CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 10 septembre 1997

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                          AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                           Application No. 32338/96                       by Jonathan P. HODGETTS                       against the United Kingdom          The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting in private on 10 September 1997, the following members being present:                Mrs.   J. LIDDY, President            MM.    M.P. PELLONPÄÄ                  E. BUSUTTIL                  A. WEITZEL                  C.L. ROZAKIS                  L. LOUCAIDES                  B. MARXER                  B. CONFORTI                  N. BRATZA                  I. BÉKÉS                  G. RESS                  A. PERENIC                  C. BÎRSAN                  K. HERNDL            Mrs.   M. HION            Mr.    R. NICOLINI              Mrs.   M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber          Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;        Having regard to the application introduced on 20 December 1995 by Jonathan P. HODGETTS against the United Kingdom and registered on 22 July 1996 under file No. 32338/96;        Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission;        Having deliberated;        Decides as follows:   THE FACTS        The applicant is a British citizen, born in 1957 and resident in Cornwall.   The facts, as they have been submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.        The applicant is a college lecturer specialising in special educational needs.   Between 1 September 1989 and 31 March 1992 the applicant was a tutor/organiser for Cornwall Adult Basic Education. The applicant was made redundant on 31 March 1992.        On 10 June 1992 the applicant was informed by police officers that he should attend at Penzance Police Station to answer questions relating to allegations of sexual abuse made by a former student.   No further clarification was given.        On 11 June 1992 the applicant instructed solicitors.   He told them that he had not done anything which could give rise to such allegations.   On 15 June 1992 he was interviewed by police officers of the Child Protection Team at Penzance Police Station.   The applicant was informed prior to the interview that an allegation of sexual abuse had been made against him and another man, by a male 28 year old student with learning difficulties.   The officers put questions to the applicant, including questions containing allegations of indecent assault.   On the advice of his solicitors, the applicant replied "no comment" to these questions.        On 26 August 1992 the applicant learned that the police had ceased their inquiries and did not propose to interview the other man against whom allegations had been made by the student.        In January 1993, unknown to the applicant, a letter was sent to all educational establishments under the authority of the Cornwall County Council ("the Council"), stating that if the applicant attempted to obtain a post at an educational establishment, the Council should be contacted before offering any employment to the applicant.        On 9 February 1993, the applicant was sent a letter from the college in Cornwall ("the college") where he was working as an examiner,   requesting that he cease working there and arrange for another examiner to be appointed in his place.   The letter stated that the reason for the request was:        "the investigation held under the agreed professional abuse      procedures which related to your previous employment at a college      in Cornwall."        The applicant contacted solicitors who wrote to the college on 26 March 1993 requesting clarification of the contents of the letter. The college passed this letter on to the Council.   The Council replied on 24 May 1993, to the effect that there had been an "investigation" under the auspices of its Area Child Protection Committee.   No further information was provided.   The applicant instructed fresh solicitors who wrote to the Council on 18 June 1993 asking for clarification of the "investigation" and its outcome.   By a letter dated 28 June 1993 the Council replied stating:        "it was as a result of an investigation under the professional      abuse procedures and a decision made formally under those      procedures by a properly constituted planning meeting that the      local education authority should be contacted before employment      was offered to him. It was in response to this letter that [the      college] advised that [the applicant comes] ... into contact with      the college students and it was thus that [the college] wrote to      [the applicant] in the terms advised by the County Council."        The applicant's solicitors sought emergency legal aid for the applicant and instructed counsel.   By an application dated 12 August 1993 the applicant sought judicial review of the decision of the Area Child Protection Committee of the Council to blacklist the applicant in respect of educational establishments operated by the Local Education Authority.   The applicant sought to quash the blacklisting decision and to obtain compensation in respect of the damage to his career.        At an oral hearing on 22 October 1993 Mr Justice Auld adjourned the hearing of the application, upon the agreement of the Council to provide the applicant with an oral hearing.   However, following this ruling on 22 October 1993 there was lengthy correspondence between the solicitors of the applicant and the Council in relation to the disclosure of documents.   By 13 May 1994 the applicant's solicitors were satisfied they had all the relevant material necessary for a proper hearing.   On 8 September 1994 the applicant's solicitors wrote to the Council stating that in default of a hearing date being given by the Council, they would make an application to the Court.   In response to this letter the Council informed the applicant that an oral hearing by the Council would commence on 2 November 1994.   The applicant agreed to this date.   The hearing took place on 2 and 3 November 1994 and 5 December 1994.   On 16 December 1994 the Council informed the applicant that the allegations made against him had been found to be unsubstantiated.        On 7 July 1995 the judicial review proceedings were settled.   The Council agreed to pay the applicant's reasonable legal costs and also to write to the various educational bodies, to whom it had previously written in January 1993, stating that the allegations against the applicant had proved unfounded.   The applicant reserved the right to seek damages.        On 9 September 1995 the applicant obtained legal aid to obtain counsel's advice as to the merits of taking proceedings in negligence against the Council seeking damages.   Counsel advised that no such action would lie in English law.   COMPLAINTS        The applicant contends that his good reputation and ability to carry on a profession were civil rights.   He states that these were interfered with by the Council without a prior hearing.   The applicant claims that the judicial review proceedings and the panel hearing in 1994 did not remedy the violation and these proceedings were not conducted within a reasonable time.   The applicant invokes Article 6 of the Convention in relation to these complaints.        The applicant further complains that he was provided with no effective domestic remedy as he had no entitlement to damages.   In this respect the applicant invokes Article 13 of the Convention.   THE LAW   1.    The applicant complains that he was blacklisted by the Council without a prior hearing.    The applicant invokes Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.        Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention provides, so far as relevant, as follows:        "1.    In the determination of his civil rights and obligations...      everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a      reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal      established by law..."        The Commission will assume for the purposes of the decision that the blacklisting of the applicant, with the result that he was unable to carry on his profession, and the subsequent judicial review of the blacklisting, concerned a determination of his civil rights and thus that Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention is applicable.        The Commission notes that the applicant settled the judicial review proceedings that he brought against the Council in July 1995. In these circumstances the applicant cannot claim to be a victim of a violation of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention as regards the substance of the proceedings.        It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill- founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   2.    The applicant further complains that he was unable to bring proceedings, separate from the judicial review proceedings, in order to claim damages against the Council.   When the applicant settled the judicial review proceedings he reserved the right to seek damages, but was subsequently advised by counsel that no such action would lie in English law against the Council.   The applicant invokes Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.        Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention does not guarantee a right to damages.   The Commission notes that Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention extends only to disputes over civil rights and obligations which can be said, at least on arguable grounds, to be recognised under domestic law (see Eur. Court HR, 0 v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 8 July 1987, Series A no. 120, p.24, para. 54). It is the applicant's contention that under domestic law there was no right to claim damages against the Council in relation to their alleged negligence in blacklisting the applicant.        It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill- founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   3.    The applicant complains under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention of the length of proceedings.        The Commission notes that there was a period of 16 months between the commencement of judicial review and the finding that the allegations against the applicant were unsubstantiated and then a further seven months before the judicial review proceedings were finally settled.     The Commission notes that it was not until 8 September 1994 that the applicant insisted that the hearing ordered by Mr Justice Auld be held, as prior to this the applicant's solicitors had been involved in correspondence with the Council over the disclosure of relevant documentation. The Commission does not consider that in the circumstances such a period amounts to a breach of the obligation to have a hearing within a reasonable time.        It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill- founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   4.     The applicant complains under Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention that he was unable to claim damages against the Council and thus did not have an effective remedy.        Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention provides:        "Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this      Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a      national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been      committed by persons acting in an official capacity."        The Commission recalls that there is no "civil right" to claim damages recognised under domestic law to attract the application of Article 6 para. 1 and that Article 13 (Art. 6-1, 13) does not go so far as to guarantee a remedy allowing a Contracting State's laws as such to be challenged before a national authority (see. Eur. Court HR, Powell and Rayner v. the United Kingdom judgment of 21 February 1990, Series A no. 172, p. 16, para. 36).        It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill- founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.        For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,        DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.       M.F. BUQUICCHIO                                  J. LIDDY      Secretary                                     President to the First Chamber                          of the First Chamber