The Court reiterated that the evidentiary standard of proof required for the purposes of the Convention was proof “beyond reasonable doubt”.

On 29 and 30 April 1992 the expert Prof G.J. presented his report orally.

On 2 November 2000 Plovdiv District Court dismissed the applicant’s action and refused compensation on the ground that he had failed to adduce sufficient proof that he had suffered non ‑ pecuniary

Another gynaecologist expert retained by the applicant’s lawyer reached the conclusion that the injuries suffered by the applicant had clearly been the proof of sexual intercourse.

However, this decision was overturned on 24 January 2006, in so far as the legal fees had in fact been paid in due time, the proof of payment having been ignored by the lower court.

To assess this evidence, it has generally applied the standard of proof “beyond reasonable doubt” (see Talat Tepe v. Turkey , no. 31247/96, § 48, 21 December 2004).

The domestic courts tried to make a distinction between them but went on to examine as the principal criterion whether the applicant’s value judgments were truthful, placing the burden of proof upon the

To assess this evidence, the Court adopts the standard of proof “beyond reasonable doubt” but adds that such proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences

Est présumée d'origine professionnelle toute maladie désignée dans un tableau de maladies profes-sionnelles et contractée dans les conditions mentionnées à ce tableau.

Si la commune soutient en défense que le règlement du PPRIF des Monts de Vaucluse interdit toute construction, il ressort au contraire des extraits qu'elle cite que les locaux à vocation agricole sont

Had the court correctly assessed the meaning of the incriminated passage, it would have concluded that the applicants had furnished proof of its factual basis.

Its representative argued that all relevant documents had been destroyed and that the onus of proof as regards the deposit of the coins lay on the applicant.

  If a chief officer's memorandum states that he proposes to prefer disciplinary charges or has done so, it shall be his duty to prefer and proceed with them (s. 90(10) ibid.).

  The medical expert Prof. K. confirmed the applicant's physical capacity to participate in the proceedings.

    The standard of proof In the leading domestic decision, Re H (Minors) (Sexual Abuse: Standard of Proof) [1996] AC 563, the House of Lords considered that: “When assessing the probabilities

The court agreed with the findings of the Agency and considered that a lower standard of proof regarding an applicant’s identity could be applied, in accordance with the domestic case-law (see MIG 2012

However, the applicant stated before the court that it did not have any proof.

       The Commission notes that the guilty plea of F.S. was admitted as proof that F.S. had committed a tax evasion on the UK Revenue and thus direct evidence that there was a

The letter of 5 February 2008 did not constitute such proof (see paragraph 16 above).

The applicant also complains that, although the proceedings were criminal in nature, the civil standard of proof applied.