/95                       by Mileta SAVIC                       against the Slovak Republic          The European Commission of Human Rights (Second Chamber) sitting in private on 3 December 1997, the following members being present:              Mrs    G.H. THUNE, President            MM     J.-C. GEUS                  G. JÖRUNDSSON                  A. GÖZÜBÜYÜK                  J.-C. SOYER                  H. DANELIUS                  F. MARTINEZ                  M.A. NOWICKI                  I. CABRAL BARRETO                  J. MUCHA                  D. SVÁBY                  P. LORENZEN                  E. BIELIUNAS                  E.A. ALKEMA                  A. ARABADJIEV              Ms     M.-T. SCHOEPFER, Secretary to the Chamber        Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;        Having regard to the application introduced on 28 September 1994 by Mileta SAVIC against the Slovak Republic and registered on 1 September 1995 under file No. 28409/95;        Having regard to:   -     the reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of      the Commission;   -     the observations submitted by the respondent Government on      21 June 1996 and the observations in reply submitted by the      applicant on 14 October 1996;        Having deliberated;        Decides as follows:   THE FACTS        The applicant was born in 1945 in Yugoslavia and is of Serbian origin.   He is serving a prison sentence in the Hrnciarovce nad Parnou prison, Slovakia.   Before the Commission the applicant is represented by Mr. P. Lelkes, a lawyer practising in Trnava.        The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.   A.    The particular circumstances of the case        On 30 April 1993 the Banská Bystrica Regional Bureau of Investigation (Krajsky úrad vysetrovania) accused the applicant and two other persons of offences and attempted offences under Section 246 paras. 1 and 2 (b), (c) of the Criminal Code (see "The relevant domestic law and practice" below).   Criminal proceedings were instituted.   The applicant was suspected of having transported four young women from Slovakia to Italy, of having benefited from their prostitution and of several unsuccessful attempts to persuade other women to come to Italy for the same purpose.        In a letter of 5 June 1993 which he wrote in Zvornik (at present Bosnia and Herzegovina) the applicant informed the investigator, with reference to their prior telephone conversation, that he had brought several women from Slovakia to Italy where they had carried out prostitution.   The applicant further informed the investigator that he was on the reserve list of a special military unit and that he could not leave, because of the hostilities, the former Yugoslavia.        On 15 June 1993 the Banská Bystrica Regional Court (Krajsky súd - "the Regional Court") issued an international arrest warrant against the applicant.   On 9 November 1993 the proceedings against the applicant were suspended because of his absence.   The applicant was arrested in Vienna on 16 December 1993.   On 21 January 1994 he was handed over to the Slovak authorities.        On the same day the investigator resumed the proceedings against the applicant and the Regional Court remanded the applicant in custody pursuant to Section 67 para. 1 (a) and (c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.   The court noted that the applicant, who had a permanent address in Belgrade and another address in Vienna, had stayed at unknown places.   Since the applicant had known about the accusations brought against him, the court concluded that he had deliberately tried to avoid the proceedings.   The detention was considered necessary also in order to prevent the applicant from committing further offences. Subsequently, the following events occurred and decisions were taken in the applicant's case.   The criminal proceedings against the applicant        On 21 March 1994 the Ziar nad Hronom District Prosecutor (Okresny prokurátor - "the District Prosecutor") indicted the applicant for offences under Section 246 paras 1, 2 (b),(c) and Section 204 of the Criminal Code before the Ziar nad Hronom District Court (Okresny súd   - "the District Court").   On 30 March 1994 the latter decided to return the case to the District Prosecutor for additional investigation.   On 17 May 1994 the Regional Court upheld this decision.   The applicant's file was returned to the District Prosecutor on 2 June 1994.        On 26 September 1994 the applicant informed the investigator that he no longer insisted that his cross-examination with several witnesses, which he had originally requested and which could not be carried out because of his health problems, should be carried out.   He suggested that the investigation into his case should be terminated as soon as possible.        On 3 February 1995 the applicant informed the investigator that he considered his cross-examination with a witness necessary.        The District Prosecutor filed a new indictment before the District Court on 25 April 1995.   In it, the applicant and another person were charged with offences pursuant to Section 246 paras. 1 and 2 (c) and Section 204 para. 1 of the Criminal Code and with attempted offences pursuant to Section 246 paras. 1, 2 (b) and (c) of the Criminal Code.        The main hearing before the District Court was scheduled for 7 August 1995.   It was postponed because the interpreter was ill and several   witnesses had failed to appear.        The second hearing was held on 4 September 1995.   The court heard the applicant and several witnesses.   The proceedings were adjourned because of the absence of four witnesses.        On 18 October 1995 the District Court adjourned the hearing in the applicant's case again.   It noted that several witnesses were not present, that the interpreter was ill and that the applicant's co- accused had requested that the court should appoint a lawyer to her.        Another hearing was held on 15 November 1995.   Seven witnesses failed to appear.   The District Prosecutor suggested that in view of the change in the composition of the court's chamber the court should repeat all procedural steps relating to the main hearing.   This suggestion was supported by the lawyers of the accused and the District Court adjourned the proceedings.        On 13 December 1995 the District Court adjourned the proceedings on the ground that three witness had not appeared and that the interpreter was ill.        On 4 January 1996 the District Court found that it lacked jurisdiction to deal with the applicant's case at first instance and transferred it to the Regional Court.        The main hearing before the Regional Court was held on 10 and 12 April 1996.   On the latter date the Regional Court convicted the applicant of trafficking in women pursuant to Section 246 paras. 1 and 2 (c) of the Criminal Code and of procuring pursuant to Section 204 para. 1 of the Criminal Code and sentenced him to four years' imprisonment.   It also decided to expel the applicant from the Slovak Republic.        The Regional Court heard the two accused, three of the four women whom the accused had brought to Italy, four witnesses, two experts and took also further evidence.   It established that in June 1992 the applicant and another person had met four Slovak women and agreed to bring them to Italy for the purpose of carrying out prostitution.   The accused had brought the aforesaid four women to Padova at the beginning of July 1992 and had benefited from their prostitution until September 1992.        The court relied on the statements of the women concerned and of the applicant's co-accused, which were supported by other evidence before it.   The statements of the aforesaid persons confirmed that the applicant and the other accused had brought the four women to Italy with a view to benefiting from their prostitution there.        The court did not accept the applicant's argument according to which he had taken the four women to Italy upon the request of his co- accused and that the latter had explained to him that those women intended to find a job during the cucumbers harvest.   The Regional Court further noted that in his letter to the police investigator of 5 June 1993 the applicant had expressly admitted the facts imputed to him.   The court did not accept the applicant's explanation according to which he had admitted the acting in question with a view to protecting his co-accused.        At the hearing before the Regional Court the applicant was assisted by his lawyer.        The applicant appealed against the Regional Court's judgment. He challenged the statements of his co-accused and of the three women concerned.   He denied the statements which he had addressed to the police investigator on 5 June 1993.   The applicant complained about the lack of impartiality of the District Prosecutor and of the District Court's judges.   He alleged that the Regional Court's judges and assessors had also been biased because, in his view, their decision was arbitrary.        On 21 August 1996 the Supreme Court (Najvyssí súd) quashed the Regional Court's judgment of 12 April 1996.   It found that the Regional Court had correctly established the facts but had committed an error in their legal qualification.   The Supreme Court convicted the applicant and the other accused of trafficking in women pursuant to Section 246 paras. 1 and 2 (c) of the Criminal Code.   The applicant was sentenced to four years' imprisonment and to expulsion from the Slovak Republic.        The Supreme Court noted that in the judgment of 12 April 1996 the Regional Court had stated clearly and in detail which facts it had held for established, on which evidence its findings had been based, had set out its considerations when assessing the evidence before it and had expressed its standpoint as to the arguments of the accused.        In particular, the Supreme Court noted that the facts imputed to the applicant had been confirmed by the other accused and three of the four women concerned.   Furthermore, the applicant had originally admitted those facts in his letters addressed to the police investigator and to one of the women concerned, and the contents of those letters corresponded in full with the statements of his co- accused and of the three women concerned.        The Supreme Court considered irrelevant the applicant's alternative argument according to which the women concerned had decided to go with him to Italy voluntarily.   The Supreme Court also noted that the evidence taken before the District Court had been considered neither by it nor by the Regional Court as the District Court had lacked jurisdiction to deal with the applicant's case.        In the appeal proceedings the applicant was assisted by a lawyer. At the hearing before the Supreme Court the applicant's earlier statements were read out but the applicant was not allowed to defend his case in person.   Decisions concerning extension of the applicant's detention on remand        On 1 July 1994 the District Prosecutor requested an extension of the applicant's detention by two months on the ground that the investigator expected that he would not be able to carry out the additional investigation ordered by the District Court within one month.        On the same day the District Court extended the applicant's detention by two months pursuant to Section 71 para. 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.   The court held that the applicant's release might obstruct the proceedings and that the reasons for his detention mentioned in the decision of the Regional Court of 21 January 1994 were still relevant.   The District Court's decision was served on 26 July 1994.         On 12 July 1994 the applicant complained to the Supreme Court that the one month time-limit laid down in Section 191 of the Code of Criminal Procedure had expired and that he was detained unlawfully. The complaint was transmitted to the District Prosecutor.        On 13 July 1994 the District Prosecutor informed the applicant, in reply to a request for release lodged by the applicant's lawyer, that he had received the file on 2 June 1994.   The prosecutor held, with reference to Section 71 paras. 1 and 6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, that as from that date the applicant could be detained for two months and that during that period no extension of his detention by a court was necessary.   The applicant's request for release was submitted to the District Court pursuant to Section 72 para. 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see "Applications for release lodged by the applicant" below).        On 18 July 1994 the applicant's lawyer replied, with reference to a letter of interpretation by the Office of the General Prosecutor of the former Czech and Slovak Federal Republic of 8 July 1992, that after a court had sent a case back to the public prosecutor for additional investigation, the detention of an accused in pre-trial proceedings could last only one month unless it was extended by a court.        On 21 July 1994 the District Prosecutor informed the applicant that his detention, for two months after the receipt of the file, was in conformity with Section 71 paras. 1 and 6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.        By a letter of 30 August 1994 the District Prosecutor requested the District Court to extend the applicant's detention by two months. The request was substantiated by the fact that on 24 August 1994 it had not been possible to cross-examine the applicant and a witness as the former alleged that he had health problems, and that the applicant had been transferred to a prison hospital (see "The examination of the applicant's mental health" below).        The aforesaid request was registered by the District Court on 2 September 1994 and on the same day a single judge decided to extend the applicant's detention until 2 October 1994.   The judge held that the applicant's detention was still necessary for the purposes of Section 67 para. 1 (a) and (c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and that the applicant's release might obstruct the conduct of the proceedings within the meaning of Section 71 para. 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.        The decision stated that although the District Prosecutor had requested a two months' extension, his request had been filed on 2 September 1994, i.e. on the day when the previous decision on the applicant's detention was to expire.   For this reason the court could not decide on the District Prosecutor's request in a chamber as required by Section 71 para. 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.        On 21 September 1994 the District Prosecutor requested a further extension of the applicant's detention on the ground that the examination of the applicant's mental health, which had been ordered on 6 September 1994, would not be terminated before 2 October 1994. On 26 September 1994 the District Court (sitting in a chamber) granted the extension until 2 November 1994.        Upon the District Prosecutor's request of 24 October 1994 a single judge of the District Court extended, on 25 October 1994, the applicant's detention until 2 January 1995.   The judge examined the applicant's file and found that the pre-trial investigation including the examination of the applicant's mental health would not be terminated before 2 November 1994.   The court held that the reasons for the applicant's detention (i.e. the danger of his absconding, committing further offences or obstructing the proceedings) were still relevant.        On 7 December 1994 the District Court (sitting in a chamber) extended the applicant's detention until 2 February 1995.   It held that the pre-trial investigation of the case regarding the applicant (whose mental health was to be examined until 4 January 1995) had not been terminated and that his detention was still necessary for the purposes of Section 67 para. 1 (a) and (c) and Section 71 para. 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.        On 30 January 1995 the District Court granted the District Prosecutor's request of 23 January 1995 and extended the applicant's detention until 2 March 1995.   The District Court noted that several procedural steps had to be taken before the investigation into the applicant's case could be concluded.   It recalled that after the applicant had committed the acts imputed to him he had tried to avoid the criminal proceedings against him in that he had been staying at an unknown place.   The court considered that further detention of the applicant was also necessary in order to prevent him from committing further offences.        On 21 February 1995 the District Prosecutor requested a further extension of the applicant's detention on remand.   On 27 February 1995 the District Court granted the request and extended the applicant's detention until 2 April 1995.   The District Court noted that the applicant had insisted that he should be cross-examined with two witnesses.   However, the cross-examination could not be carried out as one of the witnesses was hospitalised after delivery.   The District Court held that the applicant's detention was necessary for the purposes of Section 67 para. 1 (a) and (c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and pointed out that the preliminary proceedings lasted unreasonably long.         On 27 March 1995 the District Court, acting at a request lodged by the District Prosecutor on 22 March 1995, extended the applicant's detention until 2 May 1995.   The District Court noted that the cross- examination of the applicant and two witnesses scheduled for 16 March 1995 could not be carried out as the applicant's lawyer had failed to appear.        On 25 April 1995 the District Prosecutor filed an indictment against the applicant before the District Court.        On 13 December 1995 the District Court requested the Supreme Court to extend the applicant's detention by one year pursuant to Section 71 para. 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.   The District Court pointed out that the delays in the proceedings were due to the repeated absence of the interpreter, health problems of a member of the court's chamber, overload of the applicant's lawyer and also to the witnesses' failure to appear before the court.        On 21 December 1995 the Supreme Court extended the applicant's detention until 21 July 1996.   It held that the detention had started on 21 January 1994 (when the applicant had been remanded by the Slovak authorities) and not, as alleged by the applicant, on 16 December 1993 (when the applicant had been arrested in Vienna).   For this reason, the Supreme Court considered that the request for extension of the detention had been lodged in time (i.e. more than ten days before the expiry of the two years' time-limit laid down in Section 71 para. 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure).        In its decision the Supreme Court pointed out that at first instance the applicant's case was within the jurisdiction of the Regional Court.        On 26 June 1996 the Supreme Court extended the applicant's detention until 31 October 1996.   Applications for release lodged by the applicant        On 27 July 1994 the District Court dismissed the applicant's application for release which had been transmitted to it by the District Prosecutor pursuant to Section 72 para. 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see "Decisions on extension of the applicant's detention on remand" above).        The applicant lodged a complaint and claimed that the reasons for his detention had fallen away.   He alleged, in particular, that his detention could have lasted, without its further extension by a court, until 2 July 1994 (i.e. one month after the file had been returned to the District Prosecutor).   He expressed doubts as to whether the decision of 1 July 1994, by which his detention had been extended until 2 September 1994, had really been taken on that day since it had been served only on 26 July 1994 and in his letters of 13 and 21 July 1994 the District Prosecutor had not referred to the fact that a request for extension of the applicant's detention had been lodged and that a decision to that effect had been taken.        On 30 August 1994 the Regional Court quashed the District Court's decision of 27 July 1994 as the latter had not examined the whole file concerning the applicant's case.        On 8 September 1994 the District Court reexamined the application and dismissed it on the ground that the reasons for the applicant's detention under Section 67 para. 1 (a) and (c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure still existed.   It also noted that on 17 August 1994 two foreigners had been apprehended in the prison's security zone whilst communicating with the applicant.        On 14 September 1994 the applicant lodged a complaint against this decision.   He claimed that the court had not dealt with his objections, in particular, as regards the lawfulness of his detention after 2 July 1994.        On 8 November 1994 the Regional Court rejected the applicant's complaint without examining its merits as it had been lodged belatedly.        On 21 April 1995 the applicant requested that he should be released and offered a pledge pursuant to Section 73 Section 1 (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.   He claimed that it was not probable that he would commit further offences.   He also undertook to stay with his   friends in Slovakia and to comply with any restrictions the court might order.        The request was dismissed on 11 May 1995.   The District Court held that the applicant, who was under the threat of a severe sentence, could abscond and, possibly, also commit offences.        On 7 August 1995 (at the main hearing before the District Court) the applicant requested, through his lawyer, that he should be released.   He pointed out that the investigation had been closed and that he would not abscond.    The applicant alleges that he was initially informed by the District Court that he was released and that he left the court room without handcuffs.   However, after a short time he was brought back and informed that his application for release was dismissed.   The Government contest this allegation.        According to the record of the hearing of 7 August 1995, the Public Prosecutor proposed that the applicant's request be granted but the District Court rejected it pursuant to Section 72 para. 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.   The applicant's lawyer then informed the court that the applicant lodged a complaint against that decision.        The decision on dismissal of the aforesaid application for release of 7 August was served on 4 September 1995 (at the second hearing before the District Court).   The decision stated that it could be challenged by a complaint within three days after it had been served.   The applicant lodged a complaint with reasons against it on 6 September 1995.   The complaint was registered by the District Court on 11 September 1995.        The applicant claimed that in view of the lapse of time since the moment of his arrest, it could no longer be reasonably expected that he would commit further offences.   He alleged, inter alia, that his detention had been unlawful as from 1 July 1994.   On 25 September the applicant was informed that his complaint had been transmitted to the Regional Court.        On 12 October 1995 the Regional Court, sitting in camera, dismissed the applicant's complaint.   It held that on 7 August the applicant had informed the District Court that he would lodge a complaint against its decision but had failed to substantiate such acomplaint.   The Regional Court found no circumstances justifying the applicant's release.   Its decision was served on the applicant on 18 October 1995.   Examination of the applicant's mental health        On 19 August 1994 the administration of the Banská Bystrica prison imposed a disciplinary penalty on the applicant on the ground that on 17 August 1994 he had communicated from his cell with two Yugoslav nationals who had approached the prison's security zone.   The decision stated that the applicant was to be held in solitary confinement for three days as from 24 August 1994, 5 p.m.   The decision was stamped by the prison doctor and the applicant confirmed on it that he did not wish to lodge a complaint against it.        In the evening of 21 August 1994 the applicant fainted for some 20 seconds.   The following day he was taken to the prison infirmary. For this reason he asked for a cross-examination scheduled for 24 August 1994 to be postponed.   His request was not accepted and on 24 August 1994 the applicant was escorted to Ziar nad Hronom.        Upon his arrival the applicant informed the investigator that he could not participate in the examination because of serious health problems.   The medical service was summoned.   Its report indicates that the applicant complained of overall weakness and thirst.   It further states that the applicant was conscious, had dry mucous membranes and that the doctor presumed the applicant to be tendentiously bradypsychical.        The provisional diagnosis stated that the applicant was in a state of near collapse.   The doctor administered perfusion to the applicant and decided that his hospitalisation was not necessary.   The applicant's lawyer was also present and the cross-examination did not take place.   The applicant was brought back to the Banská Bystrica prison.        Upon his return the applicant was placed in solitary confinement for three days pursuant to the aforesaid decision of 19 August 1994. Between 30 August and 13 September 1994 he was examined in the prison hospital in Trencín.        On 6 September 1994 the District Court ordered that the applicant's mental health should be examined pursuant to Section 105 and Section 116 para. 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the prison hospital in Trencín.   The court noted that the applicant had complained of headaches and of problems with his back and breathing.   These problems had always occurred when the applicant was to be escorted for examination.   The court therefore ordered a general check-up including the examination of the applicant's mental health.        The applicant alleges that he lodged a complaint against this decision in time but received no reply.   The decision became final on 13 September 1994.        On 20 September 1994 the investigating officer appointed three experts.   They were requested to examine the applicant's mental health and to submit an opinion, inter alia, on his personal characteristics, his capacity to distinguish the dangerousness of his behaviour, whether he showed recidivist tendencies and on the prospects of the applicant's re-socialisation.   On 5 October 1994 the public prosecutor dismissed the applicant's complaint against this decision.        On 4 October 1994 the applicant was brought to the prison hospital in Trencín in order to have his mental health examined.   He refused to co-operate with the experts.        On 2 December 1994 the District Court extended the examination of the applicant's mental health until 4 January 1995 pursuant to Section 117 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.   The court noted that the experts could not submit their opinion as the applicant had refused to co-operate with them.        On 20 December 1994 the Regional Court dismissed the applicant's complaint against the decision to extend the examination of his mental health.   The Regional Court recalled that the applicant had never specified his health problems which had always appeared when he was to be examined in the context of the criminal proceedings against him. The court held it for possible that the applicant had tried to avoid the criminal proceedings against him and considered it necessary to extend the time-limit for examination of his mental health.        The examination of the applicant's mental health ended on 3 January 1995.   On 13 January 1995 the experts submitted their opinions in which they concluded that the applicant was not suffering from any mental disorder.   Other relevant facts relating to the applicant's case        In a letter of 29 September 1994 the applicant complained to the Constitutional Court (Ústavny súd) that the decisions concerning his detention had not been taken in conformity with Slovak law, that on 24 August 1994 he had been escorted to Ziar nad Hronom notwithstanding that he had had health problems, that subsequently he had been detained in solitary confinement and that an examination of his mental health had been ordered.   He requested that the Constitutional Court study his file and redress the violations of his rights.        On 13 October 1994 a judge of the Constitutional Court informed the applicant that the Constitutional Court lacked jurisdiction to interfere with criminal proceedings before the general courts.   The letter further stated that the Constitutional Court could only start proceedings pursuant to Article 130 para. 3 of the Constitution if a person alleged a violation of his of her fundamental rights and provided that such a person had exhausted other available remedies.        The applicant complained about several procedural shortcomings in his case to the Office of the General Prosecutor.   On 2 January 1995 he was informed, inter alia, that the fact that the District Court's decision of 1 July 1994 (by which his detention had been extended) had been served after the expiry of the time-limit laid down in Section 71 para. 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure did not render the applicant's detention unlawful.        On 25 September 1996 the Regional Court ordered the applicant to pay the court fees of 1,800 Slovak crowns.   It also ordered that the applicant should compensate the costs of his detention for the period from 21 January 1994 to 21 August 1996.   The amount of the compensation was to be determined by the prison administration.        The applicant's complaint against this decision was dismissed by the Supreme Court on 30 October 1996.   The Supreme Court held that the applicant had to compensate the costs of his detention notwithstanding that he was a foreign national and noted that a complaint against the decision concerning the court fees was not available.        On 22 October 1996 the Trnava District Court dismissed the applicant's request for conditional release and on 11 December 1996 the Bratislava Regional Court rejected the applicant's complaint against this decision.        On 19 December 1996 the Trnava District Court ordered the enforcement of the Regional Court's decision that the applicant should pay the court fees of 1,800 Slovak crowns.        On 3 January 1997 the Director of the Hrnciarovce nad Parnou prison decided, with reference to the Regional Court's decision of 25 September 1996, that the applicant should pay 47,200 Slovak crowns as compensation for his detention from 21 January 1994 to 21 August 1996.   B.    The relevant domestic law and practice   Constitutional provisions and the Constitutional Court's practice        Article 17 para. 1 of the Constitution guarantees to everyone the right to liberty of person.   Paragraph 2 of Article 17 provides that a person may be prosecuted or deprived of liberty only for reasons and by means provided for by law.        Article 46 et seq. of the Constitution guarantees to everyone the right to judicial and other legal protection in accordance with the law.        Pursuant to Article 130 para. 3 of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court may start proceedings upon a petition (podnet) of legal persons or individuals claiming to have their rights violated.        In its judgment No. I ÚS 79/93 of 15 September 1993 the Constitutional Court, acting upon a petition lodged pursuant to Article 130 para. 3 of the Constitution, found a violation of constitutional rights in that a person's detention in a mental hospital (on the ground that he suffered from a mental disorder) did not conform to the relevant provisions of Slovak law.   At the same time the Constitutional Court ordered the release of the petitioner upon the service of its judgment.   Criminal Code        Pursuant to Section 246 para. 1 of the Criminal Code a person who engages a woman, entices her into going abroad or transports her abroad with a view to having sexual intercourse with another person shall be imprisoned for one to five years.   Under para. 2 (b) and (c) of the same Section such a person shall be imprisoned for three to eight years if the woman concerned is under eighteen or if the perpetrator intended to use the woman for prostitution.        Pursuant to Section 204 of the Criminal Code, as in force until 1 October 1994, a person who incites or entices another person to prostitution or benefits from another person's prostitution shall be punished with a prison sentence from one to five years.   Since 1 October 1994 this offence has been punishable, pursuant to Section 204 para. 1 of the Criminal Code, with a maximum term of imprisonment of three years.   Code of Criminal Procedure        In accordance with Section 67 para. 1 (a) and (c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, an accused can only be remanded in custody when there are reasonable grounds to believe that he would abscond or hide in order to avoid prosecution or punishment, or that he would commit further offences or accomplish an attempted offence.        The length of a person's detention on remand is governed by Section 71 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.   Until 1 October 1994 it provided, so far as relevant, as follows:        "1. The length of detention in pre-trial proceedings shall be      limited to the period which is strictly necessary.   If the      custody is to exceed two months and if the release of the accused      could frustrate or obstruct the purpose of criminal proceedings,      a single judge can extend the custody, upon a public prosecutor's      request, up to six months.   A further extension can only be      granted by a court sitting in a chamber...   The pre-trial      detention may in no circumstances exceed one year...        2.   The public prosecutor shall lodge the request to extend an      accused person's detention pursuant to para. 1 not later than      five days before the time-limit expires.   If the court does not      decide on such a request before the expiry of the time-limit, the      public prosecutor shall release the accused.   The decision by      which the detention was extended shall be served on the accused      within ten days..."        Since 1 October 1994 the relevant provisions of Section 71 have been amended as follows:        "1. The length of detention in pre-trial and judicial proceedings      shall be limited to the period which is strictly necessary.   If      the custody in pre-trial proceedings is to exceed six months and      if the release of the accused could frustrate or obstruct the      purpose of criminal proceedings, a single judge can extend the      custody, upon a public prosecutor's request, up to one year; a      further extension, up to two years overall, can be granted by a      court sitting in a chamber.   The decision by which the detention      is extended shall be served on the accused within ten days.        2.   Custody in judicial proceedings taken together with the pre-      trial custody shall not exceed two years.   If, because of the      complexity of the case or for other serious reasons, it is not      possible to complete the prosecution by that time, and if the      release of the accused could frustrate or obstruct the purpose      of criminal proceedings, the Supreme Court can extend the custody      by another year...        4.   The request to extend the time-limit mentioned in paragraphs      1 and 2 shall be lodged with the court not later than ten days      before the expiry of the time-limit concerned.   If the request      is not lodged as mentioned above, the president of the court's      chamber, or the public prosecutor in pre-trial proceedings, shall      release the accused not later than one day after the time-limit      for the remand in custody has expired."        Paragraph 6 of Section 71 provides, inter alia, that if a case is returned to the public prosecutor for additional investigation, the time-limit set out in para. 1 shall start to run on the day on which the file was received by the public prosecutor.        Pursuant to Section 191 para. 3, additional investigation is to be carried out, as a rule, within one month from the day on which the file was returned to the public prosecutor.        Section 72 para. 2 entitles the accused to apply for release at any time.   If the public prosecutor dismisses such an application in the course of pre-trial proceedings, he or she shall submit it immediately to the court.   The court shall rule on such an application without delay.   If the application is dismissed, the accused may renew it fourteen days after the decision became final unless he invokes other reasons.        Section 73 para. 1 (b) entitles the court, or a single judge in pre-trial proceedings, to release an accused who is detained on remand under Section 67 para. 1 (a) or (c) if the latter makes a pledge in writing to abstain from any criminal activity and to comply with the obligations and restrictions imposed on him, provided that the pledge is considered as being sufficient in view of the personal characteristics of the accused.        Section 116 para. 1 provides for appointment, upon a written order by the court, of two psychiatric experts when there is a need to examine the mental health of an accused.        Pursuant to para. 2 of the same Section, when the mental health of an accused cannot be examined in another way, the court can order that he or she should be observed in an institution.   Such an order can be issued in pre-trial proceedings by the judge upon the proposal of the public prosecutor.   The order can be challenged by a complaint which has a suspensive effect.        According to Section 117, the examination of a person's mental health shall not exceed two months.   A single judge can extend it in pre-trial proceedings by one month at the request of the public prosecutor provided that the experts concerned have substantiated the need for such an extension.   Such a decision can be challenged by means of a complaint.        Pursuant to Section 241, the president of a court's chamber shall notify the public prosecutor, as a rule at least three days in advance, of the court's meeting in camera.   Such a meeting shall be attended, pursuant to Section 242, by all members of the chamber and the court clerk.   The presence of the public prosecutor is not mandatory unless otherwise provided by the law.   The attendance of a meeting in camera by other persons is excluded.        Section 259 para. 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that in case the appellate court quashes a first instance judgment or a part thereof and there is a need for a new decision, the appellate court shall, as a rule, transmit the case back to the first instance court for a new adjudication.        Pursuant to Section 259 para. 3, the appellate court can deliver a judgment on a case only if such a new decision can be made on the basis of the facts which were correctly established in the first instance judgment in question and, as the case may be, complemented by evidence that was taken before the appellate court.   An appellate court is not entitled, however, to modify the first instance judgment to the detriment of the accused unless the public prosecutor lodged an appeal to this effect.   COMPLAINTS        Under Article 5 of the Convention the applicant complains that his detention after 2 July 1994 and the examination of his mental health were unlawful.   He further complains about the length of his detention on remand and about both the length and fairness of the proceedings concerning his application for release which was dismissed by the Ziar nad Hronom District Court on 7 August 1995 and by the Banská Bystrica Regional Court on 12 October 1995.        The applicant further complains under Article 3 of the Convention that on 24 August 1994 he was escorted to Ziar nad Hronom notwithstanding that he had health problems, that he was subsequently placed in solitary confinement and that his mental health was examined in the prison hospital in Trencín for three months.        The applicant complains that the officials dealing with his case in pre-trial proceedings and at first instance were biased, that the Supreme Court failed to hear him when it was deciding on his appeal against the Regional Court's judgment of 12 April 1996, that the courts convicted him arbitrarily and thereby violated his right to be presumed innocent.        Finally, the applicant complains about the decision to expel him from the Slovak Republic, about the dismissal of his request for conditional release and that he is under the obligation to pay the court fees and the costs of his detention.   PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION        The application was introduced on 28 September 1994 and registered on 1 September 1995.        On 11 April 1996 the Commission decided to communicate the application to the respondent Government.        The Government's written observations were submitted on 21 June 1996.   The applicant replied on 14 October 1996.        On 10 September 1996 the Commission granted the applicant legal aid.   THE LAW   1.    The applicant complains that both his detention on remand after 2 July 1994 and the examination of his mental health were contrary to the relevant provisions of Slovak law.   He alleges a violation of Article 5 (Art. 5) of the Convention which provides, so far as relevant, as follows:        "1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person.      No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following      cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:      ...            c. the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for            the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal            authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an            offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to            prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having            done so;      ..."        The Government contend that the applicant has not exhausted domestic remedies in this respect as he did not, after the exhaustion of other available remedies, lodge a petition pursuant to Article 130 para. 3 of the Constitution.   They consider that the applicant's detention was in any event lawful within the meaning of Article 5 para. 1 (c) (Art. 5-1-c) of the Convention.        The applicant maintains that he exhausted all available remedies and that his detention wa