CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 1 décembre 1993

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                          AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                         Application No. 21820/93                       by K.B.                       against the United Kingdom         The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting in private on 1 December 1993, the following members being present:              MM.    A. WEITZEL, President                  C.L. ROZAKIS                  F. ERMACORA                  E. BUSUTTIL                  A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK            Mrs.   J. LIDDY            MM.    M.P. PELLONPÄÄ                  B. MARXER                  G.B. REFFI                  B. CONFORTI                  N. BRATZA                  I. BÉKÉS              Mrs.   M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber         Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;         Having regard to the application introduced on 27 January 1993 by K.B. against the United Kingdom and registered on 11 May 1993 under file No. 21820/93;         Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission;         Having deliberated;         Decides as follows:   THE FACTS         The applicant is a British citizen born in 1957 and resident in Birmingham. Before the Commission he is represented by Messrs. Maurice Andrews, solicitors practising in Birmingham.         The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.          The applicant was involved in an incident 11 March 1990 in which two men were injured. He was arrested on 3 July 1990 and, with a co- accused, charged with inflicting grievous bodily harm and assault. He was released on bail.         At his trial in February 1991, the applicant pleaded that he had been going to the defence of his co-accused, who had pleaded self- defence. He was convicted on 15 February 1991 of grievous bodily harm and sentenced to 3 years' imprisonment.         The applicant applied for leave to appeal against conviction on 26 February 1991, alleging, inter alia, that the judge had misdirected the jury as to the questions of self-defence and reasonable defence.         Leave to appeal was granted by a single judge of the Court of Appeal on 16 June 1991. Bail was refused. On 24 November 1991, the applicant contacted the Registrar of Criminal Appeals who on 3 December 1991 informed him that due to the limited availability of court time the appeal was unlikely to be heard before Christmas.         On 18 February 1992, the Court of Appeal heard the appeal. It found that the judge's direction to the jury as to self-defence had been fundamentally wrong and that the conviction should therefore be quashed.         On 13 March 1992, the applicant applied to the Secretary of State for compensation for his detention. By letter dated 30 March 1992, the Home Office stated that it would consider the application in the context of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 and the Home Secretary's statement to the House of Commons of 29 November 1985 concerning payment of compensation where a person has spent a period of custody as a result of serious default on the part of a public authority. The applicant's application was refused by letter dated 18 August 1992.         The applicant applied for judicial review of the Secretary of State's refusal.         Leave was refused on 18 January 1993. The High Court judge found that the Home Secretary had not erred in his application of the statutory machinery for compensation and rejected the submissions of the applicant's counsel that the delay in the hearing of the appeal disclosed serious default on the part of a public authority.   COMPLAINTS         The applicant complains that no compensation was paid to him for the year which he had spent in prison. He invokes Article 5 of the Convention, and, without further specification, subsidiarily mentions Articles 3, 6, and 13 of the Convention, also referring to the length of proceedings.   THE LAW   1.     To the extent that the applicant complains of the length of proceedings in relation to his appeal against conviction, the Commission recalls that Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1), so far as relevant, provides in its first sentence:   "1.    In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him,       everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time       by (a) ...tribunal established by law..."         Since the proceedings concerned the applicant's appeal against conviction on a criminal charge, the above provision applies.         According to the constant case-law of the Court and the Commission, the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of each case and having regard in particular to the following criteria: the complexity of the the case, the conduct of the applicant and that of the competent authorities (see, for example, Eur. Court H.R., Kemmache judgment of 27 November 1991, Series A no. 218, p. 27, para. 60). Persons held in detention are also entitled to special diligence (see, for example, Eur. Court H.R., Tomasi judgment of 27 August 1992, Series A no. 241-A, p. 35 para. 84).         In the present case, the period at issue is the time elapsing between conviction on 15 February 1991 and the determination of the appeal on 18 February 1992, a period of one year and three days.         The applicant applied for leave to appeal on 26 February 1991. Leave to appeal was granted on 16 June 1991. The applicant was informed by the Registrar of Criminal Appeals that due to the limited availability of court time the appeal was unlikely to be heard before Christmas. There is therefore a period between 16 June 1991 and 18 February 1992, a period of 8 months during which nothing was apparently done.         The Commission, having regard to the case as a whole however, considers that the delay that occurred is not sufficient to justify the conclusion that the total length of proceedings (i.e. 19 months from the applicant`s initial arrest until the quashing of his sentence) was excessive and thereby raises an issue under Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention.         It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   2.     The applicant also complains, without further specification, under Article 5 (Art. 5) of the Convention. Article 5 (Art. 5) provides, insofar as relevant:         "1.   Everyone has the right to liberty and security of       person.   No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in       the following cases and in accordance with a procedure       prescribed by law:         a.    the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a       competent court...         5.    Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or       detention in contravention of the provisions of this       Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation."         The Commission notes first of all that there is no indication that the applicant's detention was unlawful within the meaning of Article 5 para. 1 (Art. 5-1) of the Convention. While the Court of Appeal quashed his conviction on the basis of a misdirection of the trial judge, this does not deprive his detention of the character of "lawful" within the meaning of the Article 5 para. 1 (a) (Art. 5-1-a) of the Convention.         The Commission also notes that the applicant complains that he was unsuccessful in obtaining compensation for his period of detention. The right to compensation under Article 5 para. 5 (Art. 5-5) of the Convention presupposes that a violation of one of the other paragraphs of Article 5 (Art. 5) has been established either by a domestic organ or by the Convention organs (see eg. No. 7950/77, Dec. 4.3.80, D.R. 19, p. 213). In the present case, however, the Commission has found above that the applicant's complaints disclose no appearance of a violation of Article 5 para. 1 (Art. 5-1) of the Convention.         It follows that this part of the application is also manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   3.     The applicant also invokes, again without further specification, Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention.         Article 3 (Art. 3) provides:         "No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or       degrading treatment or punishment."         In the present case, the applicant does not even complain in general terms of the degrading experience of being detained in prison. He complains of no specific aspect and makes no reference to any physical or mental ill-effects. In these circumstances, the Commission finds that the applicant's experience, unpleasant though it may have been, does not disclose treatment of such a nature or degree as to render it either inhuman or degrading within the meaning of Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention.         It follows that this complaint must be rejected as manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   4.     Finally, again without any further specification whatsoever, the applicant invokes Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention.         Article 13 (Art. 13) provides:         "Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this       Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a       national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been       committed by persons acting in an official capacity."         The case-law of the European Court of Human Rights establishes, however, that Article 13 (Art. 13) does not require a remedy in domestic law in respect of any supposed grievance under the Convention: the grievance must be an arguable one in terms of the Convention (Eur. Court H.R., Boyle and Rice judgment of 27 April 1988, Series A no. 131, p. 23, para. 52). The Commission has considered that the applicant`s complaints under Articles 3, 5 and 6 (Art. 3, 5, 6) of the Convention are manifestly ill-founded. It finds that the applicant does not have an arguable claim of a breach of these provisions for the purposes of a remedy under Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention.         It follows that this complaint must also be rejected as manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.         For these reasons, the Commission unanimously         DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.   Secretary to the First Chamber         President of the First Chamber        (M.F. BUQUICCHIO)                        (A. WEITZEL)