In the light of the [ Engel ] criteria, the Constitutional Court concludes that disciplinary proceedings against judges of the general courts are not proceedings for the determination of

In doing so it examined whether the surcharge proceedings were “criminal” within the autonomous meaning of the Article, and to this end relied on three criteria, commonly known as the “ Engel criteria”

In so doing, the Court will have regard to the three alternative criteria laid down in Engel and Others v.   the   Netherlands (8 June 1976, § 82, Series A no.

The Court’s established case-law sets out three criteria, commonly known as the “ Engel criteria” (see Engel and Others v. the Netherlands , 8   June 1976, §   82, Series   A no. 22), to

classification of the proceedings in domestic law, their essential nature, and the degree of severity of the potential penalty (see, among many other authorities on the concept of a “criminal charge”, Engel

The Court’s established case-law sets out three criteria, commonly known as the “ Engel criteria”, to be considered in determining whether or not there was a “criminal charge” (see Engel and   Others

reiterates that the question whether the criminal head of Article 6 applies to contempt of court proceedings has to be assessed in the light of the three alternative criteria laid down by the Court in the Engel

Norway and Orr , all cited above), it does not find on the basis of the three so-called Engel criteria (namely the classification of the proceedings in domestic law, their essential nature, and the degree

It does not concern mere restrictions upon liberty of movement, which are addressed by Article 2 of Protocol no. 4 (see Engel and Others v.

Court HR, Engel v. the Netherlands judgment of 23 November 1976, Series A no. 22, p. 34, para. 81).

    The Court reiterates that the assessment of the applicability of Article   6 under its criminal limb is based on three criteria, commonly known as the Engel criteria (see Engel and Others

    The Court reiterates that an assessment of whether Article   6 is engaged under its criminal limb should be based on three criteria, commonly known as the “ Engel criteria” (see Engel

necessary to have regard to three factors: the legal classification of the measure in question in national law, the very nature of the measure, and the nature and degree of severity of the “penalty” (see Engel

However, the list set out in Article 14 is illustrative and not exhaustive, as is shown by the words “any ground such as” (in French “ notamment ”) (see Engel and Others , cited above, § 72; and Carson

reiterates that the question whether the criminal head of Article 6 applies to the contempt of court proceedings has to be assessed in the light of three alternative criteria laid down by the Court in the Engel

Those limitations do not in themselves run counter to the States’ obligations under the Convention (see Engel and Others v.   the   Netherlands , 8 June 1976, § 57, Series A no. 22).

stipulates that "everyone within <the> jurisdiction" of the Contracting States must enjoy the rights and freedoms in Section I "without discrimination on any ground" (see, mutatis mutandis, the Engel

Convention does not apply in principle to disciplinary proceedings, unless, having regard to the autonomy of the concept "criminal charge", a disciplinary offence belongs to the criminal sphere (see Engel

The judgment went on to apply “the Engel criteria” (see Engel and Others v. the Netherlands , judgment of 8 June 1976, Series A no. 22).