CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 30 novembre 1994

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                      AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                       Application No. 22842/93                     by Krzysztof WAYGART                     against Poland        The European Commission of Human Rights (Second Chamber) sitting in private on 30 November 1994, the following members being present:             MM.   S. TRECHSEL, President                H. DANELIUS                G. JÖRUNDSSON                J.-C. SOYER                H.G. SCHERMERS           Mrs. G.H. THUNE           MM.   F. MARTINEZ                L. LOUCAIDES                J.-C. GEUS                M.A. NOWICKI                I. CABRAL BARRETO                J. MUCHA                D. SVÁBY             Mr.   K. ROGGE, Secretary to the Chamber        Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;        Having regard to the application introduced on 16 October 1992 by Mr. Krzysztof Waygart against Poland and registered on 29 October 1993 under file No. 22842/93;        Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission;        Having deliberated;        Decides as follows:   THE FACTS        The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows:        The applicant, a Polish citizen born in 1956, is a lawyer residing in Opole.        On 6 October 1987 the Katowice Regional Bar Council refused to enrol the applicant as a trainee advocate on the ground that, although he complied with the applicable requirements, other candidates were better.   The applicant appealed to the National Bar Council, to the Minister of Justice, and also to the Supreme Administrative Court.        On 24 November 1988 the Supreme Administrative Court ordered the Minister of Justice to reconsider the case on the ground that the contested decision did not comply with the Code of Administrative Procedure.        In its decision of 24 February 1989 the Minister of Justice refused to allow the applicant's appeal as the employment quotas of the trainee advocates in the Katowice Regional Bar Council were already filled.   The applicant lodged an appeal against this decision to the Supreme Administrative Court.        On 18 January 1990 the Supreme Administrative Court again quashed the contested decision.        On 3 March 1990 the Minister of Justice ordered the case to be reconsidered by the Katowice Regional Bar Council.   The applicant lodged an appeal against this decision to the Supreme Administrative Court.   This appeal was declared inadmissible as the contested decision was not final.        On 29 October 1990 the Katowice Regional Bar Council refused to enrol the applicant, as the employment quotas in the region were filled.   The applicant lodged an appeal to the National Bar Council. On 17 April 1991 the National Bar Council dismissed the appeal as the argument of lack of available posts sufficed.   The applicant appealed to the Minister of Justice.        On 22 May 1991 the Minister of Justice decided to enrol the applicant on the list of trainee advocates.   However, the Katowice Regional Bar Council appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court against this decision and refused to allow the applicant to start working as a trainee advocate.        On 13 June 1991 the applicant submitted a motion to the Minister for an interpretation of his decision of 22 May 1991.   The applicant argued that as the decision admitted that he could have been enrolled in 1987,   he should be exempted from the requirement of taking the four years' training as a trainee advocate as this period had expired.   On 18 July 1991 the Minister refused to issue an interpretation as the decision was sufficiently clear.   The applicant appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court, which in September 1991 rejected the appeal as being out of time.        On 21 August 1991 the applicant brought a civil action to the Katowice Regional Court against the Katowice Regional Bar Council and the National Bar Council and against the State Treasury for compensation for damages which he had suffered as a result of not having been allowed to start working as a trainee advocate in accordance with the decision of the Minister of Justice.        On 14 November 1991 the Katowice Regional Bar Council informed the Supreme Administrative Court that in 1986 the applicant had been arrested as he had committed the offence of insulting the police, though no criminal proceedings had been instituted against him as he enjoyed immunity as a judge.        On 6 January 1992 the Supreme Administrative Court quashed the applicant's enrolment.   The Court pointed out that the decision of the Minister was both in conformity with applicable laws and correct ("prawidlowa") while the decisions of the Katowice Regional Bar Council were not in conformity with law as the Council had failed to make an assessment of the applicant's suitability to become an advocate as provided for by the Law on the Bar.   However,   the Court considered that the Minister's decision should be quashed as circumstances unknown both to the Bar and the Minister at the time when the decisions concerned had been taken came to light, suggesting that the applicant possibly did not fulfil the requirement of an irreproachable character.        On 30 January 1992 the Katowice Regional Court dismissed the applicant's civil action for compensation.On 10 February 1992 the Minister of Justice ordered the case to be reconsidered by the Katowice Regional Bar Council.        On 31 March 1992 the Katowice Regional Bar Council refused to enrol the applicant in the list of trainee advocates as he had committed a crime in 1986.   The applicant appealed unsuccessfully to the National Bar Council, to the Minister of Justice and to the Supreme Administrative Court.        On 18 June 1993 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the applicant's appeal against the decision of the Minister of Justice. In these proceedings the Court was called upon to examine the lawfulness of the contested decision.   In its decision the Court concluded that the assessment of the applicant's suitability to become a trainee advocate was in accordance with the law as the incident caused by the applicant justified the conclusion that he did not comply with the requirement of irreproachable character.   COMPLAINTS        The applicant complains under Article 3 of the Convention that the authorities subjected him to inhuman and degrading treatment in that he was not allowed to become a lawyer, was prevented from exercising any legal profession and was humiliated by the proceedings complained of.        The applicant further complains under Article 6 of the Convention that the proceedings were unfair as a whole; that the authorities in question, including the Bar, the Minister of Justice and the courts, both civil and administrative, were neither   independent nor impartial; and that these authorities based their decisions on the assumption that the applicant had committed a crime and had breached numerous applicable provisions of domestic law.   THE LAW   1.    The applicant complains under Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention that he was subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment in the proceedings complained of.   He also complains under Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention of the unfairness and the outcome of the proceedings.   2.    Insofar as the applicant's complaints relate to a period prior to 1 May 1993, the Commission recalls that Poland recognised the competence of the Commission to receive individual applications "from any person, non-governmental organisation or group of individual claiming to be a victim of a violation by Poland of the rights recognised in the Convention through any act, decision or event occurring after 30 April 1993."        It follows that this part of the application is outside the competence ratione temporis of the Commission and therefore incompatible with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2).   3.    The applicant complains under Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention of an inhuman and degrading treatment in that he was not allowed to become a lawyer, was prevented from exercising any legal profession and was humiliated by the proceedings complained of.        The Commission has examined this complaint in respect of the proceedings taking place after 1 May 1993.   It observes that the treatment complained of does not attain the threshold of inhuman of degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention as established in the case-law of the Convention (cf. Eur. Court H.R., Ireland v. United Kingdom judgment of 18 January 1979, Series A, no. 25, p. 56, para. 162).   It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   4.    The applicant complains under Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention of the unfairness of the proceedings and of their outcome.        The Commission considers that proceedings concerning admission to a profession such as in the present case come within the ambit of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention (see Eur. Court H.R., the De Moor v. Belgium judgment of 23 June 1994, Series A no. 292-A, para. 43).        The Commission has examined the applicant's complaints in respect of the period after 1 May 1993.   However, under Article 19 (Art. 19) of the Convention its only task is to ensure the observance of the obligations undertaken by the Parties to the Convention.   In particular, it is not competent to deal with an application alleging that errors of law or fact have been committed by domestic courts, except where it considers that such errors might have involved a possible violation of any of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention.   The Commission refers on this point to its established case-law (see e.g. No. 458/59, Dec. 29.3.60, Yearbook 3 p. 222, 236; No. 5258/71, Dec. 8.2.73, Collection 43 pp. 71, 77; No. 7987/77, Dec. 13.12.79, D.R. 18 p. 31, 45).        It is true that the appicant also complains under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention about the unfairness of the proceedings before the Supreme Administrative Court.   The Commission notes that this Court was only called upon to examine the lawfulness of the contested decision of the Minister of Justice.   In its decision of 18 June 1993 it found that the assessment of the applicant's suitability to become an advocate was made in accordance with the Law on the Bar. There is no indication that in these proceedings the applicant could not duly put forward his own submissions or that the proceedings were otherwise unfairly conducted.        The remainder of the application is therefore manifestly ill- founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.        For these reasons, the Commission unanimously        DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.   Secretary to the Second Chamber        President of the Second Chamber          (K. ROGGE)                         (S. TRECHSEL)