CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 6 avril 1994

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                      AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                       Application No. 19598/92                     by Torgny ROOS                     against Sweden        The European Commission of Human Rights (Second Chamber) sitting in private on 6 April 1994, the following members being present:             MM.   S. TRECHSEL, President                H. DANELIUS                G. JÖRUNDSSON                J.-C. SOYER                H.G. SCHERMERS           Mrs. G.H. THUNE           MM.   F. MARTINEZ                L. LOUCAIDES                J.-C. GEUS                M.A. NOWICKI                I. CABRAL BARRETO                J. MUCHA                D. SVÁBY             Mr.   K. ROGGE, Secretary to the Chamber        Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;        Having regard to the application introduced on 7 September 1991 by Torgny ROOS against Sweden and registered on 6 March 1992 under file No. 19598/92;        Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission;        Having deliberated;        Decides as follows:   THE FACTS        The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.        The applicant is a Swedish citizen, born in 1953. He is at present serving a life sentence in Sweden.        The applicant and his now ex-wife married in 1973. Two children were born out of this relationship. During their marriage the family lived for a period of time in Switzerland, but took up residence in Sweden again in 1989.        It appears that the applicant's relationship with his wife deteriorated to the extent that she expressed a wish of having a divorce, something the applicant would not accept. Due to this two incidents occurred in the spring of 1990, on 8 March and 18 May 1990 respectively, following which the applicant was arrested suspected of attempted manslaughter (försök till dråp), attempted murder (försök till mord) and illegal possession of firearms.        By indictment of 13 July 1990 the applicant was charged with the above offences. According to the indictment the applicant had, on 8 March 1990, assaulted and ill-treated his wife with the intent of killing her inter alia by wounding her with a knife by several stabs to her head and throat. Furthermore, he had, on 18 May 1990, allegedly attempted to kill her with a sawn-off shotgun by shooting her in the back which had resulted in permanent paralysis of major parts of her body.        The case was examined by the District Court (tingsrätten) of Stockholm where the applicant, assisted by counsel, was heard as well as a number of witnesses. Furthermore, documentary evidence and expert opinions were produced. On the basis of an evaluation of the above evidence the applicant was found guilty of the charges brought against him and sentenced to life imprisonment by judgment of 8 November 1990. The sentence of life imprisonment was imposed due in particular to the brutality and ruthlessness with which the Court found the applicant had acted. He was finally ordered to pay damages to his wife in the amount of 1,150,000 SEK.        The applicant appealed against the judgment to the Svea Court of Appeal (Svea hovrätt). He maintained in particular that it had not been his intention to kill his wife but accepted that she had suffered bodily harm. As regards the ensuing proceedings in the Court of Appeal, the applicant drew the Court's attention to the fact that his hearing is impaired and that he uses a hearing-aid. He therefore requested the Court to provide facilities in the court room allowing him to follow the proceedings in an appropriate manner.        The case was heard in the Court of Appeal from 14 to 18 January 1991. The applicant, assisted by counsel, was heard in addition to two witnesses, one of whom was his daughter who had witnessed the incident of 8 March 1990. Furthermore, the applicant's wife as well as three expert witnesses were heard. Documentary evidence was also submitted. During the hearing of the witnesses and experts the applicant moved around in the court room in order to be sufficiently close to those speaking. During the hearing of his wife and his daughter the applicant was not present in the court room but was placed in an adjacent room from where he could listen to their statements through a loudspeaker. He submits that he was sitting on a chair placed on a table in order to be as close to the loudspeaker as possible.        The Court of Appeal pronounced judgment on 1 February 1991. Following an evaluation of the evidence submitted the Court of Appeal upheld the District Court's judgment.        The applicant appealed against the judgment to the Supreme Court (Högsta domstolen). In his request for leave to appeal he maintained his innocence as regards his intent to kill his wife whereas he accepted having assaulted her and having caused bodily harm. He furthermore maintained that the case should be referred back to the Court of Appeal due to grave procedural errors (grovt rättegångsfel). In this respect he maintained that he could not appropriately follow the court proceedings due to his hearing handicap, in particular when placed in the adjacent room during the hearing of his daughter and his wife.        On 7 March 1991 the Supreme Court refused the applicant leave to appeal.     COMPLAINTS        The applicant maintains that he is innocent in so far as he has been convicted of attempted manslaughter and attempted murder.        He furthermore complains that he did not have a fair trial since he could not properly hear what was said in the Court of Appeal. In particular he submits that, in the court room, he had to move around in order to be close enough to the persons speaking, and while his wife and daughter were heard he had to sit in an adjacent room on a chair placed on a table in order to be close enough to the loudspeaker. Regardless thereof the applicant maintains that the presiding judge ignored his complaints that he was unable to hear what was said.        The applicant invokes Article 6 of the Convention.     THE LAW        The applicant complains that he was wrongly convicted and sentenced on 1 February 1991 by the Court of Appeal and also of the court proceedings concerned.        With regard to the judicial decision of which the applicant complains, the Commission recalls that, in accordance with Article 19 (Art. 19) of the Convention, its only task it to ensure the observance of the obligations undertaken by the Parties in the Convention. In particular, it is not competent to deal with an application alleging that errors of law or fact have been committed by domestic courts, except where it considers that such errors might have involved a possible violation of any of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention. The Commission refers, on this point, to its established case-law (see e.g. No. 458/59, Dec. 29.3.60, Yearbook 3 pp. 222, 236; No. 5258/71, Dec. 8.2.73, Collection 43 pp. 71, 77; No. 7987/77, Dec. 13.12.79, D.R. 18 pp. 31, 45).        It is true that in this case the applicant also complains that he did not have a fair trial as he had difficulties in hearing all what was said in the Court of Appeal. He refers in this connection to Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention which in so far as relevant reads as follows :        "In the determination of ... any criminal charge      against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ...      hearing ... ."        As regards the fairness of the trial the Commission recalls that it must consider the proceedings as a whole, including not only the proceedings in the Court of Appeal but also those in the District Court. The Commission's task is to ascertain whether these proceedings in their entirety, including the way in which evidence was taken, were fair (cf. inter alia Eur. Court H.R., Stanford judgment of 23 February 1994, Series A no. 280-A, para. 24).        Furthermore, according to the established case-law of the Commission and the European Court of Human Rights it is clear that Article 6 (Art. 6), read as a whole, guarantees the right of an accused to participate effectively in a criminal trial. In general this includes not only his right to be present but also to hear and follow the proceedings. Such rights are implicit in the very notion of an adversarial procedure and can also be derived from the guarantees contained in sub-paragraphs (c), (d) and (e) of paragraph 3 of Article 6 (Art. 6-3-c, 6-3-d, 6-3-e) (cf. for example Eur. Court H.R., Colozza judgment of 12 February 1985, Series A no. 89, p. 14, para. 27). However, where the hearing of the accused is impaired the Commission finds it obvious that this cannot as such be allowed to block the prosecution or lead to the conclusion that an accused with such a handicap cannot have a fair trial.        In the present case the Commission recalls that the applicant's hearing is impaired and that he uses a hearing-aid which improves his hearing to a certain extent. Indeed the applicant's trial in the District Court did not give rise to any misgivings in this respect whereas he maintains that he was unable to hear all what was said in the Court of Appeal. The Commission recalls that during these proceedings the applicant moved around in the court room in order to be close to the person speaking and, when not in the court room, had to make arrangements so as to be very close to the loudspeaker in order to hear the statements by his wife and his daughter. When looking at the applicant's trial as a whole, the Commission does not, however, find that these circumstances made the trial unfair.        Furthermore, the Commission recalls that the applicant was represented by counsel who had no difficulty in following the proceedings and who would have had every opportunity to discuss with the applicant any points that arose in respect of statements the applicant allegedly did not hear. In these circumstances the Commission finds the case, as submitted, does not disclose any appearance of a violation of the applicant's right to a fair trial as guaranteed to him under Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention.        It follows that the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.        For these reasons, the Commission unanimously        DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.   Secretary to the Second Chamber        President of the Second Chamber          (K. ROGGE)                         (S. TRECHSEL)