CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 21 mai 1997

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                          AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                           Application No. 27083/95                       by E.G.                       against the Netherlands          The European Commission of Human Rights (Second Chamber) sitting in private on 21 May 1997, the following members being present:              Mrs.   G.H. THUNE, President            MM.    J.-C. GEUS                  G. JÖRUNDSSON                  A. GÖZÜBÜYÜK                  J.-C. SOYER                  H. DANELIUS                  F. MARTINEZ                  M.A. NOWICKI                  I. CABRAL BARRETO                  J. MUCHA                  D. SVÁBY                  P. LORENZEN                  E. BIELIUNAS                  E.A. ALKEMA                  A. ARABADJIEV              Ms.    M.-T. SCHOEPFER, Secretary to the Chamber        Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;        Having regard to the application introduced on 20 March 1995 by E.G. against the Netherlands and registered on 24 April 1995 under file No. 27083/95;        Having regard to :   -     the reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of      the Commission;   -     the observations submitted by the respondent Government on      25 June 1996 and the observations in reply submitted by the      applicant on 10 February 1997;        Having deliberated;        Decides as follows:   THE FACTS        The applicant is a Dutch national, born in 1944, and resides in The Hague. He is a chartered accountant by profession. Before the Commission he is represented by P.J. Baauw, a lawyer practising in Utrecht.        The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.   a.    Criminal proceedings        In September 1979 the applicant declared his earnings to the fiscal authorities for the purposes of income tax. As suspicions had arisen that his declaration was incomplete, the fiscal authorities inspected his accounts in December 1979.        On 22 January 1981 the fiscal authorities questioned the applicant for the first time as a suspect of a fiscal offence. By letter of 11 July 1983 the fiscal authorities informed the public prosecutor of the applicant's case.        On 30 August 1984 the applicant was summoned to appear before the Regional Court (Arrondissementsrechtbank) of The Hague on 27 September 1984 on charges of tax evasion.        Following a hearing held on 9 October 1984, the Regional Court, in its judgment of 23 November 1984, convicted the applicant and sentenced him to three months' imprisonment, suspended pending a probation period, and imposed a fine of 20.000 Dutch guilders. Both the applicant and the public prosecutor filed an appeal with the Court of Appeal (Gerechtshof) of The Hague.        By judgment of 24 March 1986 the Court of Appeal quashed the judgment of 23 November 1984 and declared the initial summons of 30 August 1984 void. It found the facts with which the applicant had been charged insufficiently described in the summons. The public prosecutor filed an appeal in cassation with the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad).        On 26 January 1988 the Supreme Court quashed the judgment of 24 March 1986, finding that the initial summons was in conformity with the requirements of Section 261 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Wetboek van Strafvordering) and referred the case back to the Court of Appeal of The Hague for a new decision with due regard to the Supreme Court's findings.        In its judgment of 19 September 1988 the Court of Appeal of The Hague quashed the Regional Court's judgment of 23 November 1984, convicted the applicant of tax evasion and imposed a fine of 200.000 Dutch guilders. The applicant filed an appeal in cassation with the Supreme Court.        By judgment of 31 October 1989 the Supreme Court quashed the judgment of 19 September 1988 in respect of the sentence imposed by the Court of Appeal. The Supreme Court rejected the applicant's other complaints. It referred the case to the Court of Appeal of Amsterdam.        On 31 May 1991 the Court of Appeal of Amsterdam sentenced the applicant to payment of a fine of 25.000 Dutch guilders.   b.    Disciplinary proceedings        On 12 November 1984 the applicant informed the President of the Netherlands Institute of Chartered Accountants (Nederlands Instituut van Registeraccountants, hereinafter referred to as "NIVRA") of the criminal proceedings against him and requested a meeting.        By letter of 16 November 1984 the applicant was informed that the NIVRA President preferred to await the judgment of the Regional Court before meeting the applicant. He was requested to send a copy of the judgment in due time. The applicant sent a copy of the judgment of 23 November 1984 by letter of 4 December 1984.        On 6 December 1984 a meeting took place between the applicant, the applicant's lawyer, the NIVRA President and a member of the NIVRA Bureau. In the course of that meeting the NIVRA President expressed the opinion that the applicant's conduct was unbecoming for a chartered accountant and merited a disciplinary complaint, but that no disciplinary complaint would be lodged pending the final outcome of the criminal proceedings against the applicant.        Between 10 and 14 December 1984 the applicant's lawyer and the member of the NIVRA Bureau exchanged correspondence concerning disciplinary proceedings in similar cases. Between 14 December 1984 and 27 June 1990 no contacts took place between the applicant and NIVRA.        By letter of 1 November 1985, the NIVRA Board requested the Registrar to the Court of Appeal of The Hague to be informed of the state of the proceedings against the applicant. The reply was that the NIVRA Board would be informed in due course.        On 16 May 1986, the Procurator-General (Procureur-Generaal) to the Court of Appeal informed the NIVRA Board that the information requested on 1 November 1985 could not yet be supplied as proceedings in cassation had been brought.        The Supreme Court's judgment of 31 October 1989 in the applicant's case was published on 23 December 1989 in the weekly publication for lawyers "Nederlands Juristenblad" and on 10 March 1990 in the weekly Dutch case-law review "Nederlandse Jurisprudentie" under Nr. 200.        By letter of 27 June 1990 the NIVRA Board filed a disciplinary complaint with the NIVRA Disciplinary Council (Raad van Tucht). The Board informed the Disciplinary Council that the applicant had been convicted by judgment of 19 September 1988 and that this judgment had only been quashed by the Supreme Court as regards the sentence, thereby finally determining that the applicant had committed a fiscal offence.        A copy of this letter was communicated to the applicant. By letter of 9 July 1990 the applicant's lawyer objected to such proceedings given the time that had elapsed since the facts had occurred. He referred in this respect to Article 6 of the Convention and Section 44 of the Chartered Accountants Act (Wet op de Registeraccountants). On 19 December 1990 the NIVRA Board filed a written reaction to this objection, to which the applicant's lawyer replied by letter of 8 January 1991.        On 15 January 1991 a hearing was held before the Disciplinary Council. In its interlocutory decision of 7 January 1992, the Disciplinary Council held that Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention was applicable and that exceeding a "reasonable time" within the meaning of this provision does not exclude further proceedings since a determination that this requirement has not been respected could also lead to the imposition of a lighter sanction or to no such measure being imposed at all. The Council held that the disciplinary proceedings had started on 31 October 1989, when the Supreme Court rendered its judgment in the applicant's case. Noting that the applicant had not kept NIVRA informed of the state of the criminal proceedings against him, the Disciplinary Council did not find the delay between 31 October 1989 and 27 June 1990 unreasonably long. It therefore rejected the applicant's objection.        On 27 February 1992 the applicant filed an appeal against the decision of 7 January 1992 with the NIVRA Appeal Council (Raad van Beroep). On 27 July 1992 the Appeal Council declared the appeal inadmissible, as the appealed decision was not a decision on the merits of a disciplinary complaint.        On 26 January 1993 a second hearing was held before the Disciplinary Council. In its decision of 15 June 1993 the Disciplinary Council noted the applicant's conviction of fiscal offences, found the complaint by the NIVRA Board well-founded, found the applicant's conduct unbecoming for a chartered accountant and, noting that a disciplinary measure had already been previously imposed on the applicant, ordered the applicant's name to be struck off the Accountants' Register.        The applicant filed an appeal with the NIVRA Appeal Council on 16 August 1993. A hearing was held before the Appeal Council on 17 March 1994.        In its decision of 21 September 1994 the Appeal Council upheld the decision of 7 January 1992, quashed the decision of 15 June 1993 insofar as it concerned the order to strike the applicant's name off the Accountants' Register, ordered the applicant's suspension for a period of three months, upheld the decision of 15 June 1993 for the remainder and ordered the publication of its decision.        Insofar as the applicant raised complaints relating to the reasonable time requirement under Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention, the Appeal Council held that the disciplinary proceedings had started on 23 December 1989, when the Supreme Court's judgment of 31 October 1989 in the applicant's case was published and thus brought to the attention of the NIVRA Board. This finding was not altered by the fact that, apart from the criminal conviction, the NIVRA Board had also criticised the applicant for his actual conduct, i.e. providing the fiscal authorities with an incomplete declaration. The Appeal Council did not accept the applicant's argument that the proceedings should be considered as having started on 6 December 1984 given that the applicant had been clearly informed that a disciplinary complaint would only be filed in case of a criminal conviction.   COMPLAINT        The applicant complains that the disciplinary proceedings against him exceeded a reasonable time within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.   PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION        The application was introduced on 20 March 1995 and registered on 24 April 1995.        On 11 April 1996 the Commission decided to communicate the applicant's complaint concerning the length of the disciplinary proceedings against him to the respondent Government and to declare the remainder of the application inadmissible.        The Government's written observations were submitted on 25 June 1996. By letter of 10 July 1996, the Government's observations were transmitted to the applicant's representative, inviting the latter to submit the applicant's observations in reply.        When the time-limit fixed for that purpose expired on 28 August 1996, no such observations had been submitted and no extension of the time-limit had been requested.        By letter of 10 February 1997, the applicant informed the Commission that he did not find it necessary to reply to the observations of the Government as this would only mean repeating arguments already submitted.   THE LAW        The applicant complains under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention of the length of the disciplinary proceedings brought against him.        Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention, insofar as relevant, reads:        "In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ...      everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time      by an ... tribunal established by law..."        The Government submit that it was in accordance with their duty of care that the disciplinary authorities waited with filing a disciplinary complaint until the criminal charges against the applicant had been finally determined.        The Government further do not consider that the time which elapsed between the Supreme Court's judgment of 31 October 1989 and the lodging of the disciplinary complaint was unreasonably long or that the proceedings before the disciplinary organs exceeded a reasonable time.        The applicant submits that the proceedings at issue must be considered as having started either on 6 December 1984, when a meeting took place between the applicant, his lawyer, the NIVRA President and a member of the NIVRA Bureau, or on 27 June 1990, when the disciplinary complaint against him was filed. Consequently these proceedings lasted at least four years and three months, a duration which the applicant considers incompatible with the requirements of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.        The Commission considers that the disciplinary proceedings at issue fall within the scope of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention as they constituted a determination of the applicant's civil rights and obligations within the meaning of this provision (cf. No. 11504/85, Dec. 7.11.88, D.R. 58, p. 48).        According to the constant case-law of the Court and the Commission, the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of each case and having regard in particular to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and that of the competent authorities (cf. Eur. Court HR, X. v. France judgment of 31 March 1992, Series A no. 234-C, p. 90, para. 32).        In the present case, the Commission considers that, although the applicant was informed on 6 December 1984 that disciplinary proceedings could be instituted following the determination of the criminal charges against him, for the purposes of this application the proceedings began on 27 June 1990 when a disciplinary complaint was in fact lodged against the applicant (cf. Philis v. Greece, Comm. Report 16.1.96, para. 45). The proceedings ended with the decision of 21 September 1994 of the NIVRA Appeal Council and thus lasted in total slightly less than four years and three months.        The Commission cannot find that the proceedings at issue can be regarded as very complex.        As regards the conduct of the competent authorities, the Commission notes that in the proceedings before the Disciplinary Council, following written and subsequent oral proceedings, an interlocutory decision was issued on 7 January 1992.        The applicant's appeal against this interlocutory decision was declared inadmissible on 27 July 1992. Following a further hearing, a decision in first instance was rendered on 15 June 1993.        The applicant's appeal against the decision of 15 June 1993 was rejected on 21 September 1994, following a hearing held on 17 March 1994.        The Commission cannot find that there have been unreasonably long periods of inactivity in the proceedings at issue, or that these disciplinary proceedings taken as a whole exceeded a reasonable time within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention (cf. Eur. Court HR, Venditelli v. Italy judgment of 18 July 1994, Series A no. 293-B).        It follows that the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.          For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,        DECLARES THE REMAINDER OF THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.        M.-T. SCHOEPFER                               G.H. THUNE       Secretary                                   President to the Second Chamber                       of the Second Chamber