CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 7 octobre 1987

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                        AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                         Application No. 11704/85                       by Eva KROL                       against Sweden             The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on 7 October 1987, the following members being present:                 MM. C.A. NØRGAARD, President                   S. TRECHSEL                   F. ERMACORA                   G. SPERDUTI                   M.A. TRIANTAFYLLIDES                   E. BUSUTTIL                   A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK                   A. WEITZEL                   H.G. SCHERMERS                   H. DANELIUS                   G. BATLINER                   H. VANDENBERGHE              Mrs.   G.H. THUNE              Sir   Basil HALL              MM.   F. MARTINEZ                   C.L. ROZAKIS              Mrs.   J. LIDDY                Mr.   H.C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission           Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;           Having regard to the application introduced on 13 August 1985 by Eva Krol against Sweden and registered on 21 August 1985 under file N° 11704/85;           Having regard to:        - the decision by the Commission's Rapporteur of 30 October 1985        to request information from the Government,        -   the Government's reply dated 20 November 1985 and the         applicant's comments dated 27 November 1985,        -   the first report provided for in Rule 40 of the Rules of         Procedure of the Commission        -   the Commission's decision of 3 March 1986 to communicate the         application to the Government for written observations on the         admissibility and merits,        -   the Government's written observations dated 15 May 1986, and         the applicant's observations in reply dated 26 June 1986,        -   the Government's letters of 18 August and 22 December 1986,         and 30 April and 18 August 1987,        -   the second report provided for in Rule 40 of the Rules of         Procedure;           Having deliberated;           Decides as follows:   THE FACTS           The facts of the case, as they appear from the parties' submissions, may be summarised as follows:           The applicant is a Polish citizen born in 1950 and resident at Stockholm.   She is represented before the Commission by Mr.   Lennart Hane, a lawyer practising in Stockholm.           On 18 April 1985 the applicant gave birth to a female child, Maria.           Provisional care order           On 24 April 1985 the Deputy Chairman of the Social District Council No. 5 (sociala distriktsnämnden nr 5) in Stockholm decided pursuant to Section 6 of the 1980 Act with Special Provisions on the Care of Young Persons (lagen med särskilda bestämmelser om vård av unga) to take the child into care immediately (a provisional care order).           The decision was made because the Deputy Chairman of the Social District Council considered that there was a serious risk to the child's health and development if she were to remain with the mother in the hospital.   It was thought that the applicant was still suffering from a mental illness and therefore unable to take care of the child.   At this time it had not been established that Mr.   G.D. was the father of the child.   In March 1985 the applicant had said that she was made pregnant by a man who had raped her.   In any case it was considered that Mr.   G.D. was not capable of taking care of such a small child on his own.   At that time the mother alone had the legal custody of the child.           The decision by the Deputy Chairman was confirmed by the Social District Council on 30 April 1985.           On the day the provisional care order was issued Maria was moved to another hospital.   Two days later she was placed in a temporary foster home.           Section 21 of the 1980 Act prescribes that a provisional care order enters into force at once.   As soon as the Court has made a decision on the matter whether the child shall remain in care the provisional care order is no longer valid.   The Court has power to order that its decision on care shall be enforced at once.   If such an order is not made, the Court's decision cannot be enforced until it has acquired legal force.           The provisional care order was submitted to the Regional Administrative Court (länsrätten) of Stockholm for confirmation.           When the Regional Administrative Court examined the case, the applicant and Maria were represented by their legal representatives, the applicant by Mrs.   Birgitta Alexandersson and Maria by Mr.   Ingemar Drogell.   Both are members of the Swedish Bar Association.   On 3 May 1985 the Regional Administrative Court confirmed the provisional care order.           The applicant appealed to the Administrative Court of Appeal (kammarrätten) of Stockholm which on 31 May 1985 rejected the appeal.           The applicant appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court (regeringsrätten) which on 11 July 1985 struck the case off its list of cases as the Regional Administrative Court had in the meantime decided that the applicant's child should be taken into care and the provisional care order was therefore no longer valid.           Decision to deny access           On 14 May 1985 the Social District Council decided to prohibit any contact between the applicant and her child and not to disclose the child's whereabouts to the applicant.           On 27 August 1985 the Regional Administrative Court rejected the applicant's appeal against the Council's decision and gave the following reasons for its decision:   "On 18 June 1985 the Court ordered that Maria Therese Krol should be taken into care under Section 1 of the (1980 Act).   Maria Therese is now living in a family home. The purpose of the care plan is that she may grow up in a stable and safe environment, that she may have access to the different kinds of support and assistance which are offered by society, that she may have a close relationship to a guardian and access to other grown up people, children and a normal social network.   Finally, she will be staying at a place which is not to be revealed until her legal custodian has shown that she is willing to collaborate with the social authorities and until there is no risk that she endangers the purpose of the care.   From what has emerged when the girl was taken into care and from the investigation concerning the intended care the Court finds that the applicant is closely attached to her cohabitee Mr.   G.D. who has acted without self-control and with threats.   These threats could also be aimed at those who are taking care of the child at present.   The Social District Council has written to the applicant on several occasions during the summer in order to establish contact with her and discuss the future of her child.   The applicant does not answer the phone nor does she answer letters.   As the matter of taking the child into care is still being examined by the Administrative Court of Appeal and the situation therefore is still very emotionally infected, the Regional Administrative Court finds that it cannot be excluded that the care of the child might be disturbed if the applicant gets permission to see her daughter and if the whereabouts of the child are revealed. The Regional Administrative Court therefore concludes that there are strong reasons for the standpoint that the custodian shall be prohibited until further notice from seeing the child and that the whereabouts of the child are not to be revealed to the mother, in any case not until the matter of taking the child into care has been finally settled and the mother and Mr.   G.D. have obtained a better understanding of the actions which have been taken.   The appeal should therefore be rejected."           Care order           On 15 May 1985 the Social District Council applied for the Regional Administrative Court's decision to take Maria into care.   The Council alleged that the applicant's mental illness and the conditions in her home involved a considerable risk for the child's health and development.   The Court held an oral hearing in camera. Witnesses were heard.           On 18 June 1985 the Court granted the Council's application. In its judgment the Court summarised its reasons as follows:   "From what has emerged in the case it must be concluded that the applicant is suffering from a mental illness of long duration but that the prognosis for the illness is good. However, no reliable statement can be made concerning the future course of the illness.   The applicant has not been given a clean bill of health but has been conditionally discharged from the Långbro hospital.   From the facts available it must be concluded that she is strongly dependent on Mr.   G.D. who claims that he is the father of her child and has shown that he is very negative to the assistance offered. When considering all aspects of the case the Court therefore finds that the assistance that can be offered to the applicant on a voluntary basis must be disregarded.   Even if the applicant agreed at the hearing to obtaining assistance from a person specially appointed to assist her (stödperson), provided that this person is not appointed by the social authorities, the Court does not find this consent very convincing considering that a similar proposal has been clearly rejected by Mr.   G.D.   It is said in the report that the applicant, after the childbirth, has been aware that she is suffering from a mental illness and that she is unable to take care of the child herself but that 'Mr.   G.D. is a kind man and could take care of the child'.   Even if the applicant, as Dr.   N has stated, would be able to take care of the child under optimal conditions it must be borne in mind that at the present time the applicant and Mr.   G.D. are rejecting the assistance that could be offered to them.   The Court also finds, considering what Mr.   G.D. has stated, that the applicant, due to her health and other social conditions, also in a long-term perspective will not be able to take care of her little child without assistance. The Court therefore finds that there is a danger to the child's health and development as described in Section 1, sub-para. 1, unless the child is taken into care.   The application for taking the child into care under the 1980 Act should therefore be granted."           The above judgment did not include any order as to its immediate enforcement.   Consequently the judgment was not enforceable until it had acquired legal force.   However, the child was kept in care.           The applicant appealed to the Administrative Court of Appeal, both against the care order and the prohibition of contacts with the child.   On 8 October 1985 the Administrative Court of Appeal decided to revoke the judgments of the Regional Administrative Court concerning both the care order and the order relating to contacts with the child.           The Administrative Court of Appeal had held an oral hearing. As new witnesses were heard a former chief physician, Mr.   R.S., who also submitted a written statement to the Court, and Mrs.   A.W., who is a midwife.   The Court concluded that the facts presented in the Court showed that the applicant now was healthy and that the illness from which she had suffered no longer was a cause to take the child into care, nor were her relations with Mr.   G.D.           The Social District Council then appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court referring to new medical certificates.   In the meantime the child was kept in care.           On 15 November 1985 the Deputy Chairman of the Social District Council decided to issue a provisional care order relating to the child pursuant to Section 6 of the 1980 Act.           On 18 November 1985 the Supreme Court refused to grant leave to appeal.           On 19 November 1985 the Social District Council decided to terminate the provisional care and, on 20 November 1985, the child was returned to the applicant.           Following a complaint the Parliamentary Ombudsman (justitie- ombudsmannen) decided on 8 December 1986 to request the Chief Public Prosecutor (överåklagaren)   of the Prosecuting Authority of Stockholm to conduct a preliminary criminal investigation both against the presiding judge of the Regional Administrative Court and the Social District Council.   In his decision the Parliamentary Ombudsman stated inter alia the following:   "It appears from Section 8 of the 1980 Act that a provisional care order ceases to be valid when the court decides on the question of care.   This provision, which entered into force on 1 July 1974, was introduced   as a result of the uncertainty which had prevailed in the question   as to whether a provisional care order continued to be valid after the court had decided on the question of care.   The Regional Administrative Court of Stockholm ordered in its judgment of 18 June 1985 that Maria should be taken into care pursuant to the 1980 Act.   The judgment did not contain any order as to the immediate enforcement of the order.   The President of the Court has stated that this was the result of negligence.      ...   In its present state, it appears from the investigation that (the President of the Court) has been negligent since he has not inserted in the judgment the decision about immediate enforcement which the Court appears to have agreed on.   The President has also not been careful enough when, during the examination of the appeal against the decision on the prohibition of contact, he did not consider that on the facts of the case such a prohibition could not lawfully be maintained.   The circumstances are such that there are reasons to institute a preliminary criminal investigation as regards the question whether in view of these facts (the President) is guilty of the offence of negligent exercise of public power.      ...   (The Deputy Chairman) of the Social District Council ordered in a decision of 15 November 1985 ... that Maria should be taken into care immediately pursuant to Section 6 of the 1980 Act.   The decision appears to have been the result of the fact that the Administrative Court of Appeal decided to quash the decision on care under the 1980 Act.   It can be questioned whether the decision had any basis in law.   Maria has been in care under this decision until 20 November 1985 when she returned home.   As a result of the negligence which has occurred in the Social District Council, as the result of the measures of the Council, the child has been in care against the will of the custodian and without legal basis for such care.   The circumstances are such that there is reason to institute a preliminary criminal investigation concerning negligent exercise of public power."           Subsequently the Chief Public Prosecutor recommended to the Parliamentary Ombudsman that the presiding judge of the Regional Administrative Court as well as the Deputy Chairman of the Social District Council be informed that they were under suspicion of having committed offences when dealing with the applicant's case.   As regards the Deputy Chairman the proposed charge is misuse of public power and, as regards the President of the Court, negligent exercise of public power.           In a decision of 8 July 1987 the Parliamentary Ombudsman decided not to institute any criminal proceedings.   In the decision the Ombudsman concluded:   "Maria has been in care from 18 June to 15 November 1985 without legal basis as a result of the fact that the Regional Administrative Court's omission to order immediate enforcement in its judgment of 18 June 1987 has not been observed.   There is of course reason to look seriously at what has happened.   In connection with the violation of   justice which has occurred it must, however, be taken into account that the care, at least until the Administrative Court of Appeal delivered judgment, has been in accordance with the intention of the Regional Administrative Court and has thus objectively not been without foundation."           As regards the omission of the Regional Administrative Court to order that its judgment should be immediately enforceable the Ombudsman found it established that the Court had examined the issue and that it was the Court's intention that the judgment should be enforceable immediately.   However, the President of the Court had by negligence not included in the judgment an order concerning immediate enforcement.   The Ombudsman considered that this negligence could not be regarded as gross negligence and there were consequently not sufficient reasons for instituting criminal proceedings against him.           The Ombudsman further criticised the Social Council for not having observed that the Regional Administrative Court's judgment did not include an order as to the immediate enforcement of the judgment. It was assumed that the Social Council would amend its routines to avoid such mistakes in the future.           As regards the decision by the Deputy Chairman of the Social District Council of 15 November 1985 to take Maria into care immediately under Section 6 of the 1980 Act, the Parliamentary Ombudsman found that the investigation had shown that new circumstances - the contents of three medical certificates indicating inter alia that a return of the child to the applicant would jeopardise the child's health and development - had occurred after the judgment of the Administrative Court of Appeal, and that consequently there were no reasons to consider that the Deputy Chairman had disregarded the provisions of the 1980 Act when he made the provisional care order.   There were thus no reasons to institute criminal proceedings against the Deputy Chairman.     COMPLAINTS   1.       The applicant alleges that the removal of her new born child, when she was recovering from a ceasarean operation, was inhuman and degrading treatment in breach of Article 3 of the Convention.   2.       The applicant submits that she has not had a fair and public hearing for the determination of the question whether the provisional removal of her child was lawful and just.   She alleges a breach of Article 6 of the Convention.   3.       The applicant alleges that the provisional removal of her child while she was still in hospital is a breach of Article 8 of the Convention.   4.       The applicant, as a practising Catholic, also alleges that the provisional bereavement of her child is a violation of her freedom of religion.   She has allegedly been prevented from baptising her child as quickly as prescribed by her faith.   The applicant alleges a violation of Article 9 of the Convention.   5.       The applicant moreover alleges that her right in Article 12 of the Convention to form a family has been violated.   6.       Finally, she alleges a breach of Article 13 of the Convention. It is submitted that no remedy was available to her since the Supreme Administrative Court removed the case from its case-list without determining the merits.     PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION           The application was introduced with the Commission on 13 August 1985 and registered on 21 August 1985.           By letter which arrived on 28 October 1985, the applicant requested that the Commission take immediate action in the case in view of the fact that the Administrative Court of Appeal had revoked the original care order and the Social District Council nevertheless did not return the child to the applicant.           On 30 October 1985 the Rapporteur of the Commission decided pursuant to Rule 40, para. 2, sub-para. a, of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission to request information from the Government concerning the procedure before the Supreme Administrative Court and the reasons for keeping the child in care.           The Government's reply was dated 20 November 1985 and the applicant's comments were dated 27 November 1985.           On 3 March 1986 the Commission decided to communicate the application to the Government for written observations on the admissibility and merits of the application.           The Government's observations were received by letter dated 15 May 1986 and the applicant's observations in reply were dated 26 June 1986.   A further letter from the Government was received on 18 August 1986.   On 22 December 1986 the Government submitted a further letter enclosing the decision of the Parliamentary Ombudsman of 8 December 1986.   Further letters from the Government were dated 30 April 1987 and 18 August 1987, the latter enclosing the decision of the Ombudsman of 8 July 1987.     SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES   A.     The Government   1.     The Facts           The applicant came to Sweden from Poland in 1980 with her son Robert, born in 1971.   Her marriage with Robert's father in Poland had been dissolved.   In Poland she had been treated for psychiatric illness in hospitals on a few occasions.   Since 1981 she has been in contact with psychiatrists regularly for psychiatric treatment.   From April to July 1984 she was admitted to a psychiatric hospital for compulsory treatment.   Her son Robert attends a public school close to Stockholm.   The social authorities have been in contact with the applicant for several years, inter alia to give her financial assistance.   In 1984 the applicant met Mr.   G.D.   He is 74 years old. He came to Sweden from Hungary in 1956.   He has been married in Sweden but the marriage was dissolved in 1982.   He is Maria's father.           As soon as the social authorities had received information that the applicant was pregnant they considered the possibility of taking the child in care.   A contact was taken with the chief physician, Dr.   J.K., in order to discuss the applicant's ability to take care of the child herself.   The psychiatrist, Dr.   G.N., was also informed.   There was a risk for a psychosis in connection with the delivery.   The social authorities intended to make a close investigation, since they found that there was a considerable risk to the health and development of the child if she were to be left with the applicant and Mr.   G.D.           The day after the child was born the applicant was informed that there was to be an investigation concerning the conditions of the new-born child.   The social authorities suggested that a contact should be established between the family and a social worker appointed by the social authorities.   The applicant declared that she did not wish to have any contact with the social authorities.   On the same day Mr.   G.D. was arrested for having threatened, among others, Dr.   J.K. Mr.   G.D. was also informed about the investigation.   He declared that he was unwilling to collaborate with the social authorities.           After the care order had been revoked the Social District Council suggested a meeting with the applicant on 22 October 1985 in order to plan how the meetings between her and the child should be arranged pending the decision of the Supreme Administrative Court. When the day came, the applicant informed the Council that she was unable to take part in the meeting.           She did not wish to arrange another appointment.   Later she told the Council that she did not want to meet any of its representatives without her counsel, Mr.   Hane, being present.   Later in October a meeting was held and a day was decided when the applicant was to see her child in Stockholm.   The child was brought to Stockholm by her foster parents from Skåne in the south of Sweden.   The applicant however, did not turn up on this occasion.   None of the parents could be found to see the child.           On 11 December 1985 the child's former foster parents asked the Parliamentary Ombudsman (justitieombudsmannen) to examine the way in which the Administrative Court of Appeal had handled the case and its decision of 8 October 1985.   On 14 April 1986 the Ombudsman stated that he found no reason to take any action against the Administrative Court of Appeal.   However, the Ombudsman subsequently started an investigation ex officio to examine how the Social District Council handled the matter.   2.       The Admissibility           The applicant has alleged violations of Articles 3, 6, 8, 9, 12 and 13 of the Convention.   However, these allegations were made before the final decision by the Supreme Administrative Court and the return of the child to her parents.   In his letter to the Commission of 27 November 1985 the applicant's counsel seems to concentrate on the effects of the decision to take the child into immediate care.           The Government have no objection against the application with regard to the six months' rule.   It thus remains to be examined whether the complaint falls within the scope of the Convention, whether the applicant has exhausted domestic remedies or whether the application should be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded.   2.1      Article 3 of the Convention           With respect to the complaint under Article 3 in relation to the decision to take the child immediately into care domestic remedies could be said to be exhausted.   That decision was a preliminary measure which became surpassed by the judgment of the Regional Administrative Court of 18 June 1985.   This also explains why the Supreme Administrative Court struck the case off its list. However, since the Parliamentary Ombudsman has started an investigation of the measures taken by the Social District Council it may be that further actions will be taken.   The Government must therefore make an objection with reference to the domestic remedies' rule.           This objection applies even more in case the alleged violation of Article 3 is related to the other meaures taken by the Swedish authorities.           In case the Commission does not share this view, the Government maintain that the complaint is manifestly ill-founded (cf. below).   2.2      Article 6 of the Convention           The complaint with respect to Article 6 is based on the allegation that "no fair and public hearing has been held for deciding on the legality and justness of the provisional bereavement of the child at the time when the mother was in the hospital".           The Government have in other cases before the Commission questioned whether decisions on care fall within the scope of Article 6 of the Convention.   Even if the Commission should not share this view, the present complaint falls outside the scope of the Convention. The complaint refers to preliminary measures pending a court ruling on an application to submit the child to care under the 1980 Act. However, Article 6 does not require that the guarantees laid down in that Article should be observed in all details also with respect to preliminary or provisional measures taken within the scope of a more overriding matter.           Even if the Commission should consider that the preliminary matter decided by the competent authorities concerned the applicant's civil rights, the question remains whether the decision concerned a "determination" of these civil rights.   The Government are of the opinion - in case the matter concerns civil rights at all - that a "determination" was not made through the preliminary measure taken by the Social District Council or the Regional Administrative Court on 3 May 1985.   If a "determination" was made at all, this determination was made by the Regional Administrative Court after a hearing on 18 June 1985.           The Government are thus of the opinion that the complaint should be rejected as being incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention.   2.3      Article 8 of the Convention           The Government maintain that domestic remedies have not been exhausted.   Reference is made to the investigation by the Parliamentary Ombudsman and to the fact that the applicant has not tried to have the measures taken by the Social District Council before 8 October 1985 or after that date examined by competent organs with a view to assessing whether the measures taken amount to misuse of public power or negligent exercise of public power.   It seems as if the counsel for the applicant is aware of this, since he assumes that the possibilities for mother and child to be granted compensation by Swedish courts are very small.           Under all circumstances the Government maintain that the complaint under Article 8 is manifestly ill-founded (see below).   2.4      Article 9 of the Convention           The Government contend that domestic remedies are not exhausted, since the matters under Article 9 - as far as the Government have been able to establish - were never raised before the Swedish authorities.   In all events the complaint must be manifestly ill-founded.   2.5      Article 12 of the Convention           In the Government's opinion no separate issue arises under Article 12.   The applicant has not been prevented from forming a family.   A decision to take a child into care is in accordance with the Strasbourg case-law considered to fall within the scope of Article 8.   Since no other information is submitted to substantiate the applicant's allegation, the complaint under Article 12 must be considered manifestly ill-founded.   2.6      Article 13 of the Convention           It appears that the complaint under Article 13 is based upon the fact that the Supreme Administrative Court struck from its list the case concerning the preliminary taking of the child into care. However, this matter was by then consumed by the superseding decision by the Regional Administrative Court to take the child into care.   The complaint should therefore be rejected as being incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention.           In any case the applicant did in fact have a remedy, since the provisional decision was examined both by the Regional Administrative Court and the Administrative Court of Appeal.   This should satisfy the requirements of Article 13, in particular taking into consideration that the decision appealed against was a preliminary measure. Alternatively, this part of the application should therefore be rejected as manifestly ill-founded.   3.       The Merits   3.1      Article 3 of the Convention           The immediate decision as well as the judgment of the Regional Administrative Court were made in order to prevent dangers to the health and development of the child as prescribed in the 1980 Act.   The applicant's illness and behaviour gave the social authorities reason to believe that such a danger might occur, if the applicant left the hospital with the child.   She had in fact herself at that stage questioned her own capacity to look after the child but declared that Mr.   G.D. had this capacity.   It appears that it was at that time impossible for the social authorities to establish a trustful way of collaboration in order to assist the applicant.   Under these circumstances the Government maintain that the decision to take the child into care immediately was neither inhuman nor degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention.   3.2      Article 6 of the Convention           The Government contend that this part of the application is inadmissible and abstain at the present stage of the proceedings from further comments.   3.3      Article 8 of the Convention           The Commission has constantly held that decisions to take children away from their parents, placing them under care, is an interference with Article 8 of the Convention.   But in all previous cases the Commission also held that the circumstances of the case, the facts about the children's situation, and the investigations showed that the authorities' decisions were justified under paragraph 2 of Article 8, by the need to care for the health of the children.           Against this legal background, and taking note of the facts regarding the situation of the new-born child and of the reasons as stated by the Regional Administrative Court, the Government maintain that the actions taken by the Social District Council in May 1985 and the Regional Administrative Court on 18 June 1985 were justified and in accordance with the Convention as well as with Swedish law.           The Government find it rather obvious that also when a court's judgment or decision on matters of taking a child into care is reversed by a higher court, this does not mean that the decision or judgment of the lower court has been in violation of the Convention. These questions are often very difficult to decide and it is natural that different opinions can exist.   In the present case it is obvious that the matter was of a complex nature.   To illustrate this the Government refer to the fact that Dr.   N in a written statement on 24 October 1985 - a statement to which the Social District Council referred in appealing against the judgment of the Administrative Court of Appeal - said with reference to the applicant that it was so difficult to assess her ability to look after a child that one assumes responsibility for the child being handed over to the mother unless guarantees were given that the authorities would make continuous observations concerning the child's conditions.           As far as the denial of contacts between the applicant and her child is concerned the Government note that the original decision on this matter was taken by the Social District Council on 14 May 1985. This decision was upheld by the Regional Administrative Court on 27 August 1985 but quashed by the Administrative Court of Appeal on 8 October 1985.   The decision was thus valid for almost five months.           In the Government's opinion the decision in question was based on the same facts as the decision to take the child into care.   The authorities feared that the applicant and, indeed, Mr.   G.D. could take actions that would seriously jeopardise the aim of the care.   The Government also emphasise that the Regional Administrative Court expressly stated that the whereabouts of the child could not be revealed to the mother "in any case not until the matter of taking the child into care has been finally settled ... ".           In view of the circumstances the Government maintain that the decision to deny contacts between the applicant and her child and the decision to take the child into care should be seen in the same context and - from the Regional Administrative Court's point of view - as quite logical.   As it turned out, the Administrative Court of Appeal did not share the opinion of the lower court, but this is another matter.           With reference to these observations the Government submit that the measures taken were in conformity with Article 8 of the Convention.           Since the Regional Administrative Court did not state that its judgment should be enforced immediately it can be questioned whether the keeping of the child in care after 18 June 1985 was in accordance with Swedish law.   If the Social District Council from that date or from the date of the judgment of the Administrative Court of Appeal, ie. 8 October 1985, has acted contrary to the Swedish law it cannot be said that the Convention has been violated until an internal investigation is completed and all domestic remedies have been exhausted.   As said before this is not the case.           The Government add the following.   The interrelation between the rules on care and the rules on provisional care orders has caused some confusion.   Amendments have been made and a commission's proposal for further amendments is considered within the Ministry for Health and Social Welfare.   Even if an investigation leads to the conclusion that in the present case the Social District Council has acted contrary to the law, this does not automatically permit the conclusion that the requirement "in accordance with the law" in Article 8 para. 2 is not fulfilled.   Member States have a considerable margin of appreciation in designing their domestic system.           To illustrate this idea, the Government give the following hypothetical example.   It should be possible under the Convention to prescribe e.g. that a child living with foster parents under care should stay with them until a judgment restoring the custody of the natural parents gains legal force in order to avoid the risk that the child - after a possible reversal of the judgment by a higher court - is sent back from the parents to the foster home. Under such circumstances the expression "in accordance with the law" should be recognised in a broader perspective, while the control of the details of the system should be left to the Member States.   3.4      Article 9 of the Convention           The Government maintain that there is no violation of Article 9.   The facts presented by the applicant are not sufficient to tell what efforts she has made to have the child baptized or in what way this has been prevented by the authorities.   In fact, the files of the case do not hold any information suggesting that questions related to the rights under Article 9 were ever raised by the applicant.   3.5      Article 12 of the Convention           The Government contend that there is no violation of Article 12.   3.6      Article 13 of the Convention           The Government contend that this part of the application should be rejected as manifestly ill-founded.   4.       Conclusions           The Government conclude:        -   that the application is inadmissible for falling outside the scope         of the Convention (Articles 6 and 13), alternatively for failure to         observe the domestic remedies rule (Articles 3, 8 and 9),         alternatively for being manifestly ill-founded, and        -   that there is no violation of the Convention.     B.       The Applicant   1.       The Facts           The applicant points out that when the child was taken away from her on 24 April 1985 there was a factual separation between them due to the fact that the applicant did not know where her child was kept.   This was so in spite of the fact that it was not until 14 May 1985 that the Social District Council decided to prevent any contact between the applicant and her child.   Such a decision had in practice been applied as from 24 April.           The applicant tried as much as possible to hide her pregnancy from Dr.   K since she feared that the child would be taken away from her.   This fear appears to be justified since already before the birth of the child the staff of the social authorities had decided to take it into care.   Dr.   G.N. was thus appointed behind the back of the applicant as a psychiatric consultant.           In their testimonies before both the Regional Administrative Court and the Administrative Court of Appeal Dr.   K and Dr.   G.N. stated that no-one had been asked or consulted as to the question whether the child should be taken away from the mother but they were only told this when the measures had been implemented by the social workers.           During her first six days together with the applicant and the two following days at the children's hospital there were no requests as to the need for an investigation of the physical status of the newborn child.   It is true that Mr.   G.D., the child's father, was arrested on the same day as the child was born as a result of his expressing   severe dissatisfaction with the doctor K.   However, subsequently, the Svea Court of Appeal (hovrätt) has acquitted Mr. G.D. of the alleged criminal offence.           When the Chairman of the Social District Council had considered that there was a serious risk for the child's health this was an allegation which had not been investigated and which the mother had had no opportunity to refute.   According to Dr.   G.N. she was healthy during the whole time he was in contact with her, that is to say during the birth and also for a long time thereafter.           The fact that the lawyer, Mr.   Drogell, as an official counsel for the newly born child consented to the decision about immediate care shows how treacherous the Swedish system is with a lawyer appointed for the child.   Mr.   Drogell has for obvious reasons had no contacts or connections with the newly born child but rather appears as a hostile lawyer towards the parents allied with their counter party.   The unit child-parent is thereby broken.           As regards the Regional Administrative Court's judgment of 18 June 1985 the applicant invokes a medical certificate dated 2 June 1985 issued by Dr.   R. S.   His final assessment is that there are insufficient reasons for separating the applicant from her child. In the reasons of the Regional Administrative Court this is not mentioned.   Neither is the fact that none of the two doctors heard by the Regional Administrative Court wanted to disqualify the applicant as custodian as a result of her mental illness.           The decision of 15 November 1985 of the Deputy Chairman of the Social District Board about immediate care of the child shows that the parents are without legal rights.   It also shows how easily a judgment by a court can be set aside without anything having happened in the meantime apart from the dissatisfaction of the authorities with the judgment of the court.   2.       The Admissibility   2.1      Article 3 of the Convention           The taking into care of the child occurred when the mother and the child were in the hospital.   There were other alternative ways of helping and giving care to the mother and the child if this was necessary.   The applicant had no chance to defend herself and her child.   The examination of the Parliamentary Ombudsman is in no way a remedy for the applicant.   The preliminary character of the decision can in no way change the fact that it concerns a small baby who completely a