CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 17 janvier 1995

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                          AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                         Application No. 24355/94                       by Kazimierz KALUZA                       against Poland        The European Commission of Human Rights (Second Chamber) sitting in private on 17 January 1995, the following members being present:              Mr.    H. DANELIUS, President            Mrs.   G.H. THUNE            MM.    G. JÖRUNDSSON                  S. TRECHSEL                  J.-C. SOYER                  H.G. SCHERMERS                  F. MARTINEZ                  L. LOUCAIDES                  J.-C. GEUS                  M.A. NOWICKI                  I. CABRAL BARRETO                  J. MUCHA                  D. SVÁBY              Mr.    K. ROGGE, Secretary to the Chamber        Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;        Having regard to the application introduced on 7 February 1994 by Kazimierz Kaluza against Poland and registered on 8 June 1994 under file No. 24355/94;        Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission;        Having deliberated;        Decides as follows:   THE FACTS        The facts of the case as submitted by the applicant may be summarised as follows:        The applicant is a Polish citizen born in 1940.   He is an engineer, residing in Olawa.        In 1973 the applicant concluded a contract with the local state administration for the use a plot of land in Olawa for 99 years.   The contract determined, inter alia, the rates to be paid each year.   In 1990, as a result of the reform of the municipal administration, the plot became the property of the municipality.   On 16 September 1991 the Board of the Olawa Municipal Council passed a resolution to increase rates for use of the land owned by the municipality.   On 18 September 1991 the Board informed the applicant of the increase.        The applicant and his neighbours filed a complaint about this resolution to the Supreme Administrative Court.   They argued that the applicable law did not allow for an increase of the rates as they had previously been determined in a civil contract between them as users and the State as a former owner.        On 28 January 1992 the Supreme Administrative Court rejected the applicant's complaint.   The Court considered that the Board's resolution, even though taken by the municipal administration, had not been an administrative decision and that it was a civil court which would be competent to entertain the complaint.        Upon the applicant's request, the President of the Supreme Court filed an extraordinary appeal to the Supreme Court on 8 July 1992.   He argued that the applicable law on land planning did not authorise the municipalities to raise rates for the land use unilaterally.   Moreover, the resolution of the Municipal Board, although affecting the applicant's civil rights and not an administrative decision in a strict sense, was undeniably an act of an administrative character.   Thus, the Administrative Court should have entertained the complaint.        On 22 October 1992 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal.   The Court considered that the contentious issue of the increase of the rates for the land use fell within the competence of a civil court.        The applicant filed a civil action with the Olawa District Court requesting declaration that the rates which he should pay were those established by the parties in 1973.   On 18 May 1993 the District Court dismissed the action as it found that the applicant only questioned the manner in which the rates had been raised but not their actual sum after the raise.   Thus, he had no legal interest in a determination that the original rates were still binding between the parties.        The applicant appealed to the Wroclaw Regional Court and requested exemption from the advance court costs.   On 23 June 1993 the Court refused to grant exemption.   On 27 August 1993 the Court dismissed the appeal.         On 31 December 1993 the President of the Supreme Court refused to file an extraordinary appeal on the applicant's behalf.   COMPLAINTS        The applicant complains under Article 6 of the Convention that the judgments concerned are arbitrary and in breach of law and equity. He contends that the rates for the use of land should have remained unchanged as they had been agreed between the parties in a contract concluded as a notarial deed.   He contends that the Courts lacked impartiality and   independence.   The applicant alleges that the Courts failed to take evidence properly and wrongly assessed the evidence.   THE LAW   1.    Insofar as the applicant's complaints relate to a period prior to 1 May 1993, the Commission recalls that Poland recognised the competence of the Commission to receive individual applications "from any person, non-governmental organisation or group of individual claiming to be a victim of a violation by Poland of the rights recognised in the Convention through any act, decision or event occurring after 30 April 1993."        It follows that this part of the application is outside the competence ratione temporis of the Commission and therefore incompatible with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2).   2.    The applicant complains under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention that the Courts lacked impartiality and   independence.   He further complains that the judgments concerned are arbitrary and in breach of law and equity.   He contends that the rates for use of the land should not have been unilaterally changed by one of the parties.        The Commission has examined these complaints in respect of the period after 1 May 1993.   However, under Article 19 (Art. 19) of the Convention the only task of the Convention organs is to ensure the observance of the obligations undertaken by the Parties to the Convention.   In particular, it is not competent to deal with an application alleging that errors of law or fact have been committed by domestic courts, except where it considers that such errors might have involved a possible violation of any of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention.   The Commission refers on this point to its established case-law (see e.g. No. 458/59, Dec. 29.3.60, Yearbook 3 p. 222, 236; No. 5258/71, Dec. 8.2.73, Collection 43 pp. 71, 77; No. 7987/77, Dec. 13.12.79, D.R. 18 p. 31, 45).        It is true that the applicant also raises complaints under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention about unfairness of the proceedings.   However, as regards the admissibility and assessment of evidence, the Commission recalls that the admissibility of evidence is primarily governed by the rules of domestic law, and as a general rule it is for the national courts to assess the evidence before them.   The Commission's task is to ascertain whether the proceedings, considered as a whole, including the way in which the evidence was submitted, were fair (see Eur. Court.H.R., Lüdi judgment of 15 June 1992, Series A no. 238, p. 23, para.43).        In the present case the Commission has not found any elements which could lead it to conclude that the right to a fair hearing was not respected.   There is no indication that in these proceedings the applicant could not duly put forward his own submissions or that the proceedings were otherwise unfairly conducted.        As regards the complaint concerning lack of impartiality and independence of the courts, the Commission considers that the applicant has not submitted any ascertainable facts which might raise doubts in this respect.   In particular he has not submitted any details which could rebut the presumption of personal impartiality of the judges involved or call into question the independence of the Courts dealing with his case after 1 May 1993.              It follows that the remainder of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.        For these reasons, the Commission unanimously        DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.   Secretary to the Second Chamber         President of the Second Chamber           (K. ROGGE)                               (H. DANELIUS)