CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 11 septembre 1997

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                          AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                          Application No. 32783/96                        by Peter CHESTER                        against the United Kingdom           The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting in private on 11 September 1997, the following members being present:              Mrs.   J. LIDDY, President            MM.    M.P. PELLONPÄÄ                  E. BUSUTTIL                  A. WEITZEL                  C.L. ROZAKIS                  L. LOUCAIDES                  N. BRATZA                  I. BÉKÉS                  G. RESS                  A. PERENIC                  C. BÎRSAN                  K. HERNDL            Mrs.   M. HION            Mr.    R. NICOLINI              Mrs.   M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber         Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;         Having regard to the application introduced on 2 January 1996 by Peter CHESTER against the United Kingdom and registered on 27 August 1996 under file No. 32783/96;         Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission;         Having deliberated;         Decides as follows:         THE FACTS         The applicant is a British citizen born in 1954 and currently serving a sentence of life imprisonment in HM Prison Full Sutton, York.         The facts, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows:         The applicant has maintained regular contact with relatives and friends via correspondence and, over the last 3 to 4 years by telephone. Previously the use of telephones required the purchase of "telephone cards". A new system was introduced in October 1995 in the applicant's prison. This system required the use of a Personal Identification Number ("PIN") for prisoners requesting access to telephone facilities and the prior nomination of a limited number of (up to twenty) telephone numbers that could be called by the individual. The PIN arrangement has lead to occasions when, by the refusal to accept a nominated number, requests to contact people or organisations have been denied by the prison authorities; for example, the applicant was unable to contact a Building Society, and the local County Court, the latter in relation to a civil case he was bringing concerning the telephone arrangements.         The applicant made complaints about these matters to the prison authorities on 26 October 1995. The reply from the Governor of 26 October 1995 referred to the policy of improving prison security and stated that information contained on the system was secure. The applicant appealed to the Area Manager who, by reply of 9 February 1996, stated that the PIN system was introduced in the face of abuse by prisoners of the previous system and that ex-directory numbers would not be accessible to any outside source.         The applicant issued proceedings against British Telecom for its installation of the system in the prison. His case was dismissed by the County Court on 3 April 1996, and his appeal dismissed on 1 May 1996.     COMPLAINTS   1.     The applicant complains that his right to respect for private life under Article 8 has been violated because he is restricted as to who he can call; the PIN system requires him to give prior notification to the prison authorities of the telephone numbers he intends to use and on past occasions certain legitimate numbers have been refused or delayed. Further, he is forced to reveal the telephone numbers (some of which are confidential) he intends to call both to the authorities and, by virtue of the fact that the numbers are displayed on a visual display screen on the telephone, visible to others in the vicinity of the telephones at the time. For example, the applicant wishes to call his brother who, for security reasons related to his work, wishes his number to remain strictly confidential. The applicant, in the circumstances outlined above, will not telephone his brother, a soldier in Northern Ireland, for security reasons and so is prevented from regular telephone contact in this way.   2.     The applicant likewise complains that the same facts constitute a breach of Article 10 of the Convention, in so far as this relates to his right to receive and impart information from family, friends and institutions.3.   The applicant further complains that he has been subjected to discriminatory treatment under Article 14, in that he is restricted to twenty telephone numbers whereas members of the public and prisoners serving in other prisons (where the telephone card arrangements continue) are not so restricted.   4. The applicant also claims a breach of Article 13 in so far as his civil action to remedy the complaint was ineffective.     THE LAW   1.     The applicant complains about restrictions on telephone calls and the conditions under which telephone calls are made. He invokes Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention which provides as relevant:         "1.   Everyone has the right to respect for his private and       family life, ... and his correspondence.         2.    There shall be no interference by a public authority with       the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with       the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests       of national security, public safety or the economic well-being       of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the       protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the       rights and freedoms of others."         The applicant submits that the limitation on the number of persons whom he may call, the refusal of the authorities to allow calls to certain persons or institutions, and the requirement to inform the authorities of the numbers interferes with his rights under Article 8 (Art. 8). He also submits that the use of a visual display screen on the telephone which shows the number being called is an intrusion of privacy and prevents him calling his brother, who by his work must take security precautions.         The Commission notes the importance that prisoners maintain contacts with family and friends outside prison. It recalls however that Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention does not guarantee prisoners the right to make telephone calls, in particular where the facilities for contact by way of correspondence are fully available and adequate (see eg.   Boyle v. the United Kingdom, No. 9659/82, Dec. 5.5.83). Where telephone facilities are provided by the prison authorities, having regard to the ordinary and reasonable conditions of prison life, these may be subjected to legitimate restrictions, for example, in light of the shared nature of the facilities with other prisoners and the requirements of the prevention of crime or disorder. In this context and to the extent that such conditions may be regarded as an interference with private life or correspondence, the Commission finds that they may be considered justified in terms of the second paragraph of Article 8 (Art. 8).         Further, the Commission does not find it substantiated that the visual display screen on the telephone is of such a size or positioned in such a way as to place the applicant at a serious risk that the numbers may be noted or used by other prisoners or prison officers in such a way as to interfere with the applicant's private life. Nor does the Commission find it substantiated that the refusal of the prison authorities to allow calls to certain persons or institutions has interfered with his private life or his ability to manage his affairs, the possibility of correspondence remaining unrestricted. Insofar as the applicant does not wish to disclose to others ex-directory numbers, the Commission does not find that the prison authorities can be required to waive security precautions to enable him to use his telephone privileges in respect of such numbers.         Consequently, the Commission finds that the restrictions and conditions complained of fail to disclose any appearance of a violation of Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention. This part of the application must therefore be rejected as manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   2.     The applicant has also invoked Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention, which guarantees freedom of expression, in respect of the restrictions on his telephone calls. The Commission finds that these complaints disclose no appearance of a violation of Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention for the same reasons as above and that these complaints are also manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   3.     The applicant complains under Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention, which prohibits discrimination in the enjoyment of the rights guaranteed under the Convention, that he is subject to restrictions which are not applied to prisoners in other prisons or to persons at liberty.         The case-law of the Convention organs establishes however that it is not every difference in treatment which constitutes discrimination within the meaning of Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention. It must be established that other persons in an analogous or relevantly similar situation enjoy preferential treatment and that there is no reasonable or objective justification for this distinction (see eg. Eur. Court HR, Van der Mussele v. Belgium judgment of 21 November 1982, Series A no. 70; Fredin v. Sweden (No. 1) judgment of 18 February 1991, Series A no. 192, p. 19, para. 60).         In the present case, the Commission is not satisfied that the applicant may claim to be in a comparable position to persons at liberty or to prisoners in other establishments where different regimes or security considerations may apply. It accordingly rejects this part of the application as manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   4.     The applicant also invokes Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention, which provides that :         "Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this       Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a       national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been       committed by persons acting in an official capacity."         The Commission recalls however that Article 13 (Art. 13) does not require a remedy under domestic law in respect of any alleged violation of the Convention. It only applies if the individual can be said to have an "arguable claim" of a violation of the Convention (Eur. Court HR, Boyle and Rice v. the United Kingdom judgment of 27 April 1988, Series A no. 131, p. 23, para. 52).         The Commission finds that the applicant cannot be said, in light of its findings above to have an "arguable claim" of a violation of his Convention rights.         It follows that this complaint must be dismissed as manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.         For these reasons, the Commission unanimously,         DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.     M.F. BUQUICCHIO                                  J. LIDDY      Secretary                                     President to the First Chamber                         of the First Chamber