CEDH · CASELAW;REPORTS;ENG — 29 mai 1997

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                    EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS                      Application No. 22954/93     Mobin Ahmed, Dennis Perrin, Ray Bentley and David John Brough                               against                         the United Kingdom                      REPORT OF THE COMMISSION                      (adopted on 29 May 1997)                          TABLE OF CONTENTS                                                             Page   I.    INTRODUCTION      (paras. 1-16). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1        A.    The application           (paras. 2-4). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1        B.    The proceedings           (paras. 5-11) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1        C.    The present Report           (paras. 12-16). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2   II.   ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS      (paras. 17-38) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3        A.    The particular circumstances of the case           (paras. 17-30). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3        B.    Relevant domestic law           (paras. 31-38). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7   III. OPINION OF THE COMMISSION      (paras. 39-107). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11        A.    Complaints declared admissible           (para. 39). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11        B.    Points at issue           (para. 40). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11        C.    As regards Article 10 of the Convention           (paras. 41-87). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11             CONCLUSION           (para. 87). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20        D.    As regards Article 11 of the Convention           (paras. 88-93). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21             CONCLUSION           (para. 93). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21        E.    As regards Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention           (paras. 94-104) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22             CONCLUSION           (para. 104) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23        F.    Recapitulation           (paras. 105-107). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23                          TABLE OF CONTENTS                                                             Page   CONCURRING OPINION OF M. L. LOUCAIDES . . . . . . . . . . . 24   DISSENTING OPINION OF MRS. G.H. THUNE . . . . . . . . . . . 26   DISSENTING OPINION OF MRS. J. LIDDY JOINED BY MM. B. MARXER AND G. RESS . . . . . . . . . . . . 27   APPENDIX: DECISION OF THE COMMISSION AS TO THE           ADMISSIBILITY OF THE APPLICATION. . . . . . . . . 28   I.    INTRODUCTION   1.    The following is an outline of the case as submitted to the European Commission of Human Rights, and of the procedure before the Commission.   A.    The application   2.    The applicants are four British citizens, born in 1941, 1948, 1947 and 1932 respectively.   They live in London, Yelverton, Edgware and Exeter respectively.   They were represented before the Commission by Mr. B. Piper, a solicitor and Director of Legal Services of UNISON, a trade union.   3.    The application is directed against the United Kingdom.   The respondent Government were represented by their Agent, Ms. S.J. Dickson of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London.   4.    The case concerns restrictions on the political activities of local government officers.   The applicants invoke Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention and Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.   B.    The proceedings   5.    The application was introduced by the present applicants, and by Unison, a trade union, on 21 September 1993.   It was registered on 19 November 1993.   6.    On 30 August 1994 the Commission decided, pursuant to Rule 48 para. 2 (b) of its Rules of Procedure, to give notice of the application to the respondent Government and to invite the parties to submit written observations on its admissibility and merits.   7.    The Government's observations were submitted on 16 January 1995 after two extensions of the time-limit fixed for this purpose.   The applicants replied on 4 April 1995 after an extension of the time-limit.   8.    On 26 June 1995 the Commission decided to hold a hearing of the parties.   The hearing was held on 12 September 1995.   The Government were represented by Ms. S.J. Dickson, Agent of the Government, Mr. J. Eadie, counsel, and Mr. P. Rowsell, Ms. E. Jenkinson,   and Mr. N. Dexter, advisers, Department of the Environment. The applicants were represented by Mr. J. Goudie Q.C., counsel, Mr. A. Lynch, counsel, and Mr. B. Piper, solicitor. Mr. D. Whitfield, officer of Unison, was also present.   9.    On 12 September 1995 the Commission declared the application inadmissible to the extent that it was brought by Unison.   It declared the remainder of the application admissible.   10.   The parties were invited to respond to a question from the Commission and to submit such further information or observations on the merits as they wished.   The applicants submitted further information on 19 October 1995 and Government submitted further observations on 7 November 1995.   11.   After declaring the case admissible, the Commission, acting in accordance with Article 28 para. 1 (b) of the Convention, also placed itself at the disposal of the parties with a view to securing a friendly settlement.   In the light of the parties' reaction, the Commission now finds that there is no basis on which such a settlement can be effected.   C.    The present Report   12.   The present Report has been drawn up by the Commission in pursuance of Article 31 of the Convention and after deliberations and votes, the following members being present:             Mr.   S. TRECHSEL, President           Mrs. G.H. THUNE           Mrs. J. LIDDY           MM.   E. BUSUTTIL                G. JÖRUNDSSON                L. LOUCAIDES                J.-C. GEUS                M.P. PELLONPÄÄ                B. MARXER                B. CONFORTI                N. BRATZA                I. BÉKÉS                J. MUCHA                D. SVÁBY                G. RESS                C. BÎRSAN                P. LORENZEN   13.   The text of this Report was adopted on 29 May 1997 by the Commission and is now transmitted to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, in accordance with Article 31 para. 2 of the Convention.   14.   The purpose of the Report, pursuant to Article 31 of the Convention, is:        (i)   to establish the facts, and        (ii) to state an opinion as to whether the facts found disclose           a breach by the State concerned of its obligations under           the Convention.   15.   The Commission's decision on the admissibility of the application is annexed hereto.   16.   The full text of the parties' submissions, together with the documents lodged as exhibits, are held in the archives of the Commission.   II.   ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS   A.    The particular circumstances of the case   17.   Section 1 (5) of the Housing and Local Government Act 1989 ("the Act") entered into force on 29 November 1989.   It empowers the Secretary of State for the Environment to make regulations to restrict the political activities of certain local government officers.   The persons to whom the relevant parts of the Act refer are called persons holding politically restricted posts ("PPRPs").   The applicants are all PPRPs.   18.   The Local Government Officers (Political Restrictions) Regulations 1990 ("the Regulations") were made under Section 1 (5) of the Act on 4 April 1990.   They were laid before Parliament the following day and came into force on 1 May 1990.   19.   The first applicant, Mr. Ahmed, is a solicitor with the London Borough of Hackney.   He was adopted as Labour candidate for municipal elections in the London Borough of Enfield in 1990, but was unable to stand because of the Regulations.   On 7 March 1990 he applied for removal of his job description from the list of politically restricted posts.   The council confirmed that Mr. Ahmed had not attended committees during previous 12 months, but stated that he would be involved in giving advice to committees in future, and would attend on a more regular basis.   The council therefore did not provide a certificate that he did not give advice regularly.   The adjudicator replied to the council on 30 March 1990 that Mr. Ahmed's application for exemption could not therefore be granted (see Relevant Domestic Law, post).   20.   The second applicant, Mr. Perrin, was Principal Area Planner with the Devon County Council until he retired.   On 19 February 1990, he applied for exemption from political restrictions on the ground that although he advised the council at meetings and spoke to the media, the advice was "factual valuation information regarding the acquisition, disposal and management of property".   His application for exemption was refused on 20 March 1990.   The adjudicator wrote "I am satisfied that the duties of your post do fall within Section 2 (3) of the Act in that you do regularly attend committee meetings of the authority to give advice.   Your authority do state that this advice does not extend to 'policy advice', but the Act itself makes no distinction between types of advice.   I am not prepared, therefore, to grant an exemption under Section 3 (4) of the Act."   21.   As a result of the Regulations, Mr. Perrin had to give up his position as vice chair and property officer of Exeter Constituency Labour Party, and had to refrain from supporting and assisting labour candidates in Exeter City Council elections, including his wife, who was a candidate in May 1990 and May 1991.   He has also reduced his involvement in trade union activities.   22.   The third applicant, Mr. Bentley, is a Planning Manager with Plymouth City Council.   He resigned from his position as Chairman of Torridge and West Devon Constituency Labour Party because of the Regulations, and was also restricted in canvassing for his wife who stood as the only Labour Councillor for the West Devon Borough Council, and in giving radio interviews in his position as Chairman of the Plymouth Health Emergency, a body concerned with National Health policies.   23.   The monitoring officer of the council classified Mr. Bentley's post as one which was politically sensitive and appropriately subject to political restrictions, under Section 2 (3) of the Act.   The reasons for the classification included that Mr. Bentley was head of the council's corporate policy unit, that he was responsible directly to the head of the council's paid service, that his post was responsible for policy analysis and research, that he represented the council on a transport steering group involving other authorities and organisations, and that, in the 12 months to 31 August 1990, he attended three meetings of the council's Policy and Resources (Finance sub-) Committee and advised on four separate issues of public transport.   The monitoring officer considered that Mr. Bentley's post also fell within Section 2 (7) (a) and (b) of the Act, and so was politically restricted in any event.   24.   Mr. Bentley applied for exemption from political restrictions. On 19 November 1990 the adjudicator underlined that he regarded his duties as limited to considering applications concerning restrictions under Section 2 (2) of the Act.   He stated that although the council may have identified the post as being politically restricted, it was not "politically restricted because of that fact, but because it is explicitly covered by Section 2 (1) (c) of the Act.   I therefore do not consider it necessary or desirable to address the question of whether this post meets the criteria for inclusion in the list of posts under Section 2 (2) or for exemption from that list, unless or until it is established that the post is not covered by Section 2 (1) (c)."   25.   The fourth applicant, Mr. Brough, is head of Committee Services with the London Borough of Hillingdon.   He was Parliamentary Chairman in Harrow East in the last two General Elections, and is regularly invited to speak at public meetings on issues such as housing and the health service.   These activities are restricted under the Regulations. His employing authority's chief executive has said that the service Mr. Brough gives to the hung council is completely impartial and totally professional and that it would be tragic if Mr. Brough were forced to choose between his job and pursuing political interests outside Hillingdon.                                * * *   26.   The applicants and Nalgo (the predecessor of Unison, one of the original applicants in the present application) applied for and were granted leave to apply for judicial review of the Regulations.   The application was dismissed on 20 December 1991.   The judge, Mr. Justice Hutchison, recalled that the House of Lords had recently given its decision in the case of R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Brind and others.   He considered that he was bound by the House of Lords' findings as to the position of (in particular) Article 10 of the Convention in domestic law.    In connection with the test of "Wednesbury" unreasonableness, the judge referred to an affidavit submitted by Mr. Simcock, a senior civil servant at the Department of the Environment, in which Mr. Simcock explained how the Widdicombe Committee had been set up in 1985 to enquire into local authority practices and procedures with particular reference to the respective roles of elected members and officers.   Mr. Simcock also described the consultation process between the publication of the Widdicombe Report and the making of the Regulations, in which Nalgo was involved, and the way in which the Regulations were in some respects less restrictive than the Committee's proposals.   Referring to senior officers, the Committee had said:        "...It is part of their job to advise councillors, and to      adjudicate on matters of propriety, and in so doing they must      command the respect and trust of all political parties.   There      might well be some senior officers who are politically active but      who are nevertheless totally able to detach themselves from such      activity in carrying out their duties as neutral officers.      Nevertheless we believe there will always be a very significant      risk that they are viewed with suspicion by councillors of other      parties, and that as a consequence the performance of their      duties towards the council as a whole will be impaired".   27.   The judge continued:        "... I preface my summary by pointing out that some of [the      applicants' complaints] reflect the applicants' root and branch      opposition to the whole concept of restricting the political      activities of local government employees.   It is said that:             a)    There was no pressing social need for the Regulations-           local government employees have in the past provided           impartial advice and there is public confidence in their           ability to do so.             b)    The definition of PPRPs is unduly wide - a much more           restricted category would have served the government's           purpose.             c)    The restrictions are expressed in broad, subjective           and uncertain terms - a vice particularly objectionable           where, as here, they seek to restrict fundamental human           rights.   Thus, in the Schedule references to apparent           intention (paragraphs 6 and 7) and to publication in           circumstances likely to create an impression (paragraphs 9           and 10) are objectionable, as is paragraph 4 of the           Regulations themselves.             d)    The consequence of the vice mentioned in the previous           paragraph is that employees are likely to be treated           inconsistently by different employers, by reason of there           being room for undue latitude in interpreting the           restrictions.             e)    The Regulations go too far in prohibiting conduct           undertaken with apparent intention, etc., or likely to           create the impression of support, etc.   They should, at           most, have proscribed actual political activities.             f)    The width of the language used means that many non-           party political activities, including trade unions and           charitable activities, are prohibited.             g)    The terms are imposed on existing employees, who           entered into their contracts of employment on a different           basis.             h)    The restrictions may have an adverse effect on           recruitment and lead to resignations by skilled staff.        Some of these points will have to be considered individually when      I come to deal with further arguments advanced by the applicants      under quite different heads, but in the context of Wednesbury      unreasonableness I propose only to say that they do not in my      judgment come near to establishing a case of perversity.   I have      already briefly referred to the genesis of the Act and the      Regulations in the Widdicombe Report, and to the consultative      processes that followed it.   Paragraph 51 of the Report contained      the recommendation that:             '..... terms and conditions of [PPRPs] [should include] a           prohibition on political activity, including ... (iii)           speaking or writing in public in a personal capacity in a           way that might be regarded as engaging in party political           debate;'        The Government's Command Paper in July 1988 (in which, as already      mentioned, the view was expressed that the categories of PPRPs      should be more restricted than the Report proposed) spelt out the      essential aim that:             'it was important that the post-holder should be seen to be           politically impartial but that otherwise, local government           employees should not be subject to restrictions on their           political activity.'        Of the specific arguments mentioned in (a) to (h) above, those      in (a), (b), (e), (g) and (h) are, it seems to me, essentially      arguments against the whole concept of restricting such      activities, and in the circumstances cannot found an attack on      Wednesbury grounds.   The arguments summarised in (c) and (d) are      to the effect that the Regulations are uncertain and incapable      of consistent and fair application.   As a Wednesbury argument,      this contention could not avail the applicants - at least unless      the regulations were void for uncertainty (this would be a      distinct ground for challenge) which plainly they are not.      Finally, the argument mentioned in (f) is in my view      misconceived: the Regulations do not prohibit the kind of      activities there mentioned.   I shall have more to say on this      subject when I deal with the applicants' specific arguments on      vires and legitimate expectation, to the first of which I now      turn."   28.   Finally, the judge found that the Regulations did not go beyond the policy and purpose of the Act, and rejected an argument that the applicants had a "legitimate expectation" that the Government would not interfere with trade union activities on the basis of an assurance from the then minister for local government matters.   29.   An appeal to the Court of Appeal was dismissed on 26 November 1992.   Lord Justice Neill, who expressly approved the judgment of Mr. Justice Hutchison, found that the provisions of Article 10 of the Convention did not assist Nalgo and the applicants, confirmed that it was not open to the courts below the House of Lords to depart from the traditional Wednesbury grounds in reviewing the decision of a minister who has exercised a discretion vested in him by Parliament, and found that the Regulations were not "Wednesbury unreasonable" or ultra vires.   He also agreed with the first instance judge as to legitimate expectation.   The other judges, Lords Justices Russell and Rose, agreed.   Leave to appeal to the House of Lords was refused.   30.   The House of Lords refused leave to appeal to it on 24 March 1993.   B.    Relevant domestic law   31.   Section 1 (5) of the Act provides:        "The terms of appointment or conditions of employment of every      person holding a politically restricted post under a local      authority (including persons appointed to such posts before the      coming into force of this section) shall be deemed to incorporate      such requirements for restricting his political activities as may      be prescribed for the purposes of this subsection by regulations      made by the Secretary of State."   32.   Section 2 of the Act defines PPRPS as (i) the holders of certain specified posts (Section 2 (1) (a) - (f)) and (ii) persons included on lists held by the local authority (Section 2 (1) (g)).   33.   As to PPRPs who hold specific posts, Section 2 (1) (c) makes "non-statutory chief officers" PPRPs.   A "non-statutory chief officer" is defined at Section 2 (7) as, inter alia, a person for whom the head of the authority's paid service is responsible (Section 2 (7) (a)), or a person who, largely or exclusively, reports directly to or is directly accountable to the head of the authority's paid service (Section 2 (7) (b)).   A "deputy chief officer" is a person who, as respects all or most of the duties of his post, is required to report directly or is directly accountable to one or more of the statutory or non-statutory chief officers (Section 2 (8)).   By Section 2 (9), purely secretarial or clerical staff are not non-statutory chief officers or deputy chief officers.   34.   As to the lists prepared pursuant to Section 2 (1) (g), the authority is required to keep lists of persons with a salary above a certain level (currently £25,020 or pro rata for part time posts), unless they are exempted under Section 3.   35.   Section 3 of the Act provides for the appointment of a person to consider applications for exemption from political restriction.   If the person appointed (who is called the adjudicator) finds that the duties of a listed post (that is, a post which is politically restricted by virtue of Section 2 (1) (g), rather than by virtue of Section 2 (1) (a) - (f)) do not fall within Section 2 (3), he is required to direct that the post is not to be regarded as a politically restricted post.   The authority must then remove the post from the list maintained under Section 2 (2).   36.   Section 2 (3) provides:        "The duties of a post under a local authority fall within this      subsection if they consist in one or both of the following, that      is to say -        (a)   giving advice on a regular basis to the authority           themselves, to any committee or sub-committee of the           authority ...        (b)   speaking on behalf of the authority on a regular basis to           journalists or broadcasters."   37.   Section 2 (10) of the Act excludes teachers from the scope of the definition of a PPRP.   38.   The Regulations provide, so far as relevant, as follows:        "3.   (1)   The terms of appointment and conditions of employment      of every person holding a politically restricted post under a      local authority (including persons appointed to such posts before      the coming into force of these Regulations) shall be deemed to      incorporate -             (a)   in all cases, the terms and conditions set                out in Part I of the Schedule hereto;             (b)   in the case of persons appointed other than                pursuant to Section 9 of the Act [such as the                individual applicants]..., the further terms and                conditions set out in Part II of that Schedule                ..."             (2)   The terms and conditions referred to in paragraph      (1)(a) to (c) apply to the appointee at all times while he holds      his appointment.        4.    In determining whether a person is in breach of a term or      condition set out in Part II of the Schedule hereto, regard shall      be had, in particular, to the following matters -        (a)   whether the appointee referred to a political party or to           persons identified with a political party, or whether           anything said by him or the relevant work promotes or           opposes a point of view identifiable as the view of one           political party and not of another ...        (b)   where the appointee spoke or the work was published as part           of a campaign, the effect which the campaign appears to be           designed to achieve.                              Schedule          Terms of appointment and conditions of employment                               Part I                               General        1.   The appointee shall not announce or cause, authorise or      permit anyone else to announce that he is, or intends to be, a      candidate for election as a member of -             (a) the House of Commons;             (b) the European Parliament; or             (c) a local authority within the meaning of Section 21(1)               or (2) of the Act.    ...        4.   The appointee shall not be an officer of a political party      or of any branch of such a party or a member of any committee or      sub-committee of such a party or branch if his duties as such an      officer or member would be likely to require him -             (a)   to participate in the general management of the party                or the branch; or             (b)   to act on behalf of the party or branch in dealings                with persons other than members of the party or                members of another political party associated with the                party.        5.   The appointee shall not canvass on behalf of a political      party or on behalf of a person who is, or proposes to be, a      candidate for election or any of the bodies mentioned in      paragraph 1.                               Part II        6. The appointee shall not speak to the public at large or to a      section of the public with the apparent intention of affecting      public support for a political party.        7.    (1)   The appointee shall not -             (a)   publish any written or artistic work of which he is                the author (or one of the authors) or any written work                or collection of artistic works in relation to which                he has acted in an editorial capacity; or             (b)   cause, authorise or permit any other person to publish                such a work or collection,        if the work appears to be intended to affect public support for      a political party.            (2) Sub-paragraph (1) only applies to publication to the      public at large or to a section of the public; and nothing in      that sub-paragraph shall preclude the display of a poster or      other document on property occupied by the appointee as his      dwelling or on a vehicle or article used by him.        8.   Nothing in paragraph 6 or 7 shall be construed as precluding      the appointee from engaging in the activities there mentioned to      such extent as is necessary for the proper performance of his      official duties."   III. OPINION OF THE COMMISSION   A.    Complaints declared admissible   39.   The Commission has declared admissible the applicants' complaints that the Local Government (Political Restrictions) Regulations 1990 operate to their detriment in a way which denies their freedom of expression and of assembly, and their right to participate fully in the electoral process.   B.    Points at issue   40.   The points at issue in the present case are as follows:   -     whether there has been a violation of Article 10 (Art. 10) of the      Convention;   -     whether there has been a violation of Article 11 (Art. 11) of the      Convention, and   -     whether there has been a violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1      (P1-3) to the Convention.   C.    As regards Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention   41.   Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention provides as follows:        "1.   Everyone has the right to freedom of expression.   This      right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and      impart information and ideas without interference by public      authority ...        2.    The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it      duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities,      conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law      and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of      national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for      the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health      or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of      others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in      confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of      the judiciary."   42.   The applicants claim that the Regulations have had a clear impact on their lives in that each applicant has had to curtail political activities because what was formerly permitted has now been made a breach of contract by the Regulations.   43.   They consider that this interference with their freedom of expression is not compatible with Article 10 (Art. 10).   They deny that the Regulations are formulated with sufficient precision to be "prescribed by law", pointing in particular to para. 6 of the Schedule to the Regulations, which proscribes speaking to the public "with the apparent intention of affecting public support for a political party". Para. 7 of the Schedule also refers to work which "appears to be intended to affect public support for a political party".   In further connection with the allegation that the Regulations are not "prescribed by law", the applicants point out that they are employees of local authorities, and are bound by contracts with those local authorities, but that the Regulations were imposed by central authorities, and will inevitably be enforced inconsistently.   44.   The applicants accept that they owe duties and responsibilities to their employers, and that those duties and responsibilities affect their freedom of expression.   They do not, however, accept that the Regulations can form part of those duties and responsibilities.   They note, first, that the Regulations were not in force when they took up their employment, but also consider that their own duties and responsibilities cannot extend to a denial of all political activity.   45.   The applicants can see no necessity in a democratic society for the Regulations.   They find neither a legitimate aim nor a "pressing social need" for the interference.   As to the legitimate aim for the interference, they accept that the "rights of others" may in certain circumstances extend to including the rights of citizens to secure an effective political democracy (Comm. Rep. 11.5.84, Glasenapp v. Germany, in Eur. Court HR, Series A no. 104, p. 43, para. 88).   They contend, however, that the present case is quite different.   While in Glasenapp the very security of the constitutional system was at issue, as exemplified by the reference to Article 17 (Art. 17) of the Convention (para. 89), in the present case, the applicants wish to do no more than participate in normal, legitimate political activities. They underline that no complaint was ever made about their political activities in the past.   The applicants add that, in any event, the "others" referred to in Article 10 para. 2 (Art. 10-2) must be individuals in the first place, and that the provision requires at least something more substantial than the Government's perception that the rights of others are being protected.   46.   Even if there were a legitimate aim for the interferences, the applicants discern no "pressing social need" for them.   They repeat that there were never complaints about their political activities in the past, and in particular there was never any call to use the various disciplinary mechanisms which existed to deal with the case where an officer's professional duties conflicted with his political activities. The applicants point out that the Widdicombe report itself admitted that there was no serious evidence of lack of impartiality in the exercise of professional duties, or favouritism in local authority appointments, arising out of the political commitments and activities of local government officers.   They consider that the Regulations impose burdens which outweigh any "pressing social need" or any supposed benefit.   They underline that the Regulations prohibit not only campaigning on behalf of a political party but also the expression of views which might be identified with those of a particular party. In the United Kingdom, personal views on a broad range of social, economic and other issues could readily be associated with those of one political party or another.   Moreover, the ambit of the Regulations is not confined to the actual conduct and intentions of PPRPs, but restrictions are imposed on the basis of their apparent intentions and of the alleged impression which is allegedly gained by those who witness the individual PPRP speaking, or read or view written or artistic work published by him (paras. 6 and 7 of the Schedule).   47.   A further aspect of the case where the applicants see a lack of proportionality between the effect of the Regulations and the aim sought to be pursued lies in the width of the definition of PPRPs.   The applicants note that the definition includes chartered surveyors and other professionally qualified people who advise local authority committees yet whose advice relates solely to professional matters and has no political content.   In addition, local authorities may add to the list of PPRPs, and the adjudicator may exempt posts, which may lead to inconsistencies between local authorities.   Finally in connection with the definition of PPRPs, the applicants underline that whilst some PPRPs are defined by the post itself, others are defined by reference to a salary level.   The salary limit was originally £19,500 and is now £25,020.00.   The applicants claim that the limit has not been updated annually to keep pace with local government pay awards, so that each year more and more posts fall into the category of PPRP without reference to their function for reasons which are wholly arbitrary.   48.   As to the exemption mechanism, the applicants note that the power of the adjudicator extends only to posts included on lists (Section 2 (1) (g) of the Act), that the function of the adjudicator depends largely on the opinion of the employer, and that the adjudicator has power, under Section 3 (2) (b) of the Act, to add to the authority's list of PPRPs.   49.   The Government do not accept that there has been an interference with the applicants' Article 10 (Art. 10) rights.   They recall that the right of access to the public service is not guaranteed by the Convention, and submit that measures which prescribe conditions of employment within the public service regulate access to that service, and therefore fall outside the scope of the Convention.   They accept that the Regulations do, to a certain extent, go beyond the limitations imposed on officers' political activities before 1990, but underline the advantages of having convention replaced by clear rules and clear guidance.   50.   On the assumption that there has been an interference with the applicants' freedom of expression, the Government submit that any such interference is "prescribed by law".   They recall that the level of precision must depend on the degree and content of the instrument in question, the field it is designed to cover and the number and status of those to whom it is addressed, and note that the Regulations in the present case cover a wide field and a large number of employees.   They conclude that any interference meets the "Sunday Times" criteria of accessibility and foreseeability (Eur. Court HR, Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom judgment of 26 April 1979, Series A no. 30, p. 31, para. 39).   In connection with the words "apparent intention" in paras. 6 and 7 of the Schedule to the Regulations, the Government claim that those words set up an objective test of what a reasonable person would perceive the intention of the speaker to be.   They add that it is not the employing authority which makes the final decision as to whether the test is satisfied, but rather the courts to which a challenge to disciplinary action could be taken.   For the Government, the Regulations are clear when taken as a whole: an officer will fall within para. 6 of the Regulations if he is seeking to influence support for a particular political party, but not if he is merely expressing views on a politically controversial subject.   51.   The Government claim that the measures are "necessary in a democratic society" within the meaning of the Convention case-law. Referring to the "duties and responsibilities" which freedom of expression carries with it, the Government are of the opinion that where, for example, an elected representative also has another job which imposes duties and responsibilities, both sets of responsibilities must be weighed: and that it is legitimate for a national authority to make its own assessme