CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 11 septembre 1997

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                          AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                           Application No. 32332/96                       by R.J.B.                       against the United Kingdom          The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting in private on 11 September 1997, the following members being present:              Mrs.   J. LIDDY, President            MM.    M.P. PELLONPÄÄ                  E. BUSUTTIL                  A. WEITZEL                  C.L. ROZAKIS                  L. LOUCAIDES                  N. BRATZA                  I. BÉKÉS                  G. RESS                  A. PERENIC                  C. BÎRSAN                  K. HERNDL            Mrs.   M. HION            Mr.    R. NICOLINI              Mrs.   M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber        Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;        Having regard to the application introduced on 29 January 1996 by R.J.B. against the United Kingdom and registered on 22 July 1996 under file No. 32332/96;        Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission;        Having deliberated;        Decides as follows:   THE FACTS        The applicant is a national of the United Kingdom, born in 1940, and currently resides in Wiltshire. He is represented by Atter MacKenzie, a firm of solicitors practising in Evesham.        The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.        In 1977, the applicant and his wife jointly bought a house, where they took up residence.        In February 1988 the applicant was arrested for suspected theft. He was released on bail without charge.        On 3 April 1989, the Criminal Justice Act of 1988 (the 1988 Act) entered into force. Under Part VI of the 1988 Act, trial courts may make confiscation orders aimed at removing assessed benefits obtained through the commission of offences of which a person has been found guilty.        In June 1989, the applicant gave to his wife his share in their matrimonial home and his interest in the endowment policy covering the sum borrowed when this house was mortgaged.        In May 1990, the applicant was rearrested and charged. He was committed for trial on 14 September 1990 on 22 charges of theft.        On 11 December 1991, following a trial that had lasted twenty-two days, a jury at the Wood Green Crown Court convicted the applicant of multiple counts of theft by deception and using false instruments committed between January 1986 and September 1987. He was sentenced to three years' imprisonment and, pursuant to Part VI of the 1988 Act, a confiscation order in the amount of £.140,643.18 was made against him with twelve months' consecutive imprisonment if this sum was not paid within twelve months.        With leave of the Crown Court, the applicant filed an appeal against both his conviction and sentence with the Court of Appeal, which was dismissed on 26 March 1993.        Since nothing was paid in satisfaction of the payment order, the Crown Prosecution Service applied in November 1995 to the High Court for the appointment of a receiver for the realisation of property held by the applicant, including the assets he had given to his wife in June 1989. This application was opposed by both the applicant and his wife.        When the application was heard before the High Court on 2 November 1995, the applicant and his wife relied, inter alia, on the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 9 February 1995 in the case of Welch v. the United Kingdom (Series A no. 307-A). On this and other points Judge McCullough held:        "It is accepted on behalf of both Mr and Mrs B. that that      <judgment> does not bind this Court. If it did it would not      merely prevent the appointment of a receiver, it would render the      confiscation order of no effect. What is submitted is that the      <judgment> is a factor which the Court should take into account      when exercising its judgment as to whether it would be      appropriate to take these gifts <made in June 1989> into account      as part of Mr B.'s realisable property. I do not accept this.      What is appropriate is to have regard to the provisions of the      1988 Act, Section 102(4) of which applies the provisions to      offences committed before the commencement of Part VI of that      Act, provided proceedings have not been instituted by that date.      Additionally, it is to be noted that the gifts in question were      made after Part VI have come into force.        ... Whatever the hardship to Mrs B., there is no reason why she      should be treated more favourably than she would had the gifts      had not been made. In any event, this Court should proceed on the      basis that the money in Australia, or wherever it is, is      available to Mr B. That has already been decided by the Crown      Court and upheld by the Court of Appeal. ...        ... I have no doubt that the transfers of Mr B.'s interests in      the house and in the endowment policy were made in an endeavour      to put the interest in question beyond the reach of the court or      any judgment creditors. ...        I should perhaps add a further word in relation to the argument      that, had Mr B. retained his interests in the house and the      endowment policy, they would undoubtedly have been part of his      realisable property. It does not, however, automatically follow      that had the Crown Court been asked to consider them, those      assets would necessarily have been taken into account in      calculating the amount of the confiscation order; the power of      the Crown Court to make a confiscation order is discretionary,      not mandatory. More to the point perhaps is that even if, as I      imagine will normally be the case, the Crown Court does take such      assets into account, the High Court is not prevented, on an      application such as this from excluding from its order those      assets the realisation of which would lead to hardship for an      innocent wife."        The prosecution's application was consequently rejected as the realisation of the matrimonial home and endowment policy was found to cause Mrs B. undue hardship. Some days later, the Crown Prosecution Service sought the applicant's imprisonment for failure to satisfy the confiscation order.        On 25 January 1996, the High Court rejected the applicant's request for a Certificate of Inadequacy under Section 83 of the 1988 Act.        On 3 February 1996, the Bow street Magistrates' Court issued an order allowing the applicant's imprisonment for 365 days for failure to satisfy the confiscation order.        On 22 August 1996, the applicant informed the Commission that he had been discharged from prison.     COMPLAINT        The applicant complains under Article 7 of the Convention of the retroactive application of the 1988 Act resulting in a confiscation order against him.     THE LAW        The applicant complains under Article 7 (Art. 7) of the Convention of the retroactive application of the 1988 Act resulting in a confiscation order against him.        Article 7 (Art. 7) of the Convention reads as follows:        "1.    No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on      account of any act or omission which did not constitute a      criminal offence under national or international law at the time      when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed      than the one that was applicable at the time the criminal offence      was committed.        2.     This Article shall not prejudice the trial and punishment      of any person for any act or omission which, at the time when it      was committed, was criminal according to the general principles      of law recognised by civilised nations."        However, the Commission is not required to decide whether or not the facts submitted by the applicant disclose any appearance of a violation of Article 7 (Art. 7) of the Convention as, in accordance with Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention, the Commission finds that the final decision regarding the applicant's case was given by the Court of Appeal on 26 March 1993, when it rejected the applicant's appeal against his conviction and sentence and thus determined the imposition of the confiscation order. This is more than six months before the date on which the application was submitted.        This finding is not altered by the subsequent proceedings, as these proceedings merely concerned the modalities of the execution of the confiscation order imposed.        It follows that the application must be rejected under Article 27 (Art. 27) of the Convention.        For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,        DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.     M.F. BUQUICCHIO                                  J. LIDDY      Secretary                                     President to the First Chamber                          of the First Chamber