CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 24 janvier 1986

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on 24 January 1986, the following members being present:             MM. C. A. NØRGAARD, President               G. SPERDUTI               J. A. FROWEIN               G. JÖRUNDSSON               S. TRECHSEL               B. KIERNAN               A. WEITZEL               H. DANELIUS               G. BATLINER               H. VANDENBERGHE         Mrs.   G. H. THUNE          Sir   Basil HALL   Mr. H. C. KRÜGER Secretary to the Commission   Having regard to Art. 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (art. 25);   Having regard to the application introduced on 31 July 1985 by N.M. against the United Kingdom and registered on 27 November 1985 under file N° 11864/85;   Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 40 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission;   Having deliberated;   Decides as follows:   THE FACTS   The applicant is a United Kingdom citizen, born in 1945.   He lives in Staffordshire and describes himself as a company director.   The facts of the application, as they have been submitted by the applicant and may be deduced from the documents supplied by him, may be summarised as follows:   In 1980, the applicant's company was sued by another company ("the plaintiff company").   The applicant, claiming a personal interest in the action, was added as a second defendant.   The trial took place on 21 May 1984, when judgment was given against the applicant's company and against him.   The applicant applied to have the Order of 21 May 1984 set aside, but that application was refused on 10 August 1984 as the applicant should have appealed formally.   A notice of appeal dated 30 November 1984 was submitted in which the applicant also requested an extension of time in which to appeal.   A single judge of the Court of Appeal considered the evidence and the judge at first instance's decision and found on 15 February 1985 that the appeal would have no realistic chance of of success at all and that leave to appeal out of time should not be granted.   The full Court of Appeal on 29 April 1985 agreed with the single judge.   On 24 October 1985 a further hearing was held in which a judge in chambers first refused an application for the original order of 21 May 1984 to be dismissed (there being no power to make such an order).   A request for a committal order against the plaintiff company's lawyers and an unnamed officer of the court in the Leeds District Registry was also refused.   That second application was by way of an appeal from an order of a District Registrar which itself dismissed a summons by the applicant requesting an indemnity for the applicant from the plaintiff company's lawyers in respect of costs.   As a corollory to the above proceedings, the applicant is being pressed by the bankers to his company for payment of various sums in connection with guarantees made by the applicant in respect of his company's lending from the bank.   COMPLAINTS   The applicant complains of the hearings before the various courts from 1984 to 1985.   He also alleges a conspiracy on the part of the bank in that the bank is also banker to the plaintiff company.   The applicant alleges violations of Arts. 8 (art. 8), 13 (art. 13) and 14 (art. 14) of the Convention.   THE LAW   To the extent that the applicant complains about the activities of his company's bank, the Commission recalls that, under Art. 25, para. 1 of the Convention (art. 25-1), it may only admit an application from a person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals, where the applicant alleges a violation by one of the Contracting Parties of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention and where that party has recognised the competence of the Commission.   The Commission may not, therefore, admit applications directed against corporate bodies such as a bank.   In this respect the Commission refers to its consistent case-law (see e.g. Dec. Nos. 172/56, Yearbook I, p. 211 and 3925/69, Collection 32 p. 36, 58).   It follows that this part of the application is incompatible ratione personae with the Convention within the meaning of Art. 27, para. 2 of the Convention (art. 27-2).   The applicant also complains about the proceedings in which he has been involved before the United Kingdom courts.   However, the Commission is not required to decide whether or not the facts alleged by the applicant disclose any appearance of a violation of the Convention as Art. 26 of the Convention (art. 26) provides that the Commission "may only deal with a matter ... within a period of six months from the date on which the final decision was taken". According to the Commission's consistent case-law the "final decision" within the meaning of Art. 26 (art. 26) refers solely to the final decision involved in the exhaustion of all domestic remedies according to the generally recognised rules of international law.   In particular, only a remedy which is "effective and sufficient" can be considered for this purpose (see e.g. Dec. No. 918/60, Collection 32 pp. 108-110 and No. 654/59, Yearbook IV, p.277, 283).   The Commission finds that, in the present case, the applicant's request on 30 November 1984 for an extension of time in which to appeal which was refused on 15 February 1985 and all subsequent hearings could not constitute an effective remedy under the generally recognised rules of international law because they were all brought either out of time or in circumstances in which there was no competence to consider them. Consequently, the decisions regarding these further applications and summons cannot be taken into consideration in determining the date of the final decision for the purposes of applying the six months time limit laid down in Art. 26 (art. 26). The final decision regarding the applicant's disputes with the plaintiff company is accordingly the decision of the judge of first instance of 21 May 1984, whereas the present application was submitted to the Commission only on 31 July 1985.   Furthermore, an examination of the case does not disclose the existence of any special circumstances which might have interrupted or suspended the running of that period.   It follows that this part of the application has been introduced out of time and must be rejected under Art. 27, para. 3 of the Convention (art. 27-3).   For these reasons, the Commission   DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE   Secretary to the Commission          President of the Commission       (H. C. KRÜGER)                        (C. A. NØRGAARD)