CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 10 septembre 1997

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                          AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                           Application No. 23118/93                       by Arnold NILSEN and Jan Gerhard JOHNSEN                       against Norway           The European Commission of Human Rights (Second Chamber) sitting in private on 10 September 1997, the following members being present:              Mr.    J.-C. GEUS, Acting President            Mrs.   G.H. THUNE            MM.    A. GÖZÜBÜYÜK                  J.-C. SOYER                  H. DANELIUS                  F. MARTINEZ                  M.A. NOWICKI                  I. CABRAL BARRETO                  J. MUCHA                  D. SVÁBY                  P. LORENZEN                  E. BIELIUNAS                  E.A. ALKEMA                  A. ARABADJIEV              Ms.    M.-T. SCHOEPFER, Secretary to the Chamber           Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;         Having regard to the application introduced on 2 November 1993 by Arnold Nilsen and Jan Gerhard Johnsen against Norway and registered on 17 December 1993 under file No. 23118/93;         Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission;         Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government on 27 October 1995 and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant on 15 January 1996;         Having deliberated;         Decides as follows:   THE FACTS         The applicants are Norwegian citizens, born in 1928 and 1943, respectively. The first applicant is a police inspector residing at Garnes. The second applicant is a police constable residing at Fyllingsdalen. Before the Commission they are represented by Mr Johan Hjort, a lawyer practising in Oslo.   A.     Particular circumstances of the case         In the 1970s Mr N, then a law student, and Mr V, then a university lecturer, made an investigation of violence in the city of Bergen which has a population of some 200,000 inhabitants. The researchers gathered material from the local hospital relating to all patients subjected to violence in the period 1 January 1975 to 1 July 1976. Later on the researchers included material from other sources. They started to publish their findings in 1980-81, initially as several separate reports.         A summary, or rather an extract of the many reports, was published in 1981 in a book called Volden og dens ofre. En empirisk undersøkelse (Violence and its victims. An empirical study). This book of some 280 pages included one chapter of 77 pages on police brutality, i.e. the unlawful use of physical force by the police while carrying out their duties. The researchers found among other things that 58 persons, 28 of whom were medically examined, had been exposed to police brutality in the period referred to above. They then concluded that the police in Bergen were responsible for approximately 360 incidents every year in which excessive and illegal use of force was applied.         This book gave rise to a widespread public debate on the issue of police brutality.   Among other things it led to the Ministry of Justice appointing professor B and Mr S-N, a practising lawyer, with a mandate to examine whether the research carried out on police brutality gave any general indication of the form and extent of police brutality in the city of Bergen. In 1982 their report was printed and published as a book under the title Politivold-rapporten (Report on police brutality). They found that the extent and form of police brutality in the city of Bergen were far more serious than presumed, and that the conclusions drawn by Mr N and Mr V were fairly accurate.         The report sparked off another public debate. The conclusions and the premises of the work were called in question by the Norwegian Police Association among others. The association considered bringing an action for defamation against the authors of the report and the researchers, but in January 1983 counsel for the association publicly announced that it would not take legal action.         In particular the newspapers in Bergen took a keen interest in the debate following the publishing of the report. In 1981 a newspaper called Morgenavisen wrote that Mr N had lied while gathering material for his research. Mr N brought a private prosecution for defamation against the newspaper, but the latter was acquitted in 1983 by the Bergen City Court (byretten) on the grounds that the accusation had been justified.         Professor B continued his work on police brutality, but now as an independent researcher. His efforts resulted in the book Politivold (Police brutality), with the subtitle Omfang - årsak - forebyggelse. En studie i desinformasjon (Extent - causes - prevention. A study in disinformation), published in the spring of 1986. The book took the 1982 report as its point of departure, but had a much broader approach; new facts, analysis and conclusions were added. Among other things professor B was highly critical of the judgment in the case between the researcher N and Morgenavisen in Bergen. This publication caused the public debate on police brutality to flare up once again.         During this debate, in the spring and summer of 1986, the second applicant, who was then the president of the Bergen Police Union (Bergen Politilag), was interviewed by the newspaper Dagbladet. The paper published the interview with him on 15 May 1986. The text of the interview reads as follows:         (Translation)         "'The mood of the officers in the police force has been       swinging between despair and anger. An entire service has       been denounced by anonymous persons. Many of the officers       dread going out in town because there is always somebody       who believes that there must be something in these       allegations.'         This is what the chairman of the Bergen Police Union, (the       second applicant), told Dagbladet. He describes       professor B's recent report on police brutality in the       Bergen police force as 'pure disinformation intended to       harm the police'.         'Until the contrary has been proved, I would characterise       this as a deliberate lie. The allegations come from       anonymous sources and are clearly defamatory of the       service.'         'Are you questioning B's motives for exposing police       brutality?'         'There must be other ulterior motives. It appears as if the       purpose has been to undermine confidence in the police.'         'Would you suggest that the information be investigated       internally?'         'If there is any truth in it, we will do what we can to       remedy the situation. Such a situation is not to our       credit, and we are not interested in having such people in       the force.'         'So you do not exclude the possibility that misconduct has       occurred?'         'I refuse to accept that any officers have committed the       outrages described. But I cannot exclude the possibility       that some of them have in some case used force and gone too       far.'"         On 16 May 1986 the first applicant, who was chairman of the Norwegian Police Association (Norsk Politiforbund) at the time, was quoted in the newspaper Bergens Tidende in an article which reads inter alia as follows:       (Translation)         "'It is beneath the dignity of a law professor to present       something like this. The allegations are completely       frivolous since they are based on anonymous sources. They       have nothing to do with reality.'         'I have spent my whole working life in the Bergen police       force, and can safely say that the allegations concerning       police brutality bear no relation to reality. They are       stories that would have been better suited to a weekly with       space to fill than a so-called serious study,' says (the       first applicant).         'I am puzzled by the motives behind such allegations,'       continues the chairman of the Police Association. 'At any       rate, it cannot be in the interests of the rule of law and       the public good to create such problems for an entire       service. I would claim that the quality of the human       resources in the police force is fully on a par with that       found among professors. We would not be able to base a       charge against anyone on such flimsy grounds as professor B       does. At any rate, there would not then be any rule of law       in this country,'         'But you are not denying that police brutality does occur?'         'Of course not, but that is a different question. Here is       a story of the systematic use of violence and pure theft.       That kind of thing would not be tolerated in a police       force.'         (The first applicant) points out that he has not examined       the book closely, but that what has emerged so far cannot       be left unchallenged. The problem is that it is difficult       to contest the allegations because it is not an individual,       but an entire service, which feels it has been libelled. He       does, however, agree with Chief of Police OH, who told       Bergens Tidende yesterday that there must be good reason       for the Director of Public Prosecutions to examine the       matter more closely. The Police Association will also       consider getting a legal opinion of the book."         In the autumn of 1986 the Ministry of Justice considered appointing a commission of inquiry headed by a Supreme Court judge. However, this never materialised. The Ministry of Justice decided only to propose to the national assembly that a permanent, independent investigative body should be set up to consider claims against the police.         Late in the autumn of 1986 professor B and Mr N published another book on the issue: "Dokumentasjon av politivold og andre overgrep i Bergenpolitiet" (Documentation of police brutality and other misconduct in the Bergen police force). Certain statements by professor B in this book led the Norwegian Police Association and the Bergen Police Union to prefer defamation charges against him in July 1988. The statements required to be annulled in this action against professor B were as follows:    "(a)       The harassment and persecution to which N - and in part V       - have been subjected in Bergen are reminiscent of the fate       of dissidents in Eastern European countries. I doubt that       there is anyone among us whose situation is closer to that       of these dissidents than N. It is a wonder that he has had       the courage and strength to continue his struggle to bring       the truth to light.         (b)       It is impossible to say how many officers in the Bergen       police force are involved in the unlawful practice       described here; hopefully only a small minority. It is,       however, difficult to believe that a great many in the       force could be unaware of the actions of certain       colleagues. But their silence is ensured by the pressing       demand for 'loyalty'. This has made it possible for the       criminal sub-culture in the Bergen police force - whose       activities encompass various kinds of offences - to survive       and most likely to flourish.         (c)       There is reason to believe that many of the actions against       N and V are headed by somebody who is centrally placed -       that there is somebody behind the scenes in the Bergen       police force who is pulling the strings, plotting       strategies and laying plans together with a few highly       trusted colleagues. According to information that has come       to light, it may now be possible to identify the key people       responsible for some of the misconduct."         The defamation case against professor B was later discontinued in view of the European Court of Human Rights' judgment in the case Thorgeirson vs. Iceland (Series A no. 239).         Up to this juncture the identity of the persons who had supplied information on police brutality in the city of Bergen was known only to the researchers themselves. An unexpurgated version of the latest book giving names of the persons in question was sent by professor B to the Director General of Public Prosecutions, who responded by commencing an investigation. The investigation was headed by Mr L, a public prosecutor of the Eidsivating Office of the Public Prosecutor. He was assisted by senior police officials and police officers at Oslo police headquarters. The result of the investigation was made public in June 1987. The conclusion was essentially that the allegations of police brutality which had been advanced were unfounded. Two hundred and sixty-eight cases of alleged police brutality in the city of Bergen were investigated. This led to charges against one police officer who was, however, subsequently acquitted.         After the investigation was concluded, indictments were preferred against 17 persons who had made statements to the police and a writ giving the option of a fine was served on one person, inter alia for giving false evidence. Fourteen persons were convicted of this. In the public debate these cases became known as the "boomerang cases".         Charges were also brought against two individuals for false accusations against the police related to other matters. One of these individuals was Mr N, who was acquitted of these charges in June 1990.       In the spring of 1987 professor B published another book called Politiovergrep og personforfølgelse. 220 forklaringer om politivold og andre overgrep i Bergenpolitiet (Police misconduct and individual harassment. 220 statements concerning police brutality and other forms of misconduct in the Bergen police force). This book was based on the 1986 publication Dokumentasjon av politivold og andre overgrep i Bergenspolitiet (Documentation of police brutality and other misconduct in the Bergen police force). In this publication he updated his previous book Politivold (Police brutality) with new factual information.         In 1988 Lov og Rett (a Norwegian law journal) published a special volume devoted to police violence and the debate around it. The issue included a number of articles by persons who were critical of the investigation by public prosecutor L. It included a long article by professor B in which he harshly criticised the investigation and an article by the two researchers Mr N and Mr V, whose investigations sparked off the debate, called A new trial against Galilei. At the same time it became public knowledge that Amnesty International would investigate police brutality in the Bergen police force.         A new statement by the first applicant was printed in Annonseavisen in Bergen on 2 March 1988. The statement reads:         (Translation)         "Not only has professor B now issued a demand that a       government commission of inquiry should be set up to review       what has long since been concluded by the Director of       Public Prosecutions. The Bergen police department have now       been reported to Amnesty International for violating human       rights! A delegation from the international secretariat in       London has already been in Bergen. Their report is expected       to be ready this spring.         'I have to admit that I was quite surprised when I was       recently told about this. It seems as if gentlemen like N,       V and B now realise that when one move does not work, they       can try another,' commented the chairman of the Norwegian       Police Association (the first applicant).         In (his) view, the matter has begun to get out of hand. He       describes reporting the matter to Amnesty as an insult, and       feels that with the recent, sharp attacks by professor B       among others, the limits of what can be called impartial       research have long been exceeded. 'In my view, one is faced       with a form of skulduggery and private investigation, where       there is good reason to question the honesty of the       motives'.         'The fact that professor B now calls into question the work       done by (public prosecutor) L and instituted by the       Attorney General is in itself serious and astonishing. Now       the charges have been extended to include superior police       authorities as well.'"         On 7 June 1988 the first applicant spoke in his capacity as president of the National Police Association at its annual general assembly meeting. He was quoted as follows in the newspaper Bergens Tidende:         (Translation)         "'The Norwegian Police Association will not accept ...       amateur private investigations on a grand scale intended to       fabricate allegations of police brutality which are then       made public.'"         The article furthermore reads:         "He described verbal attacks on the police as an attempt to       undermine the dignity and authority of the police."         In May 1989 professor B instituted defamation proceedings in the Oslo City Court (byretten) against the applicants in which he requested damages and asked that the following statements be declared null and void.         As regards the first applicant:       (from the newspaper article of 16 May 1986)         1)    "I am puzzled by the motives behind such accusations.       At any rate, it cannot be in the interest of the rule of       law and the public good to create such problems for an       entire service."         (from the newspaper article of 2 March 1988)         2)    "In my view, one is faced with a form of skulduggery       and private investigation where there is good reason to       question the honesty of the motives."         (from the newspaper article of 7 June 1988)         3)    "The Norwegian Police Association will not accept ...       amateur private investigations on a grand scale intended to       fabricate allegations of police brutality which are then       made public."         4)    "He described verbal brutality on the police as an       attempt to undermine the dignity and authority of the       police."         As regards the second applicant:       (from the newspaper article of 15 May 1986)         1)    "He describes professor B's recent report on police       brutality at Bergen police department as 'pure       disinformation intended to harm the police'."         2)    "Until the opposite has been proved I would       characterise this as a deliberate lie."         3)    "There must be other ulterior motives. It appears as       if the purpose has been to undermine confidence in the       police."         The case was heard in court from 24 August to 8 September 1992. The Court heard the parties as well as 23 witnesses and was presented with substantial documentary evidence. On 7 October 1992 judgment was pronounced. Having considered on the one hand the applicants' right to freedom of expression and on the other hand professor B's right to protection against defamation the City Court declared the first applicant's statements 2 and 3 and all three statements made by the second applicant null and void. Furthermore, the first applicant was ordered to pay 25,000 NOK in non-pecuniary damages to professor B as well as 112,365.83 NOK in costs. The second applicant was not ordered to pay damages as the claims in respect of him had been submitted out of time. He was, however, ordered to pay to professor B 168,541.91 NOK in costs.         The applicants and professor B appealed against the judgment to the Supreme Court (Høyesterett). On 19 November 1992 the Appeals Selection Committee granted leave to appeal on points of law.         By decision (kjennelse) of 5 May 1993 the Supreme Court rejected both appeals and thus upheld the judgment of the Oslo City Court. Furthermore, each of the applicants was ordered to pay an additional 45,000 NOK in costs to professor B. In the decision Justice Schei stated on behalf of the Court inter alia as follows:         (Translation)         "In this case particular attention must be paid to the       freedom of expression. The statements for which       mortification is demanded were made in a public debate       concerning police brutality. Police brutality - and with       this I mean illegal physical force used by the police       against individuals - is an important matter in society. It       is of central importance for democracy that a debate       concerning such matters in society may take place as far as       possible without a risk of sanctions against those who       participate. Of particular importance is to allow for a       wide margin of appreciation for criticism of society, cf.       in this connection section 100 of the Constitution. But       those who act as defenders against the criticism, among       others the representatives of the Bergen police, of course       enjoy the freedom of expression as well.       ...       However, freedom of expression does not go as far as       allowing every statement in a debate - even if the debate       relates to important aspects of society. Freedom of       expression must be weighed against the right of the injured       party. The line between statements which may pass and       statements which ought to be declared null and void must       normally be drawn at statements which relate to the other       person's personal honour or motives.       ...       I agree with the City Court that (the statements in       question) fall under section 247 of the Penal Code. Seen       together they are directed against (professor B) ...       ...       Considerations in respect of freedom of expression cannot       make these statements lawful. I refer to what I said       earlier about statements which are directed against the       personal honour and integrity.         It has been submitted that (professor B's) own situation       must be of central importance in the evaluation of the       lawfulness. It is alleged that he used strong and       embarrassing statements against his opponents in the debate       and must accept that an embarrassing light is put on him as       well.         I agree that (professor B) in his book "Politivold" makes       harsh criticism. A lot of this is criticism against the       system, but a lot is also directed against persons.       ...       I mention that the appellants have forcefully submitted       that their statements were made in their capacity as       representatives of the police and that they must enjoy, as       representatives, a particular protection against       mortification. I agree that it was natural that (the       applicants) as representatives looked after the interests       of the police officers in the debate. As I have already       mentioned they are protected by the freedom of expression       in the same manner as those who direct the attention       towards possible questionable circumstances within the       police force. But as pointed out there is - also in respect       of them - a limit. It has been overstepped here."         One judge wrote a concurring opinion in which he stated inter alia as follows:         (Translation)         "I have reached the same conclusion (as above) and I agree       on the important points in the reasoning. However, as far       as I am concerned I have reached this conclusion under some       doubts, related to the question whether the appellants'       statements were unlawful having regard to the circumstances       in which they were made. The basis for my doubts is as       follows:         It has been pointed out that in the public debate       concerning matters in society - what the Court in       Strasbourg calls `matters of public concern' - the       threshold for what the participants may say without the       risk of being convicted for defamation is very high. Even       if this is accepted I agree that this should not legitimise       attacks which are directed against the opponent's personal       integrity, or which fail to appreciate or throws suspicion       on his motives for participating in the debate.       ...       As far as I am concerned it is not very easy to see that       the statements which the City Court in this case have       declared null and void in any particular way may be said to       be directed against (professor B) as a private individual.       But I shall leave that since I also think that as such it       must be considered unlawful even in a heated public debate       to attack another person's integrity and motives instead of       what he has said.         What in particular causes a problem for me is that - as I       see it - it was (professor B) himself who, when the debate       on police brutality started again in 1986, had brought the       integrity of the police and in particular that of the       Bergen police department into the discussion...       ...       I cannot read this in any other way than that (professor B)       here indeed himself accuses his opponents in the debate -       `the police, its organisations and defenders' - of lack of       integrity, of knowingly hiding factual circumstances and of       acting on the basis of inappropriate motives.            It is in my view on this basis that the            appellants' statements must be evaluated - and            in particular these statements which were made            after the publication of 'Politivold' in 1986.            It is not as such ill-founded when the            appellants submit that they, who naturally must            have felt offended on behalf of the police, were            entitled to reply in the same manner.         In this connection it is also of importance, in my opinion,       that the appellants expressed themselves on behalf of the       police organisations in Bergen and at the national level,       respectively. They appeared as elected representatives for       the members. Very likely, and rightly so, they considered       it an organisational duty to react to the attacks which       were directed against the working methods of the police. It       is not unusual to see that a group's representatives in       reply to public attacks in our society react in a way which       might be lacking the necessary reflection and which might       be somewhat inappropriate. The appellants were not familiar       with the legislation on defamation either.         Professor (B) has maintained that there must be a       difference between what well-known politicians must endure       in respect of statements related to their political       activities and the protection he enjoys when he `from his       professional starting point engages himself in important       matters of public concern'. I do not agree in this and do       not understand either how this can be argued. In my opinion       and as a matter of principle a scholar - for example in law       - has no further right of protection under the defamation       legislation, when he embarks on a public debate on matters       of public interest, than a politician.         When I nevertheless agree with (Justice Schei's)       conclusions, this is because I agree that the       considerations for the debate on `matters of public       concern' must be given the best possible terms (and) might       suffer if such statements, which are dealt with in this       case, are not declared null and void - even if their       background is taken into consideration."   B.     Relevant domestic law and practice         Freedom of expression is protected by Section 100 of the Norwegian Constitution of 17 May 1814 which reads as follows:         (Translation)         "There shall be liberty of the press. No person may be       punished for any writing, whatever its contents, which he       has caused to be printed or published, unless he wilfully       and manifestly has either himself shown or incited others       to disobedience to the laws, contempt of religion, morality       or the constitutional powers, or resistance to their       orders, or has made false and defamatory accusations       against anyone. Everyone shall be free to speak his mind       frankly on the administration of the State and on any other       subject whatsoever."   Restrictions on freedom of expression       may only be imposed according to law. The responsibilities       referred to in Section 100 are prescribed by statute.         Firstly, a defamatory statement may constitute a criminal offence under the Penal Code of 22 May 1902. Sections 246 and 247 read as follows:         (Translation)         "Section 246. Any person who by word or deed unlawfully       (rettsstridig) defames another person, or who is accessory       thereto, shall be liable to fines or imprisonment for a       term not exceeding six months."         "Section 247. Any person who by word or deed behaves in a       manner that is likely to harm another person's good name       and reputation or to expose him to hatred, contempt, or       loss of the confidence necessary for his position or       business, or who is accessory thereto, shall be liable to       fines or imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year. If       the defamation is committed in print or in broadcasting or       otherwise under especially aggravating circumstances,       imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years may be       imposed."         To constitute an offence, a defamatory statement must be covered by the wording of either section 246 or section 247.         Moreover, a statement may only be declared null and void if it is unlawful (rettsstridig). This follows expressly from the wording of section 246, but the restriction also applies to section 247 according to case-law. The reservation that substantive statutory criminal provisions only apply to actions which are unlawful (rettsstridige) is to be understood in such a way that it is conceivable that an action which is literally within the scope of the provision may nevertheless fall outside. However, the law does not define more closely when this is the case. The decision involves a balance between the interests protected by the provision concerned and other interests which have to be protected. In each case it is for the courts to decide whether other interests have such weight that an action which verbatim is within the provision nevertheless cannot be considered unlawful (rettsstridig).         As regards how such a restriction to what is unlawful should be further delimited, Supreme Court case-law states that particular emphasis should be placed on whether the matter is of general interest, viewed in relation to what the case concerns and who the parties are. Furthermore, weight must be accorded to the context in which the statement appeared and the prelude to its appearance. Considerable importance must also be attached to whether the matter is presented in an objective, balanced manner with the main emphasis on eliciting what it concerns and any underlying factors, cf. Norwegian Law Gazette 1990, p. 636.         Secondly, a defamatory statement may by court order be declared null and void. Section 253, subsections 1, 2 and 3 of the Penal Code read:       (Translation)         "1.   When evidence of the truth of an allegation is       admissible and such evidence has not been produced, the       aggrieved person may demand that the allegation be declared       null and void unless it is otherwise provided by statute.         2.    A claim that the allegation be declared null and void       shall be summarily dismissed when the person who has made       the allegation withdraws it before the main hearing in a       manner the court finds satisfactory to the aggrieved       person.         3.    A claim that the allegation be declared null and void       shall also be summarily dismissed:         a)    when the allegation is made in a judgment, order,       judicial decision or other judicial act,       b)    when the allegation is made by a witness during a       statement in a court hearing or to the police or the       prosecution authority, or by a party, legal representative,       prosecutor, defence counsel, appointed expert or social       inquirer or by an official employed by the prosecuting       authority or the police during legal proceedings or       investigation. In these cases the claim that the       allegations be declared null and void shall, nevertheless,       not be summarily dismissed when the court finds that the       aggrieved person should have the truth of the allegation       examined in declaration proceedings against the defendant       or that the statement falls outside the limits of the case,       c)    when the allegation is made in a written statement       from the Storting's ombudsman for the public       administration. ..."         Section 253 of the Penal Code constitutes a legal remedy used to declare defamatory statements null and void by judgment of the court when the person making the allegations has not succeeded in proving their truth although evidence to this effect is admissible. This legal remedy may only be used when the defamatory statement consists of facts since the truth of value judgments is not susceptible of proof. In order to be declared null and void, a defamatory statement must be covered by the wording of either section 246 or section 247 of the Penal Code and also be considered unlawful (rettsstridig) according to the above mentioned case-law.         The remedy of declaring a defamatory statement null and void is not a penalty, but a civil legal claim. The remedy according to section 253 is nothing more than a judgment by the court that the person making the defamatory statement has not succeeded in proving its truth. Although this remedy is a civil legal claim, it is pursued through a procedure laid down by the Criminal Procedure Act.         Thirdly, if a statement is to be considered to be defamatory according to section 246 or section 247 of the Penal Code, the person making such a statement may be ordered by the court to pay compensation. Section 3-6 of the Damages Act of 13 June 1969 provides:   (Translation)         "Section 3-6 (compensation for defamation and infringement       of privacy). Anybody who commits libel or slander or       infringes the privacy of another person shall, if he has       been negligent or the conditions of imposing punishment are       fulfilled, pay compensation for the injury sustained and       such compensation for loss of future earnings as the court       finds reasonable with due regard to the degree of guilt and       other circumstances. He may also be ordered to pay such       compensation (redress) for non-financial injury as the       courts find reasonable.         If the offence takes the form of libel, and anybody who has       acted in the services of the owner or publisher of the       printed matter is responsible under the preceding       paragraph, the owner and publisher too are liable for the       compensation. The same rule applies to any redress imposed       under the preceding paragraph, unless the court decides to       exempt them..."     COMPLAINTS         The applicants invoke Article 10 of the Convention. They maintain that the judgment of the City Court and the decision of the Supreme Court represent an unjustified interference with their right to freedom of expression.     PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION         The application was introduced on 2 November 1993 and registered on 17 December 1993. On 4 July 1995 the Commission (Second Chamber) decided that notice of the application should be given to the respondent Government and invited them to submit written observations on the admissibility and merits thereof.         Following an extension of the time-limit fixed for this purpose the Government submitted their observations on 27 October 1995.         Following an extension of the time-limit the applicants submitted their observations in reply to those of the Government on 15 January 1996.     THE LAW         The applicants complain that their right to freedom of expression has been violated in view of the outcome of the case instituted against them, ending with the decision of the Supreme Court of 5 May 1993. They invoke Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention which reads:         "1.   Everyone has the right to freedom of expression.   This            righ shall include freedom to hold opinions and to            receive and impart information and ideas without            interference by public authority and regardless of            frontiers.   This Article shall not prevent States from