CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 18 octobre 1995

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                          AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                         Application No. 22030/93                       by D.S.                       against Finland        The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting in private on 18 October 1995, the following members being present:              Mr.    C.L. ROZAKIS, President            Mrs.   J. LIDDY            MM.    E. BUSUTTIL                  A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK                  A. WEITZEL                  M.P. PELLONPÄÄ                  B. MARXER                  G.B. REFFI                  B. CONFORTI                  N. BRATZA                  I. BÉKÉS                  E. KONSTANTINOV                  G. RESS                  A. PERENIC                  C. BÎRSAN                  K. HERNDL              Mrs.   M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber        Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;        Having regard to the application introduced on 20 August 1992 by D.S. against Finland and registered on 10 June 1993 under file No. 22030/93;        Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission;        Having deliberated;        Decides as follows:   THE FACTS        The applicant is a Swiss citizen, born in 1962 and resident at Kuopio, Finland. He is an engineer by profession.        On 18 February 1991 the Office for Motor-Vehicles Inspection (katsastuskonttori, besiktningskontoret; hereinafter "the Inspection Office") of Kuopio granted the applicant a permit to reconstruct his car so that it would correspond to another model of the same brand. According to the terms of the permit, the allowed weight on the axles of the reconstructed car could not exceed that stipulated for the model already in the applicant's possession. For the purpose of having his reconstructed car registered, the applicant was also ordered to have the position of the wheels inspected.        On 7 May 1991 the National Motor-Vehicle Registration Centre (autorekisterikeskus, bilregistercentralen; hereinafter "the National Centre") rejected the applicant's appeal against the decision of 18 February 1991 concerning the above-mentioned conditions. The Centre had obtained the Kuopio Inspection Office's opinion on the appeal. This had not been communicated to the applicant for possible comments before the Centre had examined his appeal. The applicant's subsequent attempts to obtain a copy of the opinion from the Centre were unsuccessful.        In rejecting his appeal the Centre noted that in spite of its requests the applicant had not submitted certain technical clarification. According to the applicant, he had received the clarification request about a month prior to the Centre's decision without any time-limit having been fixed for his response. At the time of the Centre's decision he was attempting to find an expert who could submit the clarification needed.        On 8 May 1992 the Ministry of Transport and Communications (liikenneministeriö, trafikministeriet) rejected the applicant's appeal against the decision of 7 May 1991. The Ministry had obtained opinions on the appeal from the National Centre as well as from the importer of the car brand. These had not been communicated to the applicant for comments before the Ministry had examined his appeal. The applicant subsequently obtained a copy from the Ministry of the relevant opinions. In the Ministry's letter to the applicant dated 10 August 1992 it was explained that the opinions had not been decisive for the outcome of his appeal. No further appeal lay open to the applicant.        On 23 December 1992 the applicant's reconstructed car was approved and registered. The allowed total weight on the axles of the car was, however, further restricted and the allowed number of passengers reduced. The applicant's objected to this condition, referring to a certificate by the importer of the car brand. This objection was apparently left without action by the National Centre.        According to the 1982 Decree on Vehicles (ajoneuvoasetus 233/82, fordonsförordning 233/82; later replaced by Decree no. 1256/92), the reconstruction of a vehicle which is subject to inspection shall be permitted only upon a decision made by the National Centre or an Inspection Office (section 16, as amended by Decree no. 547/87).        The 1981 Road Traffic Act (tieliikennelaki 267/81, vägtrafiklag 267/81) and the 1989 Decree on the Registration of Vehicles (asetus 842/89 ajoneuvojen rekisteröinnistä, förordning 842/89 om registrering av fordon; now replaced by Decree no. 1703/92) as well as the 1989 Decree on the Inspection of Vehicles (asetus 843/89 ajoneuvojen katsastuksesta, förordning 843/89 om besiktning av fordon; now replaced by Decree no. 1702/92) require that a vehicle normally be inspected and registered before it can be lawfully used in traffic (section 84 of the 1981 Act, as amended by Act no. 818/89, section 8 of Decree no. 842/89 as well as section 17 of Decree no. 843/89). At the relevant time an appeal against a decision of an Inspection Office lay to the National Centre and from there to the competent Ministry (section 36(2) of Decree no. 843/89).   COMPLAINTS   1.    The applicant complains that he was denied a fair and impartial hearing in the proceedings before the National Centre and the relevant Ministry concerning the conditions attached to the reconstruction permit. He considers that the proceedings involved a determination of his civil right to make use of his possessions and submits that the authorities based their decisions on material which had not been communicated to him in advance and which he could not therefore challenge. He was, moreover, refused access to the material even after the respective authorities had made their decisions. The National Centre made its decision without affording him reasonable time to obtain the clarification requested and took his failure to submit such clarification into account when rejecting his appeal. He invokes Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.   2.    The applicant also complains that the restrictions on the allowed total weight on the axles of his reconstructed car violated his property rights. This weight should have corresponded to that of the brand model into which he had been permitted to change his car. The restrictions did not pursue any public interest and were imposed without any attention having been paid to the views of the importer of the car brand. In this respect the applicant invokes Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.   THE LAW   1.    The applicant complains that he was denied a fair and impartial hearing in the proceedings before the National Centre and the relevant Ministry concerning the conditions attached to the reconstruction permit. He invokes Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention which, in so far as it is relevant, reads as follows:        "In the determination of his civil rights and obligations      ..., everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing ...      by [a] ... tribunal established by law. ..."        The Commission has first ascertained whether Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention is applicable in the instant case and, notably, whether there was a dispute over a "civil right" which can be said, at least on arguable grounds, to be recognised or imposed under domestic law. The dispute must be genuine and serious and its outcome must be directly decisive for the "right" in question (e.g., Eur. Court H.R., Zander v. Sweden judgment of 25 November 1993, Series A no. 279- B, p. 38, para. 22).        The Commission recalls that Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) is not aimed at creating new substantive rights without a legal basis in the Contracting State, but at providing procedural protection of rights already recognised in domestic law (e.g., Eur. Court H.R., W. v. the United Kingdom judgment of 8 July 1987, Series A no. 121-A, p. 32- 33, para. 73). Nevertheless, the notion of "civil rights and obligations" cannot be interpreted solely by reference to the domestic law of the respondent State (e.g., Eur. Court H.R., König judgment of 28 June 1978, Series A no. 27, pp. 29-30, paras. 88-89).        The Commission notes that the reconstruction permit was granted to the applicant on certain conditions. Among other requirements, it imposed an obligation on him to have the modified car inspected and registered before it could be lawfully used in traffic. The dispute at the core of the proceedings referred to in the present complaint did not concern the subsequent further restriction imposed at the time of the registration of the modified car. The Commission notes that this restriction appears to have been separately challenged by the applicant as going beyond the conditions prescribed in the reconstruction permit which he apparently considered himself to have complied with.        The Commission therefore finds that the applicant could not arguably claim that a "right" of his was at stake already in the proceedings concerning the conditions attached to the reconstruction permit (cf., e.g., the above-mentioned Zander v. Sweden judgment, p. 40, para. 25). Accordingly, Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention is not applicable in the particular circumstances of the case.        It follows that this complaint must be rejected as being incompatible ratione materiae with the Convention within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2).   2.    The applicant also complains that the restrictions on the allowed total weight on the axles of his reconstructed car violated his property rights. In this respect he invokes Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) which reads as follows:        "Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful      enjoyment of his possessions.   No one shall be deprived of      his possessions except in the public interest and subject      to the conditions provided for by law and by the general      principles of international law.        The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way      impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it      deems necessary to control the use of property in      accordance with the general interest or to secure the      payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties."        The Commission recalls that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) comprises three distinct rules. The first rule, set out in the first sentence of the first paragraph, is of a general nature and enunciates the principle of peaceful enjoyment of property. The second rule, contained in the second sentence of the same paragraph, covers deprivation of possessions and makes it subject to certain conditions. The third rule, stated in the second paragraph, recognises that Contracting States are entitled, amongst other things, to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest. The three rules are not "distinct" in the sense of being unconnected: the second and third rules are concerned with particular instances of interference with the right to peaceful enjoyment of property and should therefore be construed in the light of the general principle enunciated in the first rule (e.g., Eur. Court H.R., Allan Jacobsson judgment of 23 October 1989, Series A no. 163-A, p. 16, para. 53).        The Commission finds that the conditions attached to the reconstruction permit and the subsequent further restriction on the allowed weight on the axles of the applicant's car constituted a control of the use of his possessions which is to be examined under the second paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1). Under this provision the Contracting States are entitled, amongst other things, to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest by enforcing such laws as they deem necessary for the purpose. However, there must exist a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised. In striking the fair balance thereby required between the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual's fundamental rights, the authorities enjoy a wide margin of appreciation (ibid., p. 17, para. 55).        The applicant has not alleged that the restrictions were not in accordance with domestic law and the Commission finds no reason to conclude otherwise. The Commission finds it reasonable to conclude that the restrictions were based on traffic security considerations. Finally, bearing in mind the State's margin of appreciation, it finds no indication that the restrictions were disproportionate to that purpose. Accordingly, there is no appearance of a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1).        It follows that this complaint must be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.        For these reasons, the Commission, by a majority,        DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.   Secretary to the First Chamber         President of the First Chamber        (M.F. BUQUICCHIO)                         (C.L. ROZAKIS)