CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 15 janvier 1991

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                          AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                         Application No. 15615/89                       by M.                       against Austria             The European Commission of Human Rights (Second Chamber) sitting in private on 15 January 1991, the following members being present:                 MM. S. TRECHSEL, President of the Second Chamber                   F. ERMACORA                   G. JÖRUNDSSON                   A. WEITZEL              Mrs.   G. H. THUNE              Mr.   F. MARTINEZ RUIZ              Mrs.   J. LIDDY              MM.   J.-C. GEUS                   M.P. PELLONPÄÄ                Mr.   K. ROGGE, Secretary to the Second Chamber           Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;           Having regard to the application introduced on 14 September 1989 by M. against Austria and registered on 13 October 1989 under file No. 15615/89;           Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission;           Having deliberated;           Decides as follows:   THE FACTS           The applicant is an Austrian citizen born in 1943.   He lives in Vienna.   He is represented in the proceedings before the Commission by Mr.   K. Bernhauser, lawyer, of Vienna.           The facts submitted may be summarised as follows.           An indictment was brought against the applicant on 26 August 1987, accusing him of involvement with insurance fraud.   14 other persons were also charged.   The applicant's trial before the Vienna Regional Court (Landesgericht) began, apparently, in January 1988, and the applicant was convicted and sentenced on 5 April 1988.   The applicant gave notice of appeal (Berufung) and plea of nullity (Nichtigkeitsbeschwerde) within the specified three day time-limit.           By virtue of Article 270 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Strafprozessordnung), the written judgment should have been prepared within 14 days.   It was served on him on 31 January 1990.   On 6 September 1990 the applicant's plea of nullity was rejected and his sentence was reduced by the Supreme Court (Oberster Gerichtshof).   PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION           The application was introduced on 14 September 1989 and registered on 13 October 1989.           On 2 April 1990 the Commission decided to bring the application to the notice of the respondent Government and to invite them to submit observations on its admissibility and merits.           The respondent Government's observations were submitted on 15 June 1990 and the applicant's reply on 18 July 1990.           The application was referred to the Second Chamber on 7 November 1990.   COMPLAINTS           The applicant complains under Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention of the length of the above criminal proceedings, in particular the delay between his conviction and sentence on 5 April 1988 and the written judgment, which was served on 31 January 1990.   THE LAW           The applicant complains under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention that the written judgment of his conviction of 5 April 1988 was served on him only on 31 January 1990.   Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) provides, as far as relevant, as follows:   "In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law..."           It is not in dispute that the proceedings against the applicant involved the "determination of .... [a] criminal charge" within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention. Moreover, the Government do not contest the admissibility of the application.           The Government do, however, consider that the time taken for the preparation of the judgment was not unreasonable.   In particular, they underline that the applicant agreed that the various defendants should be heard separately and that separate judgments be announced in the case of each.   Further, the applicant agreed that, if an appeal was to be made, one appeal would be made for all defendants. Accordingly, the period to be taken into consideration could only begin at the date of the last judgment, that is, 6 September 1988.   A certain period would inevitably be necessary for the preparation of the judgments.   The Government consider that the subject matter of the proceedings was undoubtedly complicated, and that the judge was required to consider a large amount of documentation.   They further underline that the applicant at no stage requested accelerated production of the judgment.   Finally, the Government point out that no new cases were alloted to the judge for various periods from 11 April 1988; that the judge was removed from his position as Head of one section of the courts and that disciplinary proceedings were introduced against him because of the delays involved in preparing judgments in this complex of cases.           The applicant accepts that he had agreed to the proceedings against the various defendants being conducted separately and that he thereby saved considerable defense costs, but emphasises that it was not made clear that this would mean a delay in the preparation of the judgment.           The Commission is required to have regard to the whole of the proceedings in the present case, although the period which calls for particular examination is the time taken for preparation of the written judgment.   The Commission finds that the case raises questions of fact and law which are of such complexity that the determination requires an examination of merits.   The application is therefore not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention and no other grounds for declaring it inadmissible have been established.           For these reasons, the Commission unanimously           DECLARES THE APPLICATION ADMISSIBLE         without prejudging the merits of the case.        Secretary to the                        President of the     Second Chamber                          Second Chamber           (K. ROGGE)                              (S. TRECHSEL)